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MAN'S PREDICAMENT IN EDEN

JAMES B. PRITCHARD

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THERE IS NO MORE BAFFLING STORY in the entire Bible than that of Adam and Eve in the garden, told with such consummate literary skill in the second and third chapters of Genesis. The traditional interpretation of this bit of primeval history, suggested by the title, "the fall of man," which, for several centuries, has been placed over chapter three of Genesis in the English Bible, is that the story has to do with sin and its origin; the drama of Eden is a tragedy, in which man through disobedience lost—at least temporarily—his chance for true happiness and for immortality.

Seventy years ago, Julius Wellhausen, in his famous *Prolegomena,* boldly challenged this interpretation by asserting that the story has to do with civilization—not with sin—and must be read in the light of man's cultural history. In a word, "As the human race goes forward in civilization, it goes backward in the fear of God." A half-century later, the distinguished German orientalist, Hugo Gressmann, following in the tradition of Wellhausen's interpretation, asserted that the writer of this Hebrew myth saw that "all progress of mankind must be purchased through revolution or 'sin.' " Gressmann concluded that the writer of this ancient story had very well observed that "knowledge is indeed the mortal enemy of all religion."[1] This interpretation clearly jettisons the language of—if not some of the argument for—the traditional doctrine of man.

There have appeared recently two significant attempts to understand the paradise story. Th. C. Vriezen published in 1937 a monograph in Dutch, *Investigation of the Idea of Paradise among the Ancient Semitic Peoples.*[2] Unfortunately this remarkable work, characterized as it is by such a wide knowledge of the comparative materials and such reserve in its conclusions, has not been widely noticed in America, because of the isolation which the war has imposed upon the work of scholars on the Continent. The other recent work, written in French,

1. *Die Christliche Welt,* 40 (1926), 844-45.

2. *Onderzoek naar de Paradijsvoorstilling bij de oude Semietische Volken* (Wageningen, 1937).

is by Paul Humbert, *Studies on the Story of Paradise and the Fall in Genesis*,[3] which, although it was published in Switzerland in 1940, has only recently been circulated widely in this country. Now that these two serious studies are becoming available to biblical scholars, it may be appropriate to take stock of the progress of research on the paradise story and to attempt to evaluate the results which the various inquiries have produced.

It is apparent from the contents of the paradise myth that there are incorporated in it traditions which reach far back into the early history of Hebrew life and thought. But the impact of the ideas of the story was not felt until a late period in the development of Israel's religion. In the entire pre-exilic literature—including the prophets, who often were concerned with sin and its origin—there is not a single reference to this story. Ezekiel contains a reference to some of the material used in the paradise story, but the case for dependence is not clear.[4] In only two other places in the canonical literature of the Old Testament is there any reference to the idea of the fall of man in Genesis.[5] Not until the second century B. C. are there indications that the story was being used in theological circles. Ben Sira probably had in mind the story of the fall when he remarks that "sin began with a woman, and because of her we all die."[6] In the book of IV Ezra there are several references to Adam's creation and to his fall, and here, for the first time, appears one of the more familiar interpretations of the ancient story: "O Adam, what have you done? For although it was you who sinned, the fall was not yours alone, but also ours, for we are descended from you."[7] According to the interpretation of Judaism at the turn of the era, death came as man's fate because of Adam's sin, but there is not the slightest intimation of the later doctrine, which can be traced to Augustine, that Adam's nature underwent a change with the fall, and that this changed nature was transmitted to all his descendants.

The Pauline use of the paradise story is too well known to describe in detail. The figure of the "first Adam" follows the lines already

3. *Etudes sur le récit du paradis et de la chute dans la Genèse* (Neuchatel, 1940).
4. 28:11-19.
5. Isa. 43:27 and possibly Job 15:7-8.
6. 25:24.
7. 7:118.

drawn in Judaism: Death came into the world through Adam. With Augustine the story of Adam's fall came into the foreground of theological discussion. At the very beginning of Book XIV of *The City of God,* Augustine makes clear his view regarding the result of the disobedience of the first pair in Eden: ". . . for by them so great a sin was committed, that by it the human nature was altered for the worse, and was transmitted also to their posterity, liable to sin and subject to death." This alteration of human nature by the first disobedience is evidenced by man's constant disobedience to himself. That man is unable to control himself is best illustrated by lust, a sin suggested by the story in Genesis. For thirteen chapters Augustine continues with a most detailed discussion of lust; this, he argues, all men have inherited from the altered nature of Adam.

A recent controversy has taken place over the justification of Adam's choice. In 1926 there began a debate between Emil Brunner and L. Köhler in the pages of the *Kirchenblatt für die reformierte Schweiz.* There Brunner defined the nature of the transgression:

> And indeed sin against God alone, the outrageous encroachment of man upon the dominion which God reserved for himself alone, sin, the essence of which is that man will not recognize the boundary between him and God, that he infringes upon the divine secret of life, that he desires to get behind the knowledge which lies on the other side of that which for him is a healthy zone.

The debate, which had begun in Switzerland, was transferred to Germany, where, in *Die Christliche Welt,* Gressmann and Karl Budde contributed articles. In his reply to Brunner, Gressmann finds himself in full agreement in interpreting the nature of Adam's transgression, but he takes his stand on the side of the man and justifies him rather than the divine being of the story. Man had to be disobedient to this type of tyranny in order to become himself. The sin is the deity's for seeking to withhold the blessing of knowledge from man. Why had not the divine being given man the life and knowledge which he himself possessed? With these and other criticisms and questions Gressman rejects completely the traditional equation of the character, Lord God, in the paradise story with the concept of the divine being which is regnant in contemporary Judaism and Christianity.

The impasse reached in this extended debate of two decades ago emphasizes the need for a better understanding of the views of the author who put this story into its present form. No valid conclusion can

be drawn until every possible attempt has been made to understand the text of Genesis 2:4b—3:24. The Hebrew text itself is, when compared with other sections of the Bible, well preserved; in very few places are there any grammatical difficulties. Nor do the ancient versions differ radically from the Masoretic text. On the whole, textual criticism has little to offer by way of an improved or emended text. Texts and versions agree—except for minor details—that the text as it appears is essentially the story as it was last edited.

LITERARY ANALYSIS

A popular method for attempting to get at the meaning of the story in Genesis 2-3 has been that of literary analysis. Underlying this method of criticism is the assumption that the editor who cast the story in its present form had an older source to which he made additions reflecting his own views, or that he had two or more sources which he utilized to form the narrative as it now appears. Literary criticism is concerned with identifying and labeling these sources.

Almost without exception, critics are inclined to consider the paragraph 2:10—14, which describes the river which flowed from Eden to water the garden and then became the source for the four rivers, as a gloss, a kind of geographical excursus, and without any essential connection with the story. R. H. Pfeiffer accepts the remainder of the narrative—with the possible exception of 3:20, 23, verses which contain the incident of naming the first woman, and the first statement of the expulsion from the garden—and assigns it to a strand of Genesis which he calls S, a non-Israelitic source of primitive tales of an aetiological character.[8] Karl Budde, who for fifty years was concerned with biblical primeval history,[9] accepts most of the story through 3:19. At this point he drops out the naming of Eve, clothing the pair with skins, the tree of life, the second expulsion, and the placing of the guards. He then introduces 6:3 and makes the story end with the expulsion in 3:23.[10] The fruit of Budde's analysis is a well-knit narrative in which the tree of knowledge figures; the story of the tree of life he considers as a sub-

8. *Introduction to the Old Testament*, p. 160.

9. *Die biblische Urgeschichte* appeared in 1883.

10. See *Die biblische Paradiesesgeschichte*, pp. 89-91, where he makes minor emendations and omits 2:5b, 9b*, 10-14, 15bβ; 3:20-22, 24. The asterisk indicates that only part of the verse or stich is referred to.

stitute introduced by a redactor in place of the ending of the original story. Of all those who have analyzed the story, none has considered the evidence of the text and versions with more painstaking care than has Budde. He has subjected every detail of the narrative to the most careful scrutiny. He emphatically concludes that the paradise story is a unity which cannot be divided into separate primary sources.

The activity of literary critics has more frequently resulted in a division of the material into two sources. But here the results are diverse. H. Gunkel[11] is one who makes a twofold division into Je *(Hauptquelle)* and Jj *(Nebenquelle);* yet his primary source is not unlike the narrative which results from Budde's criticism. It is essentially the paradise story without the element of the tree of life.[12] To the secondary source, Jj, belongs the material about the tree of life in the garden.[13] On the other hand, R. Smend[14] takes the position that the tree-of-life motif is the older source and retains for this older source only a few verses.[15] A large portion of the remaining material he assigns to a later source.

O. Eissfeldt has divided the story along quite different lines. One source, which he calls L, contains the material which has to do with the creation of man, the garden, the temptation and sin, the curse on Adam, the tree-of-life motif, and the expulsion.[16] To the J source he assigns the section about the rivers and the account of the creation of woman from man.[17] A later attempt to allot the various elements to two sources is that of J. Begrich.[18] Begrich takes the story of the temptation in 3:1—17a as a unit which, he believes, is free from doublets—and therefore the earlier source—and adds to it a number of other verses which exhibit some affinity to this basic material;[19] this is called Je, or the *Hauptfaden.* Begrich's secondary narrative is composed of material concerning the expulsion of man from the garden.[20] He argues that,

11. *Genesis,* 3 (1910), 4-24.

12. 2:4b, (5), 6, (7), 9*, 15-16, 17*, (18-24), 25; 3:1-18, 19aβ, 23, 24*.

13. 2:8; 3:19aαb, 21, 22, 24*. The sections 2:10-14 and 3:20 belong to other sources.

14. *Die Erzählung des Hexateuch.*

15. 2:4b-9abα; 3:17-19*, 21, 22, 24.

16. 2:4b-5aαbα, 7*, 8*, 9, 6, 16, 17, 25; 3:1-17a, 18a, 19aαb, 22, 24*. For this division see his *Hexateuch-Synopse,* (Leipzig, 1922).

17. 2:5aβbβ, 7*, 8*, 10-15, 18-24; 3:17b, 18b, 19aβ, (20-21), 23, 24*.

18. "Die Paradieserzählung," in *ZAW* 50 (1932), 93-116.

19. 2:4b, 5*, 6*, 7, 8, 16, 17*, 18-25; 3:1-17, 19ab, (21), 23, 24*.

20. 2:5*, 9, 15; 3:18, 19c, 22, 24*.

since there is no mention of the expulsion of woman and of the serpent, the expulsion of man is a distinct narrative which was combined with the story of the temptation of the woman by the serpent. It was in the combining of the two sources that man was made to partake of the sin of the woman.

In Paul Humbert's studies of the paradise story, there is a careful analysis of fourteen supposed doublets in these two chapters of Genesis and the conclusion that there are but two real ones. While Humbert's chief contribution lies in his careful consideration of some of the perplexing elements of the story, as the meaning of "the knowledge of good and evil," and the question of the mortality of primitive man, he too makes a new attempt to divide the story into two sources. First he sees evidence for a creation myth,[21] along with which there is a paradise myth.[22]

One further illustration of the results of literary analysis will suffice. In 1931, Hans Schmidt made an attempt to analyze the contents of the story.[23] He sees two foci: first, the creation of woman; second, the tree or the trees in the garden of God. The first account[24] is not properly a creation story but an attempt at explaining the powerful attraction of man for woman. Woman is a vital part of man; she is his rib. The second narrative[25] is concerned with "the knowledge of good and evil," a phrase which Schmidt interprets as the knowledge of the differentiation of the sexes. To these two narratives was added a third, that dealing with the tree of life.[26] He interprets the tree of life not as that which will give immortality to those who eat of its fruit, but as a tree whose fruit gives man the power to reproduce and thus to create life.

When one considers the number of attempts made to analyze this material on the basis of literary analysis—and others could be listed—it is no wonder that there should appear a reaction to the futility of this approach. In 1933, P. Volz and W. Rudolph objected to the dissection of the literary critics on the grounds that it was an unnatural method, that it worked with inaccurate means, that there were better

21. 2:4b-7, 9a, 15, 18-24; 3:20.
22. 2:8, 9b, 16, 17, 25; 3:1-19, 21-24.
23. *Die Erzählung von Paradies und Sündenfall.*
24. 2:18-24 and 2:4b-5, 7.
25. 2:8a-9*, 16-17, 25; 3:1-18a, 19, 24a.
26. 2:6, 8a*, 9bα, 15; 3:18b, 19bβ, 20, 21, 23, 24b.

means available, and that the method of source analysis *(Quellenscheidung)* often destroyed the actual unity and artistic beauty of the narrative.[27] In the following year there appeared the commentary of B. Jacob on the assumption that "Genesis is a unified work, designed, thought over, and worked out in one mind."[28] In Italy, U. Cassuto exhibited a similar reaction against the prevailing method of literary analysis.[29]

It is not necessarily to the discredit of the documentary method as a useful tool in other parts of the Hexateuch that it has failed, in these two chapters, to give results which have been generally accepted as of objective validity. Some of the conjectures as to the literary sources are extremely clever, but with very few exceptions none has commended itself to any general acceptance. Source analysis has led to almost complete anarchy. The net results from this method can hardly be said to justify the vast expenditure of effort. Almost every conceivable division of the material has been suggested, but each suggestion is doomed to remain in the realm of conjecture until some actual documents used by the Hebrew writer are turned up. That we shall ever have these is extremely unlikely.

COMPARATIVE RELIGION AND FOLKLORE

Another means employed in an attempt to understand the biblical story has been that of comparative religion and folklore. Sir James G. Frazer amasses a wealth of comparative materials from widely separated sources and brings them to bear upon the narrative in Genesis in his *Folk-lore in the Old Testament* (1918). On the basis of stories current among Hottentots, Bushmen, and other primitive tribes, he reconstructs the "true original story." There are two trees, the tree of death and the tree of life. The serpent was sent by God to the man and woman with the message to eat not of the tree of death but of the tree of life and so live forever. The wise serpent perverted the message, ate of the tree of life himself, and gained the immortality which the deity had planned for man. To justify this radical alteration Frazer assembles a number of primitive stories dealing with the themes of the perverted

27. *Der Elohist als Erzähler: ein Irrweg der Pentateuchkritik*, pp. 13-14.
28. *Das erste Buch der Tora, Genesis*, p. 10.
29. *La questione della Genesi*, (Florence, 1934).

message and the cast skin, a motif which appears frequently to explain why it is that serpents obtained and men missed immortality. Upon finishing his reconstruction, Frazer states that, if his interpretation is correct, "it has been left for the comparative method, after thousands of years, to supply the blank in the ancient canvas, and to restore, in all their primitive crudity, the gay barbaric colours which the skillful hand of the Hebrew artist had softened or effaced." Frazer's bold and enthusiastic attempt to restore the "gay barbaric colours" of the original with which the Hebrew artist worked has all but been forgotten in the thirty years since it was made. His comparative material was too far removed in time and in space from sources of the biblical story. Frazer's "original" for the paradise story remains only as a curiosity among the many attempts to elucidate the meaning of the myth, and perhaps as a warning for all those who would draw parallels at too great a distance.

Arthur Geddes recently renewed the use of the anthropological method in an article, "Creation, the Blessing or the Curse upon Fruitfulness: an Anthropological Interpretation of Genesis 1—11," published in *Man*.[30] Geddes cites a number of examples of the use of fertility symbolism among certain contemporary primitive tribes. Since a Bantu tribe makes aprons of leaves from a sacred fig tree to insure fruitfulness, he believes that " 'our first parents' chose fig leaves because they wanted a baby." This undisciplined use of comparative material will not readily commend itself to the serious student.

A more probable parallel has been drawn between Eve and Pandora. A monography by Hermann Türck, *Pandora und Eva,* (1931), deals with the relevant mythology preserved in Hesiod. Prometheus, the Greek hero, steals the fire from heaven in a hollow fennel stalk and thus outwits Zeus, who was jealous of his own prerogatives. Thereupon, according to Hesiod, Zeus made an evil but beautiful thing for men as a price for fire. This creation was a woman from whom came "the deadly race and tribe of women who live amongst mortal men to their great trouble, no helpmeets in hateful poverty, but only in wealth."[31] Another version of this same myth, given by Hesiod in *Works and Days,* tells of the molding of the first woman from clay, the endowment of her by the gods with numerous graces, the evil gifts which the gods

30. 45 (1945), 123-28.
31. *Theogony,* lines 591 ff. (Loeb edition).

sent to man in a jar, and the giving of the name Pandora. According to Hesiod the story goes:

> For ere this the tribes of men lived on earth remote and free from ills and hard toil and heavy sicknesses which bring the Fates upon men. . . . But the woman took off the great lid of the jar with her hands and scattered all these and her thought caused sorrow and mischief to men. Only Hope (*elpis*) remained there in an unbreakable home within under the rim of the great jar. . . .[32]

Some similarities to the biblical paradise story are obvious: man's primeval happiness, the creation of a human being out of clay, a jealous deity, disobedience or theft, woman as the bearer or cause of evil. Türck draws attention to another similarity between the biblical and Greek myths. He sees a strong similarity between the concept of *elpis*, implying as it does both hope and fear (when colored with bright expectations, it is hope; when the future is dark, it is fear), and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil in the paradise story. The implication of the term "knowledge of good and evil" is that man, having eaten of the fruit of the tree, became subject to a life which tottered between hope and fear. It is this fate of man, to be tossed about by the uncertainty of *elpis* and of good and evil, which Türck sees as the common denominator of the two myths. While this is an ingenious exposition of the phrase, "knowledge of good and evil," its weakness lies in the fact that it is made on the basis of Greek rather than of Semitic thought. As will soon be apparent there are older prototypes of many of the similar motifs found in these bits of Greek and Hebrew mythology.

Thus far there have been described some of the major attempts at understanding the paradise story by means of literary analysis into hypothetical sources and by comparisons with stories from comparative religion and folklore. The results of the minute dissection by literary critics have been too subjective to command any widespread or general acceptance, and the attempts of such a great folklorist as Sir James Frazer to elucidate the meaning of these two chapters in Genesis have proved abortive. Is there any other means of criticism which will serve as a key to the meaning which this myth had for ancient Israel?

32. Lines 90 ff. (Loeb edition).

CUNEIFORM AND ARCHEOLOGICAL SOURCES

It has long been noticed that there are in this biblical story a number of mythological concepts—formation of the first man out of clay, trees bearing fruit possessing magical properties, making of a woman from a rib, the wise serpent, a garden as the abode of a god—many of which are evident in the mythological literature of other Semitic and pre-Semitic people. It is only when the modern inquirer utilizes all the available evidence from ancient sources to determine the connotations which these separate elements bore, that he is able to come to any valid conclusion with regard to the peculiar cast which the Hebrew writers gave to this more ancient material. This is a task of comparison and of contrast. That various elements of the resulting Hebrew mosaic can now be identified as pieces of mythology long known in the ancient Near East is a concession which in no way detracts from the genius of the artisan who put them together according to his own pattern. The Hebraic stamp has been placed indelibly on the material; this is a fact which should not be lost sight of amid the enthusiasm over the discovery of many ancient parallels.

At this point Vriezen's work is most significant. He has judicially assembled a wealth of evidence for the representations among other ancient Semitic peoples of the various motifs of the biblical paradise story. In many places the more recent development in the understanding of ancient texts has altered the picture, but, on the whole, Vriezen's work is the most useful guide to the vast material now available to the student.

From the first half of the second millennium B.C. there comes a cuneiform tablet, the alleged significance of which is to be seen in the title, *Sumerian Epic of Paradise, the Flood and the Fall of Man,* which Stephen Langdon gave to his publication of it in 1915. Three decades of debate over the meaning of this tablet, less colorfully known as Nippur 4561, has rendered less certain the connection implied in Langdon's bold title. S. N. Kramer, in the latest treatment of this text, has more soberly labeled it *Enki and Ninhursag: A Sumerian "Paradise" Myth.* The setting of the myth is in the land of Dilmun, a place of abundant plenty, of peaceful rest; the plot is concerned with the birth of deities symbolizing the introduction of various natural and cultural elements into the land of Dilmun. Enki, the Sumerian god

of wisdom, who had eaten eight plants, is cursed by Ninhursag with sickness in eight parts of his body. For the cure of each of these sicknesses a goddess is brought into being. One of these is of particular interest, as Vincent Scheil was the first to point out, as background for the incident of the creation of the woman out of man's rib in the biblical story. One of Enki's ailing members was his rib. The Sumerian goddess brought into being to cure this organ was Nin-ti, "the lady of the rib." But the same divine name may also mean in Sumerian "the lady who makes live." Thus, in Sumerian there is established, through a play upon words, a definite connection between the rib and "the lady who makes live." Perhaps, here at last we have the substratum of the association, so puzzling in Hebrew, in which the words for "rib" and "live" have nothing in common. If this explanation is the correct one, then this particular feature of the biblical myth is a "disease of language"—to use F. Max Müller's phrase—which, once having developed, has been perpetuated in a language where the original play upon words is completely obscured.

Several other elements of the myth of Enki and Ninhursag suggest connections with the biblical story of paradise. Utu, the sun-god, waters the land of Dilmun with fresh water brought up from the earth. This is not unlike the conception which seems now to be the meaning of the troublesome passage in the biblical story, "But there went up a stream from the earth, and watered the whole face of the ground."[33] One further element of connection is a motif which also appears in Genesis, although quite different use is made of it there. After Enki had eaten the eight plants he was subjected to a curse by Ninhursag, who in his anger seems to have originated sickness. While this is not a parallel to Eve's eating of the forbidden fruit and the ensuing curse upon her, it does contain the sequence of eating followed by a curse which entails suffering and pain. These individual elements, not one of which standing alone is conclusive, when taken together do form a strong case for the preservation of some of the motifs of Sumerian mythology in the biblical story.

An important element in the story of Genesis 2-3 has to do with the creation of man. Man's origin is also a concern of Sumerian speculation. Man's lowly origin from the dust of the earth in biblical thought

33. See W. F. Albright in *JBL* 58 (1939), 102-3.

finds its counterpart in Sumer, where man was fashioned from clay. Although the purpose of man's fashioning in the paradise myth is not clearly stated, Sumerian thought seems to have conceived of man's function in the divine scheme as that of freeing the gods from the necessity of work.[34] The purpose of man's creation is stated in the introduction to the myth which Kramer calls "Cattle and Grain." There it is stated that "for the sake of the good things in their pure sheepfolds, *man was given breath.*"[35] In Sumerian literature the concept of a "tree of life" appears, perhaps as a mythological tree.[36] From this cursory survey of the relevant material in Sumerian literature the conclusion may be drawn that certain ideological elements which were utilized in the paradise story are known from the earliest literature.

From the famous library of Ashurbanipal in Nineveh have come three fragments of an Akkadian myth, in which the central character, Adapa, misses his chance for acquiring immortality from the gods. While these fragments are upon tablets belonging to the seventh century, a fourth was discovered at the capital of the famous Egyptian heretic, Ikhnaton, where a fragment of the same myth had served as a school text in the fourteenth century. From this discovery it is certain that the myth known from these four fragments goes back at least to the middle of the second millennium.

The myth of Adapa may be summarized as follows. Adapa's patron and creator, Ea, had endowed him with wisdom but had withheld from him immortality. The myth tells of the opportunity which Adapa had for gaining immortality and of his loss of this chance of becoming like the gods. Adapa was a servant in the temple of Ea in Eridu; it was his duty to provide food for the gods. One day, while fishing, the south wind blew so violently that his boat was overturned, and Adapa was thrown into the water. Angered by this accident, Adapa broke the wing of the south wind; for seven days the south wind did not blow. Anu, the great god, was alarmed at this failure of the south wind and, after asking his vizier for an explanation, learned that Adapa was the culprit. Adapa was forthwith summoned to appear before Anu. Adapa's patron, Ea, then proceeded to instruct Adapa with regard to his appearance before Anu. He gave him good counsel for ingratiating himself with the

34. S. N. Kramer, *Sumerian Mythology*, p. 69.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 73.
36. Vriezen, *op. cit.* pp. 51-56.

gods, but warned him not to take of the food set before him, for it is food of death, nor of the water offered him, for it is the water of death. Adapa is granted a favorable audience with Anu and is offered food and water. Obedient to the counsel of Ea he refuses both, only to learn that they were indeed the food of life and the water of life, and that his obedience to the advice of Ea had cost him the gift of immortality.[37]

Even though the name Adapa is not to be equated with Adam of the biblical story, nor is Adapa the first man—for that matter, he is not a mere man, but a half-god, a heroic figure like Utnapishtim or Gilgamesh—there are many points of similarity between this Babylonian myth and the story of the fall of man. Both are concerned with the problem of death and why it is man's fate. In both the food of life plays an important role. In the Babylonian myth, Ea is jealous of the divine prerogative of immortality and succeeds in cheating Adapa out of the chance to acquire it.[38]

Another well-known Babylonian myth tells of a man who did succeed in gaining immortality. In the famous eleventh tablet of the Gilgamesh epic, Utnapishtim recounts the story of his deliverance from the flood sent by the gods and of his obedience to Ea, which gained for him immortality. According to this myth it is the same Ea, who in the story outlined above counseled Adapa so that he missed the proffer of immortality, who after the flood took Utnapishtim and his wife by their hands and blessed them thus: "Formerly was Utnapishtim a man, now shall Utnapishtim and his wife be gods, like us."[39] Although this part of the famous Babylonian epic is dependent upon a Sumerian myth,[40] it was skilfully incorporated into a larger creation by the Babylonians concerned with the exploits of the hero Gilgamesh and his final acceptance of mortality as his fate.

The details of the eleventh tablet of Gilgamesh are so well known that a brief summary will suffice. Gilgamesh, desirous of immortality, journeys to Utnapishtim to seek from him the secret. There the hero of the flood reveals to Gilgamesh a plant which will prolong life, lying at the bottom of the ocean. Gilgamesh gets it and starts on his long voyage homeward. In a moment of carelessness Gilgamesh drops the

37. See H. Gressmann, *Altorientalische Texte*, pp. 143-46 for translation.
38. Vriezen, *op. cit.*, p. 73.
39. H. Gressmann, *Altorientalische Texte*, p. 180.
40. S. N. Kramer, *JAOS* 64 (1944), 15-16.

plant to go bathing in fresh water; a serpent appears and carries away the precious substance. The boon of immortality is forever lost; defeated, Gilgamesh returns home to accept the common mortal fate of mankind. This theme is obviously parallel to the story in Genesis 3, in that it too seeks to explain the cause of death. It is also noteworthy that in both the stories the serpent plays a decisive role. The Babylonian epigraphic as well as the anepigraphic material on the serpent has been fully discussed by Vriezen in his study.[41] It seems likely that the choice of the serpent for the role of tempter in the biblical story was based on a well-established tradition in the oriental world.

One further element in the biblical story is clearly dependent upon a Babylonian conception. This borrowed feature is the cherubim placed to guard the way to the garden.[42] Certainly the name itself is drawn from the Babylonian world; what is not so certain is how much of the religious connotation associated there with the name was borrowed along with the name for the creatures which were charged with the keeping of the way which led into the garden from which the man and woman had been exiled.

Turning from the world of Mesopotamian thought to that of Phoenicia, as we know it from Phoenician inscriptions, the texts from Ras Shamra, and from Greek sources, the question may well be asked as to whether any of the ideas found in the biblical story are encountered in these sources. Here again there is time for but the briefest summary.[43] Phoenician literature did know of a paradise. Philo of Byblos tells of the two primeval men, Aeon and Protogonos, who lived on fruit. The name Eden occurs in Ras Shamra and there seems to mean "plain." The serpent plays an important role in mythological representations. There appear also the representations of the garden of the gods and of the isle of the blest. Death seems to have been considered the natural lot of man, but as yet an epic the theme of which is the problem of death has not come to light. Representations of a winged sphinx have been found in Palestine and Syria; these are thought to represent cherubim.[44]

One conclusion is inescapable: the Hebrew myth is deeply indebted

41. Pp. 112-13.
42. See Vriezen, *op. cit.*, pp. 113-15.
43. See Vriezen, *op. cit.*, pp. 119-24.
44. *Biblical Archaeologist*, 1 (1938), 1-2.

to legendary and mythological concepts which were widely known in the ancient Near East. From our fragmentary, but growing, knowledge of Sumerian mythology there is evidence for such ideas as the connection between rib and life, a subterranean stream which sprang up to water the land, eating of forbidden plant followed by a curse, a tree of life. In Akkadian mythology there is a concern with why death is man's fate, how a man missed his chance for immortality. There appears a deity who is jealous of his divine privilege of endless life. The concepts of food of life, the serpent as an animal which deprives man of immortality, the plant of life, and the name cherubim are evidenced in the literature of Babylonia and Assyria. In Syria there was the tradition of primeval man who lived on fruit and clothed himself with skins, of a paradise, of the name Eden, and perhaps representations of cherubim. This summary indicates that mythological language and ideas in Genesis 2-3 are known from extra-biblical sources as part and parcel of the culture of the ancient Near East.

But does it follow from this clear evidence for dependence in the realm of individual elements that the author of the Hebrew myth accepted only the current or ancient mythological interpretations and transmitted them to his hearers and readers? To the contrary, there is evidence in the Hebrew paradise story for a definite polemic which often took sharp issue with the ideas which were associated with some of the source material. There is no mention of the purpose of man's creation as the supplying of the needs of the gods through the cult, as the purpose appears in the Sumerian and Babylonian material. In Genesis, man is to work the ground and to obey the Lord God. In the Adapa myth, the man lost his chance for immortality through obedience to his creator; the Hebrew theologian would argue that man's disobedience was the cause of his loss. According to the Hebrew polemic, the serpent is not an animal associated with life, as it was elsewhere, but an animal responsible for ill-luck and should be killed.[45]

In the light of recent research and criticism, a brief summary of the contents of Genesis 2:4b—3:24 is now in order. Following a common

45. Vriezen sees certain elements in the story which reflect the view of Hebrew prophets: the first man lived in full companionship with his creator; disobedience was the origin of man's misery; man was forbidden the higher, divine knowledge. On the basis of these ideas, Vriezen asserts that the tone of the work is such that it must be attributed to one of the greatest prophetic figures in Israel.

pattern for introducing cosmologies, the story opens with a description of the undeveloped condition of the earth. Vegetation had not appeared, because there was no rain and no man to till the ground. Only a subterranean stream (called by the name of a Babylonian god) used to come up to water the ground. The action of the story begins with the formation of man out of the dust of the earth and the breath of life, a unique but fragile element, which set man apart from the animals. The Lord God then proceeds to plant a garden in Eden with all sorts of good trees; the tree of life, the fruit of which bestowed immortality; and the tree of knowledge. In this environment man was placed with the expressed duty of working and keeping it. There man enjoyed full companionship with the Lord God, who, like the Canaanite Baal, was not far removed from a *genius loci*. The divine character prohibits, upon penalty of immediate death, the eating of the fruit of the tree of knowledge. The demand laid upon man is that of absolute, unquestioned obedience on this point.

Seeing man's need for the society of a helper in the form of a human counterpart, the Lord God determines to make one. The first attempt, which made use of the same material out of which had been formed man, resulted in failure. Animals were not helpers for men. Man lives in peace with them after he has demonstrated his superiority over them through giving them names. In the second attempt the Lord God puts man into a trance, takes from him a rib, and builds it up into a woman. She is his helper, flesh of his flesh, and bone of his bone.

The fourth character in the story is the clever serpent, an animal which plays a decisive role in Babylonian mythology. Here the serpent converses freely with the woman and elicits from her the divine command given to the man and the threat of immediate death for transgressing it. The serpent, after denying that such a penalty will ensue, explains to the woman the reason for the threat on the part of the Lord God—it is jealousy on his part—and holds forth the prize of equality with the gods for eating of the forbidden tree. The woman is convinced by the serpent, and after eating, gives to her husband, who also eats. Immediately they find the threat of the Lord God to be groundless and the promise of the serpent to be fulfilled. They find themselves in possession of a new knowledge, like that of an adolescent child who is suddenly conscious of sex. This new consciousness necessitated the making of clothes, scant and fragile though they were.

The drama moves on to the inquest by the more powerful character, the Lord God. As he walked in the garden for the breezes of the day, the Lord God discovers the man and his wife hiding from their creator because of fear. Following a weak defense on the part of the man, who places the blame upon the woman, and of the woman, who places it upon the serpent, the Lord God sentences each of the offenders with a curse. The serpent is to become the most cursed of all animals, to crawl, to eat dust for food, and is to become the perpetual enemy of man. No longer is he the animal of supreme wisdom, but a despised enemy of man; he is to be hunted and killed as an animal of ill-luck. The woman's curse is, in effect, a description of her present plight: bearing children in pain, dependence upon her husband's body, and domination by him. In a similar way man's curse portrays the plight in which man at the time and place of the formation of the myth finds himself: cultivation of an unyielding soil, the sweat of toil, and the irony of wrenching from the ground, from which he was taken and to which he would eventually return, a living all the days of his life.

Following the curse upon the three offenders is a note which describes the putting into effect of the curse upon the man. Here it becomes apparent that the serpent had spokĕn the truth—if not the whole truth, at least what he had spoken was true; the eating of tree of knowledge did make man godlike in knowledge, but not in immortality. In order to preserve this last prerogative which distinguished the Lord God from the man who had boldly seized knowledge, the man was expelled from his primitive paradise to face the labor to which he had been sentenced. The exclusion of man from the possibility of further infringement upon the Lord God was insured by the placing of a guard at the gate of the garden in which grew the tree of life. The story ends with man emerging wiser but accursed.

Finally, in the light of present knowledge and a great variety of expositions, one must venture an opinion with regard to the central question with which the myth deals. Paradoxically, the end of the myth is its beginning. There, in the curse upon the serpent, upon woman, and upon man, is a description of life as lived by peasants in an agricultural society at a certain stage of man's cultural progress. In swift kaleidoscopic scenes—the hated, but awe-inspiring serpent, the pains of childbirth, the inferior status of women, the laborious side of a farmer's life, the inevitability of death—is shown life as it was ap-

praised by one in a melancholy mood. The description is observation tinged with a fatalistic sadness, arising from a contemplation of a better past and with no thought of hope for the future. Out of a contemplation of things as they were, or were felt to be, there arose the question, Why had man's knowledge, which had brought him to where he was culturally, robbed him of the carefree joy which once had been his? This same question appeared in parabolic form in the development which took place before the peasant's own eyes in the growth of children to manhood. Did they not play without a care, often naked, conscious neither of shame nor of responsibility? With the transition to maturity came knowledge and responsibility, and with it the inevitable loss of the innocent joys of childhood. Out of the conscious realization that inevitably joined together are increased knowledge and a responsibility which entails labor, pain, and suffering arose the story which seeks to express in mythopoeic language this idea.

The author of the story made use of all those elements of mythology at his disposal, fusing them into a new unity. Some of the means at hand served his purpose better than others. Man himself was responsible for his progress as well as for the ensuing misery. He had stolen it from God, but not without taking with it the misery with which it was inseparably bound. But why was knowledge withheld from him so that he must become guilty of disobedience to get it? Here the Hebrew author finds the answer which was given in his mythological sources well suited to fill his immediate need. The gods were often jealous, anxious to keep man at a proper distance, zealous to preserve for themselves certain powers which distinguished them from men. Thus it was that the needs of the developing plot called for this particular element which so conveniently offered itself from the mythologies surrounding Israel. Thus the character Lord God was credited with this attribute of jealousy in order to meet the needs of a developing plot originally designed to answer a philosophical question. It is of considerable importance that this particular picture of the nature of the deity is refuted in at least three different places in later additions to the book of Genesis.[46] According to the later view, God had created man in his likeness and in his image. It may well be that the reluctance of later Israelite writers to make use of this myth is due to what they felt to be a serious defect in the picture of the deity—a limitation

46. 1:27; 5:1; 9:6.

imposed by the nature of the material which the author used to meet the necessities of his developing plot. At any rate, it can be maintained, if the above interpretation is correct, that the origin of sin as found in the disobedient choice is not the primary concern of the myth as we have it, but rather that it is an element which was introduced in order to answer a question which was of more fundamental importance to the author of the narrative. No myth ever walks on all fours. To take a minor or secondary element and use it to represent the author's view of that particular subject often does violence to the literary form in which he has cast his thought.

How provocative this ancient myth is, is indicated by a paragraph taken from Paul Humbert's conclusion:

> The life of man was a dilemma: obey God like a child, even without understanding, remain a creature submissive and dependent strictly upon the orders of God, and live thus in the felicity of paradisical innocence and with, perhaps, the prospect, by virtue of divine grace, to life eternal. Or disobey God, no longer trust in him alone, no longer be content with what he gives, be ambitious for knowledge and, through it, the power and the ungodly equality with God, but succumb to the miseries of existence and be subject to death.[47]

According to Genesis man took the way of ὕβρις, got for himself knowledge of sex, of agriculture, of the skills, of animal husbandry, of clothing; but this progress had cost him his pristine innocence, his paradise. The deep pessimism of the myth arises out of reflection upon this dilemma. Perhaps the greatness of the story lies in its vivid statement of man's predicament in Eden.

47. P. Humbert, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

COMPARISONS AND IDENTIFICATIONS OF RULERS WITH DEITIES IN THE HELLENISTIC PERIOD*

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I

THE RULER-CULT, although it has already furnished material for numerous studies, still remains one of the most baffling institutions of ancient civilization. During the Hellenistic period it develops to such an extent that it produces problems which make it perhaps "the most delicate question in the organization of monarchy."[1]

Studying this cult more closely, one is surprised to discover the prominent place taken by one particular form of deification, i.e., the comparison or identification of the reigning sovereign, or a member of his family, with one of the principal deities of the pantheon. It is this curious and difficult problem with which we propose to deal. This process is notable primarily for three reasons: first, it concerns a living ruler, and the cult of the living, as we shall see, was not common in the classical period; secondly, we are dealing here with Greek, and then Roman, dynasties, instead of the Oriental ones previously in question; thirdly, this kind of deification is repeated under varied aspects almost uninterruptedly from the end of the fourth century B. C. to the fall of the Roman Empire. This permanence of theme in the most disparate kingdoms for almost eight centuries, alone suffices to exclude the hypothesis of fantasy or pure megalomania,[2] valid in a few isolated cases.

To explain this practice constitutes the most arduous of tasks. The most diverse hypotheses have been advanced to justify the ruler-cult, all of which can be applied to the particular aspect under consideration here. Should we recognize here a genuine and special sovereign-

* This is an enlargement of my article, "Le Point culminant du culte des souverains," *Les Etudes Classiques,* XV (1947), 100-13.

1. R. Cohen, *La Grèce et l'hellénisation du monde antique* (Paris, 1939), p. 614.

2. O. Weinreich, in his *Menekrates—Zeus und Salmoneus* (Stuttgart, 1933), emphasizes too much this idea of paranoia.

worship, in which case, is it the religious,[3] the philosophical,[4] or the political[5] motives which dominate? Or is it a politico-religious mixture?[6] Must we invoke the ancient belief in the divine character of kingship, or its debt to magic?[7] Shall we insist on the importance of the apotheosis or heroization,[8] or put forward the natural belief in the superior nature of man[9] which engenders anthropomorphism, belief in the immortality of the soul, and worship of the dead? Or shall we, rather, consider these manifestations as demonstrations of civic loyalty,[10] as acts of gratitude,[11] or flattery,[12] or even fear on the part of the subjects? And finally, what is the origin of this cult? Is it purely Greek,[13] Oriental,[14] or, as appears most likely, a new combination,

3. L. Gernet and A. Boulanger, in *Le Génie grec dans la religion* (Paris, 1932), pp. 470-71 admit a religious and spontaneous origin of Greek inception.

4. Cf. E. Rohde, *Psyché* (Paris, 1928), chs. XI, XIV, 1, and L. Delatte, *Les Traités de la royauté d'Ecphante, Diotogène et Sthénidas* (Liège and Paris, 1942), pp. 123-63.

5. P. Roussel, *La Grèce et l'Orient des guerres médiques à la conquête romaine* (Paris, 1938), p. 507; W. W. Tarn, *La Civilisation hellénistique* (Paris, 1936), p. 54; W. S. Ferguson, *Cambridge Ancient History*, VII, pp. 13-22.

6. R. Cohen, *op. cit.*, p. 614; G. Glotz, et al., *Histoire générale, Histoire grecque*, IV, 1 (Paris, 1938), p. 224.

7. J. G. Frazer, *The Magical Origin of Kings* (London, 1920); *The Golden Bough*, Part I, *The Magic Art and the Evolution of Kings*, 2 vols. (London, 1911). For the influence of "mimetism": E. Rohde, *op. cit.*, ch. XIV, 2; F. Pfister, "Epiphanie," *P.-W.*, suppl. IV (1924), cols. 313 f.

8. F. Pfister, *Der Reliquienkult im Altertum*, 2 vols. (Giessen, 1909-12); M. Foucart, "Le culte des héros chez les Grecs," *Mém. de l'Acad. des Inscr.*, XLII (1918), 1-166; E. Bickermann, "Die römische Kaiserapotheose," *Archiv. f. Religionswiss.*, XXVII (1929), 1-34; P. Jouguet, *L'Impérialisme macédonien et l'hellénisation de l'Orient* (Paris, 1937), p. 338.

9. O. Weinreich, "Antikes Gottmenschentum," *Neue Jahrb. f. Wiss. u. Jugendbildung*, VI (1926), 633-51; W.H.D. Rouse, *Gods, Heroes and Men of Ancient Greece* (London, 1933); L. Bieler, ΘΕΙΟΣ *ANHP: Das Bild des "göttlichen Menschen" in Spätantike und Frühchristentum* (Vienna, 1935); E. Peterson, *Der Monotheismus als politisches Problem* (Liepzig, 1935).

10. E. Bevan, *"The Deification of Kings in the Greek Cities," Eng. Hist. Rev.*, XVI (1910), pp. 625-39, esp. p. 638.

11. P. Jouguet, *op. cit.*, p. 343, and in *Trois Etudes sur l'Hellénisme. . . .* (Cairo, 1944), pp. 62-64, inclines toward this solution in Ptolemaic Egypt.

12. See Plutarch, *De adulatore et amico*, 12; Lucian, *Letter to Nigrinos*, 23, and *How To Write History*, 12.

13. Cf. supra, note 3.

14. Th. Zielinski, *Histoire de la civilisation antique* (Paris, 1931), p. 305. C. W. MacEwan, *The Oriental Origin of Hellenistic Kingship* (Chicago, 1934), is too simplified. For the influence of the Oriental religions in general, consult the works of F. Cumont.

"neither purely Greek nor purely Oriental"?[15] How did it develop; what is its extent and significance; what role do royal ambition, court opportunism, popular will, and exterior events play in it?

One begins to realize the great amount of unravelling to be done, and the caution which must be exercised. The purpose of this article is to sketch a system of clarification, and to indicate the tools necessary to realize such a clarification.

In spite of numerous careful inquiries, the ruler-cult remains one of the least known aspects of Hellenistic civilization, study of its special feature of comparison or identification of the ruler with a deity is still practically in the embryonic state. Several studies, of course, have been devoted to it, but too often historians ignore the problem, or reduce it to absurdly modest proportions, contenting themselves with pointing out isolated cases and scrutinizing the same familiar examples (usually comparisons of artists and poets), but neglecting to extend their investigations to grouping the results systematically and drawing the conclusions implicit in them.

II

First, let us examine the modern bibliography of the subject.[16]

In regard to Alexander the Great, three problems are discussed: first, did he represent himself as Neos Dionysos (Radet thinks so), or not (Nock believes that the legend of the world conqueror as Dionysos is a later creation of the Ptolemaic court);[17] secondly, was Alexander

15. M. Rostovtzeff, *Cambr. Anc. Hist.*, VII, 115.

16. We do not ignore the studies of E. Buerlier, E. Bevan, E. Kornemann, C. Lattey, etc. on the ruler-cult in general. For our question, it is necessary to know, for the Hellenistic and Roman period: A. D. Nock, "Studies in the Graeco-Roman Beliefs of the Empire," *Jour. Hellen. St.*, XLV (1925), 84-101, "Notes on Ruler-Cult," *J. H. St.*, XLVIII (1928), 21-43, and *Conversion: The Old and New in Religion from Alexander the Great to Augustine of Hippo* (Oxford, 1933); F. Pfister, "Epiphanie"; S. Eitrem, "Zur Apotheose," *Symbol. Osl.*, X (1931), 31-56, XI (1932), 11-34, and XV-XVI (1936), 111-37; L. R. Taylor, *The Divinity of the Roman Emperor* (Middletown, 1931); M. P. Charlesworth, "Some Observations on the Ruler-Cult, especially in Rome," *Harv. Theol. Rev.*, XXVIII (1935), 5-44; U. Wilcken, "Zur Entstehung des hellenistischen Königskultes," *Sitz. Preuss. Akad. Wiss.*, XVIII (1938), 298-321; J. L. Tondriau, "Bibliographie du cultes des souverains hellénistiques et romains," *Bull. de l'assoc. Guill. Budé*, n.s. V (1948), 106-25; "Princesses ptolémaic comparées ou identifiéees à des deesses, II^{e}-I^{er} siècles avant J. C.," *Bull. Soc. Arch.* XXXVII (1948), 24 pp.

17. G. Radet, "Les Idées et les croyances d'Alexandre le Grand," *Jour. des savants*, (1935), pp. 145-52, and *Alexandre le Grand* (Paris, 1933); R. Vallois, "Alexandre et

identified with Heracles or not (Anderson's arguments do not seem conclusive);[18] thirdly, what about his statue as Zeus at Delphi?[19]

For Ptolemaic Egypt,[20] one should consult the interesting articles by Perdrizet and Rostagni on Ptolemy IV Philopator as Neos Dionysos;[21] and those by Jeanmaire, Milne, Rose, and Scott on Cleopatra as Isis or Aphrodite, and Antony as Osiris or Dionysos.[22] In 1928, Nock published his important "Notes" on the Dionysian legend of Alexander the Great, and the prominent part assumed in it by the Alexandrian court; he drew attention to the extent of the Dionysian problem, particularly in Egypt, and pointed out the dominant role of court propaganda. He promised a sequel which has never seen the light of day. In 1930, he produced an exhaustive study on the *Sunnaoi Theoi*, a variant of the ruler-cult which consists of worshiping a sovereign in the temple of a deity, together with the god.[23]

Some aspects of the identifications of Ptolemaic princesses with

la mystique dionysiaque," *Rev. Et. Anc.*, XXXIV (1932), 81 f.; A. Piganiol, "Les Dionysies d'Alexandre," *Rev. Et. Gr.*, XLII (1940) (= Mél. Radet), 285-92. We prefer Nock's presentation in "Notes on Ruler-Cult," Parts I and II, esp. pp. 21-30.

18. A. R. Anderson, "Heracles and His Successors," *Harv. St. Class. Philol.*, XXXIX (1928), 12-19.

19. Pausanias, 25, 1; cf. H. E. Stier, "Zum Gottkönigtum Alexanders des Grossen," *Die Welt als Gesch.*, IV (1939), 391-95. For legends of Alexander's divinity, E. Mederer, "Die Alexanderlegenden bei den ältesten Alexanderhistorikern," *Würz. St. z. Altertumswiss.*, VIII (1936).

20. The royal titles often include identifications of the kings mostly with Egyptian gods: H. Gauthier, *Le Livre des rois d'Egypte. Recueil de titres et de protocoles royaux*. 5 vols. (Cairo, 1907-17), vols. IV and V for the Ptolemies and the Roman emperor; F. Cumont, *L'Egypte des Astrologues* (Brussels, 1947).

21. P. Perdrizet, "Le Fragment de Satyros sur les dèmes d'Alexandrie," *Rev. Et. Anc.*, XII (1910), 217-47 (=*B.S.A.A.*, XII (1910), 53-82); A. Rostagni, "Neos Dionysos. Poeti e litterati alla corte de Tolomeo IV Filopatore," *Atti r. Accad. Sc. Torino*, L (1914-15), 989-1013. At this time, the famous royal Dionysiac decree (Pap. B.G.U., 1211, verso) was still unknown. See Tondriau, "Le Décret dionysiaque de Philopator," *Aegyptus*, XXVI (1946), pp. 84-95.

22. J. G. Milne, "Antony and Cleopatra?" *Jour. Eg. Arch.*, I (1914), p. 99, pl. 14. Milne mentions a jar from Abydos (Brit. Mus., 52929), on which he thinks he recognizes a satirical representation of Antony-Dionysos and Cleopatra: H. Jeanmaire, "La Politique religieuse d'Antoine et Cléopâtre," *Rev. Arch.*, XIX (1924), 241-61; H. J. Rose, "The Departure of Dionysos," *Ann. Arch. Anthrop.*, XI (1924), 25-30, on the Alexandrian legend that Dionysos abandoned Antony the night before Actium; K. Scott, "Octavian's Propaganda and Antony's *De sua ebrietate*," *Class. Philol.*, XXIV (1929), 133-41; A. R. Anderson, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-44, for Antony-Heracles.

23. A. D. Nock, "Σύνναος Θεός," *Harv. St. Class. Philol.*, XLI (1930), 1-62.

goddesses have been treated: coins by Kahrstedt and Koch;[24] vases by Mowat and Courby;[25] seals by Milne[26] (who also considers the question of the rulers); gems by Furtwängler;[27] cameos by Chabouillet;[28] street names identifying Arsinoe II with various deities, by Bell;[29] poetical comparisons by Couat and Pfeiffer (Jouguet has studied Berenice II as the fourth Grace).[30] The most honored queen is naturally Arsinoe II Philadelphos, identified with Aphrodite-Isis, for whom there are articles by Glotz, Milne, Pfeiffer, and Weil;[31] while Cleopatra II and Cleopatra III have been carefully studied by Otto and Bengtson.[32]

Since the Egyptian material is not sufficiently known and dissemi-

24. U. Kahrstedt, "Frauen auf antiken Münzen," *Klio,* x (1910), 261-314; W. Koch, "Die ersten Ptolemäerrinnen nach ihren Münzen," *Zeits. f. Numismat,* xxxiv (1924), 67-106; see also R. Mowat, "Symboles monétaires ptolémaïques mis en rapport avec les fêtes dionysiaques d'Alexandrie," *Rev. Numismat.,* 3rd ser., xi (1893), 27-39; W. Drexler, "Isis," Roscher's *Lexicon,* II, 1, p. 517 (queens as Isis on coins).

25. R. Mowat, "Le Vase sacrificatoire des reines d'Egypte," *Rev. Numismat.,* 4th ser., v (1901), 14-35; F. Courby, *Les Vases grecs à reliefs* (Paris, 1922), pp. 509-13.

26. J. G. Milne, "Ptolemaic Seal Impressions," *Jour. Hellen. St.,* xxxvi (1916), 87-101.

27. A. Furtwängler, *Die Antiken Gemmen,* 3 vols. (Berlin and Leipzig, 1900), II, Taf. xxxi to xxxiii.

28. M. Chabouillet, *Catalogue général et raisonné des camées et pierres gravées de la Bibliothèque impériale* (Paris, 1900), passim.

29. H. I. Bell, "Notes on Early Ptolemaic Papyri," *Archiv. f. Pap.,* vii (1924), 17-27; see also A. Calderini, *Dizionario dei nomi geografici e topografici* (Cairo, 1935), I, 94 f.; A. D. Nock, "Σύνναος Θεός," p. 21.

30. A. Couat, *La Poésie alexandrine sous les trois premiers Ptolémees (324-222),* (Paris, 1822); R. Pfeiffer, *Kallimachosstudien* (Munich, 1922); P. Jouguet, "Reine et poète," *Bull. de l'Inst. d'Eg.,* xx (1937-38), 131-35.

31. H. Weil, *Un Papyrus inédit,* Mon. gr. publiés par l'Assoc. pour l'encour. des et. gr. en Fr., viii (1879), 28-34; G. Glotz, "Les fêtes d'Adonis sous Ptolémée II," *Rev. et. gr.,* xxxiii (1920), 169-222 (by means of her Adonis cult, Arsinoe prepared her identfication with Aphrodite); R. Pfeiffer, "Arsinoe Philadelphos in der Dichtung," *Antike,* II (1926), 161-74. On Arsinoe-Artemis at Delos: R. Vallois, *Le Temple délien d'Arsinoe Philadelphe ou d'Agathè Tychè* (Paris, 1929), pp. 32-40. A. Plassart, *Les Sanctuaires et les cultes du Mont Cynthe à Delos* (Paris, 1928), pp. 227-28. See also E. Kiessling, "Zum Kult der Arsinoe im Fayum," *Aegyptus,* xiii (1933), 542-46; M. Secre, "Epigraphica. Il culto di Arsinoe Filadelfo nelle città greche," *B.S.A.A.,* xxxi (1937), 286-98.

32. W. Otto, *Priester und Tempel in hellenistischen Aegypten,* 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1905-08) II, index 3, p. 380 (for various princesses); W. Otto and H. Bengston, "Zur Geschichte des Nederganges des Ptolemäerreiches," *Abhandl. bayer. Akad Wiss.,* N.F. xvii (1938); completed for the cult of Cleopatra III by Otto, "Ptolemaica," *Sitz. bayer. Akad. Wiss.,* III (1939), 5-16, s. 1.

nated,[33] we have begun to publish inventories of cases for Lagid kings and queens separately.[34]

For the Seleucids of Syria, one may take for guides the section on Zeus Seleukios in Nock's "Notes on Ruler-Cult," IV, and, especially, Chapter VII of Bikerman's authoritative book.[35]

Demetrius the Besieger is the subject of articles by Ehrenberg, and Scott. It is a very delicate problem whether Demetrius was definitely identified with Dionysos; Scott, who proposed this theory, is opposed by Tarn.[36]

There are no specialized studies on the other Diadochs, and one must be content with allusions in general books. It is noteworthy here that, in Macedonia, the king, in his position as *primus inter pares* had little chance of being deified, much less compared or identified with a deity.[37]

It would be well to study separately the importance of the role of Mithradates VI Eupator, King of Pontus, who posed as Neos Diony-

33. For Alexandria see C. E. Visser, *Götter und Kulte im ptolemäischen Alexandrien* (Amsterdam, 1938), passim.

34. "Les Souverains lagides en déesses au IIIe siècle avant J. Ch." *Etudes de papyrologie* VII (1948), 1-15; "Ptolémées comparés ou identifiés à des divinités," to be published in *Chronique d'Egypte*, (1948), Nos. 45-46, pp. 127-46. See also my "Les Thiases dionysiaques royaux de la cour ptolémäique," *Chronique d'Egypte*, XLI (1946) 149-71, on identifications with Dionysos: Philopater (pp. 149-56), Auletes (pp. 156-60), Mark Antony (pp. 160-67). I shall publish, in the *Etudes de papyrologie* (1948), a detailed article on Dionysos identified with Lagid rulers and other dionysiac manifestations in Ptolemaic Egypt. I am also preparing a special monograph on Philopator's religious policy.

35. A. D. Nock, "Notes . . .," IV. Zeus Seleukios, pp. 41-43; E. Bikerman, *Institution des Séleucides* (Paris, 1938), pp. 236-57 (Bikerman omits to mention Antiochus VI and XII as Dionysos). For Seleucus-Zeus Nikator and Antiochus-Apollo Soter: E. Bevan, "A Note on Antiochus Epiphanes," *Jour. Hellen. St.*, XX (1900), pp. 26-30; B. V. Head, *Historia Numorum*[2], pp. 766 f.; P. Gardner, *B.M.C., Seleucid Kings of Syria*, p. 102, no. 5.

36. V. Ehrenberg, "Athenischer Hymnus auf Demetrius Poliorketes." *Antike*, VII (1931), 279-97; K. Scott, "The Deification of Demetrius Poliorcetes." *Am. Jour. Philol.* XLIX (1928), 137-66, 217-39, esp. p. 233; W. W. Tarn, "The Hellenistic Ruler-Cult and the Daemon." *Jour. Hellen. St.* XLVIII (1928), p. 217, n. 54. See also E. T. Newell, *The Coinage of Demetrius Poliorcetes* (London, 1927); G. H. Macurdy, "A Note on the Jewelry of Demetrios the Besieger," *Am. Jour. Arch.*, XXXVI (1932), 27 f.; G. Dimikratos, *Demetrios Poliorketes und Athen*, Diss. Hamburg, 1937.

37. Suidas, s.v. *Antipater;* on royal position in Macedonia: F. Hampl, *Der König der Makedonen* (Weida, 1936) P. Jouguet, *Trois Etudes*, pp. 9-11. There is only a doubtful comparison Lysimachus-Heracles:Planud, *Anthol.* (Ed. Tauchnitz), III, 333, no. 100 (anonymous).

sos,[38] and that of the Dionysiac Technitai of the Pergamene court,[39] who, by choosing the Attalid sovereigns for presidents of their association, perhaps made them Neoi Dionysoi, and whose action is explained by von Prott.[40]

III

To pass on to Rome—for our question, the inventory of Riewald, though outmoded and incomplete, is the only one in existence for the whole Roman world.[41]

With regard to Julius Caesar, the big problem is whether Dion Cassius was right in saying that the dictator was proclaimed Zeus Ioulios in Rome.[42] This appears doubtful, as does the hypothesis of Anderson that Caesar wished to be a second Heracles.[43]

The case of Augustus-Apollo has been analyzed by Deonna and Haight;[44] of Augustus-Zeus, by Ward;[45] of Augustus-Zeus Patroos, by Buckler;[46] of Augustus-Mercury, by Brendel, Degrassi, Elmore, Leh-

38. See *O.G.I.S.*, 367; Posidonius, *Ap. Ath.*, 5, p. 212d; Clement Alex., *Protr.*, IV, 54; Cicero, *Pro Flacco*, 25, 60. Cf. M. Castagna, *Mithridate VI Eupatore, Re del Ponto* (Portici, 1938).

39. See A. D. Nock, "The Historical Importance of Cult-Associations," *Class. Rev.*, XXXVIII (1924), 105-9; also the numerous works of F. Poland, esp. "Technitai," *P.-W.*², 5, 2 (1934), cols. 2473-2558. For Egypt: M. San Nicolò, *Aegyptisches Vereinwesen zur Zeit der Ptolemäer und Römer*, 2 vols. (Munich, 1913-15).

40. H. von Prott, "Dionysos Kathegemon," *Mitt. deutsch. Arch. Inst.*, Gr. Abt., XXVII (1902), 161-88; A. D. Nock, "Studies in the Graeco-Roman Beliefs . . .", p. 94, no. 84, and "Notes . . .", p. 33, no. 60.

41. P. Riewald, *De imperatorum Romanorum cum certis dis et comparatione et aequatione*, Diss. Philol. Hal., 20, 3 (1912), pp. 265-344, gives many examples for the Hellenistic period also. See supra, note 16. J. S. Reid, "Roman Ideas of Deity," *Jour. Rom. St.*, VI (1916), 170-84, treats various problems relative to our theme.

42. Dio Cass., 44, 6, 4, on Caesar's divine ascendency; H. J. Rose, "Anchises and Aphrodite," *Class. Quar.*, XVIII (1924), pp. 11-16.

43. A. R. Anderson, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-42.

44. W. Deonna, "Le Trésor des Fins d'Annecy," *Rev. Arch.*, 5e sér. XI (1920), 112-206 (as Apollo, p. 185; as Sol, pp. 186 f.; as Mercury, p. 187 f.); E. H. Haight, "An 'Inspired Message' in the Augustan Poets," *Am. Jour. Philol.*, XXXIX (1918), 341-66.

45. M. Ward, "The Association of Augustus with Jupiter," *Studi mater. storia rel.*, IX (1935), 203-24. On coins, with thunderbolt behind head: L. Lafranchi, "Gli ampiamenti del pomerio di Roma," *Bull. com.*, XLVII (1921), 25.

46. W. H. Buckler, "Auguste, Zeus Patroos," *Rev. Phil. Lit. Hist. Anc.*, IX-LXI (1935), 177-88; On Βουλαῖος probably including an identification Augustus-Zeus, see A. D. Nock, "Notes . . .", p. 35.

mann-Hartleben, Scott, and Six;[47] Augustus-Heracles, by Anderson;[48] and Augustus-Veiovis, by Mattingly.[49] Also, it is not without interest to examine his deification by Horace, Ovid, and Vergil.[50]

The imperial family under Augustus has been studied principally by Scott, who gave special treatment to the identification Drusus-Castor, while the case of Livia has been analyzed by Gertrude Grether.[51]

The question loses some of its importance with Tiberius, opponent of the imperial cult[52] (nonetheless, Riewald mentions a doubtful ex-

47. J. Six, "Octavien-Mercure," *Rev. arch.*, 5e sér., IV (1916), 257-64; W. Deonna, "Le Trésor . . .", pp. 187 f. K. Lehman-Hartleben, "Ein Altar in Bologna," *Mitt. deutsch. Arch. Inst.*, Röm. Abt., XLII (1927), 163-76; K. Scott, "Mercur-Augustus und Horaz C. I, 2," *Hermes*, LXIII (1928), pp. 15-33, and "Mercury on the Bologna Altar," *Ibid.*, L (1935), pp. 225-30; J. Elmore, "Horace and Octavian (*Car.* I, 2)," *Class. Philol.*, XXVI (1931), pp. 258-63; O. Brendel, "Novus Mercurius," *Mitt. deutsch. Arch Inst.*, Röm. Abt., L (1935), pp. 250-59; A. Degrassi, "I Magistri mercuriales di Lucca," *Athenaeum* (Pavia), XV (1937), pp. 284-88.

48. A. R. Anderson, "Heracles and His Successors," pp. 14-58.

49. H. Mattingly, "Veiovis and Divus Augustus," *Num. Chron.*, XIII (1933), pp. 232-33 (posthumous assimilation).

50. Horace: see note 47, Scott and Elmore; S. Pilch, *De Augusti laudibus quid Horatium* (Lemburg, 1926); E. E. Burriss, "The Religious Element in the Poetry of Horace, with Special Reference to the *religio* of the Emperor Augustus," *Class. Weekly*, XXI (1927-1928), pp. 49-54; D. Norberg, "La Divinité d'Auguste dans la poésie d'Horace," *Eranos*, XLIV (1946), pp. 389-403 (examines C. I, 2 and III, 3 and 24). Ovid: V. A. Melichoff, "The Role of Ovid in the History of Emperor-Worship" (in Russian), *EPMEC*, VII (1914), 299-308; K. Allen, "The Fasti of Ovid and the Augustan Propaganda," *Am. Jour. Philol.*, LXIII (1922), 250-66; K. Scott, "Emperor Worship in Ovid," *Trans. Pro. Am. Phil. Assoc.*, LXI (1930), pp. 43-69 (extends the study to J. Caesar, pp. 47-50; Livia, pp. 64 f.; C. and L. Caesar, p. 66; Drusus Sr. and Tiberius, pp. 66 f.; Germanicus and Drusus Jr., pp. 67 f.). Vergil: T. Frank, "Augustus, Vergil, and the Augustan Elogia," *Am. Jour. Philol.*, LIX (1938), pp. 91-94. L. R. Taylor, "The Worship of Augustus in Italy during His Lifetime," *Trans. Pro. Am. Phil. Assoc.*, LI (1920), 116-33, and "The Divinity . . .", pp. 130-238; W. Deonna, "La Légende d'Octave-Auguste, dieu, sauveur et maître du monde," *Rev. Hist. Rel.*, LXXXIII (1921), 32-58, 163-95 and LXXXIV (1921), 77-107; K. Scott, "Notes on Augustus' Religious Policy," *Archiv f. Religionswiss.*, XXXV (1938), pp. 121-30 (concerning Augustus and Tiberius).

51. K. Scott, "Drusus Nicknamed Castor," *Class. Philol.*, XXV (1930), 155-61, and "The Dioscuri and the Imperial Cult," *Idem*, 379 f.; G. Grether, "Livia and the Roman Imperial Cult," *Am. Jour. Philol.*, LXVII (1946), 222-52. Also cf. S. Eitrem, *op. cit.*, p. 5, Das Herrscherkult und die Domus Augusta, pp. 22-34.

52. L. R. Taylor, "Tiberius' Refusals of Divine Honors," *Trans. Proc. Am. Phil. Ass.*, LX (1929), 87-101, and "Tiberius' Ouatio and the Ara Numinis Augusti," *Am. Jour. Philol.*, LVIII (1937), 185-93; M. Rostovtzeff, "L'Empereur Tibère et le culte imperial," *Rev. Hist.*, CLXIII (1930), 1-26; K. Scott, "Tiberius' Refusal of the Title 'Augustus,'" *Class. Philol.*, XXVII (1932), 43-50; R. S. Rogers, "Tiberius' Reversal of an Augustan Policy," *Trans. Proc. Am. Phil. Ass.*, LXXI (1940), 532-36.

ample of Tiberius-Zeus Megistos),[53] but resumes force with Caligula. The *Legatio ad Gaium* of Philo paints an amazing picture of the divine megalomania of the Emperor, who identified himself with several deities (see works by Balsdon, Eitrem, Koll, and Willrich).[54]

Then comes Claudius, whose pretensions are ridiculed in Seneca's *Apokolocyntosis*.[55]

For the Flavians, there is Scott's unsurpassed monograph (which is a study of their whole ruler-cult), as well as a few other articles.[56]

Antinous, the minion of Hadrian, identified after death with different deities, is examined by Weber, Mehlis, Wernicke, and Wilcken.[57] For Hadrian himself identified with different gods, see Perret.[58] Three articles by Aymard, Cumont, and Rostovtzeff are devoted to Commodus, who liked to identify himself with Hercules and Jupiter.[59] Finally

53. P. Riewald, *op. cit.*, p. 296, n. 1, perhaps a Tiberius-Mercury; A. de Boissieu, *Inscriptions antiques de Lyon* (Lyon, 1846-1854), esp. p. 606.

54. H. Willrich, "Caligula," *Klio*, III (1903), s. IX, 439-48; S. Eitrem, *op. cit.*, 3, Caligula, pp. 49-56; Koll, *The Ruler-Cult under Caligula*, Diss. Western Reserve University, 1932; J. P. V. D. Balsdon, *The Emperor Gaius (Caligula)* (Oxford, 1934), pp. 157-73.

55. O. Weinreich, *Apocolocyntosis, Die Satire auf Tod, Himmel-und Höllenfahrt des Kaisers Claudius* (Berlin, 1923); M. P. Charlesworth, "Deus noster Caesar," *Class. Rev.*, XXXIX (1925), 113-15, and "Flaviana III. Divus Claudius," *Jour. Rom. St.*, XXVII (1937), 57-60; K. Scott, "On Seneca's Apocolocyntosis," *Am. Jour. Philol.*, LII (1931), 66 ff.; S. Eitrem, *op. cit.*, 2, Zu Senecas Apocolocyntosis, pp. 130 ff. For Nero: McGannon, *Emperor Worship under Nero*, Diss. Western Reserve Un., 1931, (MS).

56. K. Scott, *The Imperial Cult under the Flavians* (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1936); O. Weinreich, *Studien zu Martial* (Stuttgart, 1928); F. J. Dölger, "Die Kaiservergötterung bei Martial und 'die Heiligen Fische Domitians,'" *Ant. und Christ.*, I (1929), 163-73; H. Frère, "Stace, Silvae IV praef. 5 suiv K," *Mél. P. Thomas* (1930), pp. 300-11 (on Vespasian); K. Scott, "Statius' Adulation of Domitian," *Am. Jour. Philol.*, LIV (1933), 247-59; F. Sauter, *Der römische Kaiserkult bei Martial und Statius* (Stuttgart, 1934), esp. pp. 4-16; P. Touilleux, *L'Apocalypse et les cultes de Domitian et Cybèle* (Paris, 1935); M. P. Charlesworth, "Some Observations . . . ," VI, The genius of Domitian and the second century, p. 32.

57. K. Wernicke, "Antinoos," *P.-W.*, I (1894), col. 2441; W. Weber, "Zwei Untersuchungen zur ägyptisch-griechischen Religion," II, Antinoos, *Progr. Heidel.* (1911), p. 19; C. Mehlis, "Antinous-Denkmünzen," *Philol. Woch.*, XLVI (1926), col. 1374-76; U. Wilcken, "Urkunden-Referat," *Archiv. f. Pap.*, IX (1930), 95 f. On Antinoos—Νέος Ἴαχχος (Tarsus and Adramyteum), A. D. Nock, "Notes . . . ," p. 34, n. 66.

58. L. Perret, *Le Titulature imperiale d'Hadrien* (Paris, 1929), pp. 30-33.

59. F. Cumont, "Jupiter summus exsuperantissimus," *Archiv. f. Religionswiss.*, IX (1906), 323-36; M. Rostovtzeff, "Commodus-Hercules in Britain," *Jour. Rom. St.*, XIII (1923), 91-109; J. Aymard, "Commode-Hercule fondateur de Rome," *Rev. Et. Lat.*, XIV (1936), 350-64.

an article by Aymard discusses the Antonine empresses who were compared with Venus,[60] and there are a number of studies on the emperors as Sol.[61]

Here is a field wide open for research by scholars who may be fascinated by our theme.

IV

Certain works devoted to deities have treated our special theme incidentally, as Anderson has done for Heracles, and Nock for Dionysos. For Zeus one should consult particularly the monographs of Cook and Frazer (who concerns himself also with Saturn, Dianus-Janus, Atys, Osiris, Adonis, and the Dioskuroi), and for Isis and Mercury, two articles by Drexler and Steuding.[62] We shall return later to the question considered from the point of view of the ancient writers.

As we have noted above, few works have been related directly to our theme, which too often has been treated as a minor part of the ruler-cult in general. How can this gap be filled? Before beginning, it is wise to know the obstacles to be encountered. The errors to be avoided in the analysis of our problem are:

1. To underestimate the extent of this process of deification, and to regard it as sporadic, negligible, or even abnormal.

To be content with the few cases always quoted is to renounce all intimations of the depth of the phenomenon. Our purpose here is not

60. J. Aymard, "Venus et les impératrices sous les deniers Antonins," *Mél. d'Arch. et d'hist.*, LI (1934), 178-96.

61. Th. Preger, "Constantinos-Helios," *Hermes*, XXXVI (1901), 457-69; J. Maurice, "La Dynastie solaire des seconds Flaviens," *Rev. Archéol.*, 4e sér., XVII (1911), 377-406; H. P. L'Orange, "Sol Invictus Imperator. Ein Beitrag zur Apotheose," *Symbol. Osl.*, XIV (1935), 86-114; F. Cumont, works on Mithra and the imperial solar-cult. On Pharaonic influences: J. Maurice, "Les pharaons romains," *Byzantion*, XII (1937), 71-103; H. P. L'Orange, "Das Geburtsritual der Pharaonen am römerischen Kaiserhof," *Symbol. Osl.*, XXVI (1941), 105-16.

62. A. R. Anderson, "Heracles and . . . ," Alexander, pp. 12-19; Romulus, pp. 29-31; Scipio, pp. 31-37; Pompey, pp. 37-39; J. Caesar, pp. 39-42, Antony, pp. 42-44, Augustus, pp. 44-58; A. D. Nock, "Notes . . . ," Alexander, pp. 21-30, Neos Dionysos, pp. 30-38; A. B. Cook, *Zeus*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1914); J. G. Frazer, *The Magic Art . . .*, ch. XIII (Kings of Rome and Alba as Jupiter), ch. XVIII (as Saturnus), ch. XXI (as Dianus-Janus), Vol. IV, *Atys and Osiris*, chs. IV and X; vol. V, *Adonis*, chs. II, VI, VII; *The Magical Origin of Kings*, ch. II (for Dioscuri). For Isis: W. Drexler, *op. cit.*, cols. 517-20; for Mercury: Studing, "Mercurius," *ibid.*, cols. 2817-19. For the dead represented as Hercules: J. Bayet, "Un Nouvel Hercule funéraire et l'héroïsation gréco-romaine en Thrace," *Mél. Arch.*, XLVI (1929), 1-42; as Neoi Dionysoi: A. D. Nock, "The Historical Importance . . . ," p. 108, n. 10.

to give the material, to make the heuristic of the sources, but we can assert that a serious inventory proves an astonishing abundance of cases, and attests to the fact that the theme, far from being exceptional or freakish is not only bound closely to the ruler-cult itself, but is the culmination of it.[63] To identify himself with a pre-existent god, is this not for a sovereign to reach the supreme height of divine honors?

2. To tend to reduce the question, or to give generalized explanations.

In the hisory of religions, too much generalization is an error. It is necessary to analyze shades of meaning, to dissect feelings, to weigh carefully everything which can arouse or sustain devotion—"one must think of seeing the complex side of things rather than simplifying them."[64] A philological criticism of the sources would be useless if one did not, at the same time, take care of the psychological aspect. Psychology presents a free field for interpretation, but it is advisable to treat religious problems with caution, especially in the Hellenistic age, when so many divergent interests meet in opposition, so many different conceptions come into conflict, and so many religions melt down into a complicated syncretism.

3. To fail to comprehend the atmosphere of the cult.

If ruler-worship offers possibilities so vast that one can only broach them, one cannot claim to explain a disputed point without studying its background. Likewise, one must not succumb to the temptation to isolate a Hellenistic kingdom from its world, thus restricting the thesis at the same time one proposes it. The modification of a part invariably affects the whole; although each state had its autonomous life, nevertheless, it was subject to the influence of its neighbors. And here arises another enormous difficulty: where does the influence of this neighbor begin, and where does the personal action end?

From the examination of these principal dangers to be avoided, proceed several apparently contradictory conclusions: we must, at the same time, break down and unify the data; we must divide each example for the analysis, and draw general conclusions for the synthesis. The most effective method for reconciling this apparent contradiction and ob-

63. J. L. Tondriau, doctoral dissertation (MS), quotes about 100 cases for the Hellenistic period and more than 200 for the Roman.

64. Cf. Préaux, C. R. of Brady, "The Reception of Egyptian Cults by the Greeks," *Chronique d'Egypte*, XXII (1936), 584.

taining tangible results, seems to require a fourfold operation: (1) to make a list of the cases offered by the Greco-Roman world; (2) to find out what state made the greatest use of our theme, and what deity was most often chosen as a model; (3) to make note of the most typical reigns; (4) to examine thoroughly the religious policy of each of these reigns.

And what are the total results? The enumeration of the cases proves singularly long and arduous, many of the comparisons or identifications (notably in sculpture and numismatics) proving to be poorly established if not dangerous. But the certain results attest sufficiently, none the less, to the vitality, dispersion, and continuity of the theme. Egypt is, incontestably, the Hellenistic state which presents by far the most numerous examples, and, as models, Dionysos shows a marked preference with the men, and, as is natural, Aphrodite with the women.

Finally, the last two points in the program demand a detailed monograph for each characteristic reign. This means that considerable toil awaits the pioneers—an undertaking exact in its minutest details; but in specifying details does not one make a real synthesis? Moreover, there is much to be hoped for from this kind of studies which could shed new light on the religious policies of most of the rulers.

It would be well, now, to outline the origins of the theme, its principal variants, and its general purposes.

Although our theme is characteristic of the Hellenistic period, nevertheless, it had precedents in the classical age. We do not need to enter the controversy over the origins of the ruler-cult (Greek, Asiatic, and Egyptian influences all have their champions, the best theory being that of a mixed origin),[65] nor to treat of the general divine honors accorded to personalities of the classical age, often in their lifetime.[66] These honors certainly influenced to a great extent the later deifications as well as the divine pretensions of countless philosophers, and the com-

65. See notes 3 and 14-15 supra. For Egypt: A. Moret, *Du charactère religieux de la royauté pharaonique* (Paris, 1902), and *Rois et dieux d'Egypte* (Paris, 1925); F. Preisigke, *Vom göttlichen Fluidum nach ägypt. Anschauung* (Heidelberg, 1920). Professor Capart has called to my attention the importance of the pharaonic festival Heb-Sed in assimilating the king to Osiris, and insisting on *wḥm mśwt*, "renewal of births."

66. The chief examples are: Agesilaos, Cimo, Clearchus, Dionysios Jr., Diokles, Dio Evagoras, Lycurgus, Lysander, Pericles, Thero, Timoleon, Zaleucus, Alcibiades, Elissa of Tyre, and Semiramis seem to be instances of later legend-making. See Tondriaeu, "Le Point culminant . . . ," p. 100, n. 2.

parisons of artists and poets. There are the following examples: Aidoneus, King of Molossi, who named his wife Proserpine, his daughter Kore, and his dog Cerberus; Theseus, sometimes likened to Heracles; Ceyx and his wife, Halcyone, who called themselves Zeus and Hera; Artemisia and Mausoleus, represented in statues as Demeter and Heracles; Clearchus, tyrant of Heraclea, who carried a thunderbolt like Zeus, and named one of his sons Keraunos; Dionysios the younger of Syracuse, who, claiming to be a son of Apollo, called his daughters Virtue, Wisdom, and Justice; Pericles nicknamed Zeus by Cratinos, and "the Olympian" by some Athenians, whose concubine, Aspasia, was called Nea Omphale, Dejanira, and Hera, by the comic authors.[67] The most typical examples are furnished by King Salmoneus, who identified himself with Zeus, wielding the thunderbolt, and by various physicians who, no doubt jealous of Hippocrates of Cos, identified themselves with the gods, such as Menekrates, physician to Philip of Macedon, who played at being Zeus, surrounding himself with a divine court, recruited mainly from persons he had cured, among whom were the Argive Nicostratos, posing as Heracles, Nicagoras of Zelea as Hermes, Astykreon as Apollo, and the grammarian, Alexarchos, as Helios.[68]

The transition to the Hellenistic period is made by Philip II, who, if he mocked at the pretensions of Menekrates as Zeus, did not disdain (probably at the instigation of his panegyrist, Isocrates) to build for himself a Philippeion at Olympia, and, shortly before his death, to have his statue carried in procession among those of the twelve major gods at Aegae.[69]

67. Aidoneus: Plutarch, *Theseus,* 31; Aul. Sabinus, Ep., 2, 10; Theseus: Plut., *Theseus,* passim; Ceyx: Clem Alex., *Protr.,* IV, 54; Artemisia-Mausoleus: cf. J. Six, "Ikonographische Studien, XIV," *Mitt. deutsch. Arch. Inst.,* Röm. Abt. XIV (1899), 81-83; A. D. Nock, "Notes . . . ," p. 32 and n. 55; Clearchus: Plut., *Fort. Alex.,* 2, 5 (cf. H. Apfel, *Die Tyrannis von Heraklea,* Diss. Halle, 1910); Pericles: Plut., *Pericles,* passim; Aristophanes, *Acharn.,* 530; Val. Max., 5, 10, 1; Aspasia: Plut., *Pericles,* 24.

68. Hippocrates: Pliny, *N. H.,* 7, 37; Menekrates: Ath., 7, p. 289 a-f.; Clem. Alex., *Protr.,* IV, 54; Suidas, s.v. *Menekrates*; Aelian., *Hist. Var.,* 12, 51; Plut., *Ages.* 21 and *Apopht. Lac.,* 213 A and *Reg.,* 131 A.; Nikostratos: Ath., 7, p. 289 b; Nicagoras: Ath., 7, p. 289 c; Clem Alex., *Protr.* See also O. Weinreich, *Menekrates-Zeus* . . . , esp. pp. 98-104.

69. Mocking Menekrates: Aelian., *Hist. Var.,* 12, 51; Isocrates: F. Taeger, "Isocrates und die Anfänge des hellenistischen Herrscherkultes, *Hermes,* LXXII 1937), 355-60 (cf. Isocr., *To Phil.,* 117, 144, 152); Philippeion: Paus., 5, 20, 9; statue: Diod. Sic., 16, 92, 5 and 95 1. On the 13th god: A. D. Nock, "Notes . . . ," p. 22, n. 7; O.

Alexander amplifies these divine claims, presenting himself as a god, though there is no conclusive proof that he proclaimed himself Neos Dionysos. However, his lieutenant, Clitus, posed as Poseidon, after having captured several triremes at Amorgos.[70]

The idea is launched herewith, and will be taken up and exploited by the Diadochi. Athens begins the series with her splendid festivals in honor of Demetrius the Besieger, but it still remains to be proved that he was identified with Dionysos.[71] At any rate, this is only an isolated phenomenon, resulting from a wave of gratitude toward the liberator: the role of the dynast proved more passive than active.

Egypt was the first Hellenistic state to exploit the theme systematically. The Alexandrian court had unusual advantages which simplified its task: nowhere had the divinity of the monarch been so characteristic as with the Pharaohs, and no people were so religious as the Egyptians. The Lagids, then, in principle, had received a heritage propitious for deification. Moreover, the presence in the kingdom of the corpse of Alexander conferred on its possessors special prestige, and facilitated their plans. No wonder, then, that Ptolemy IV Philopator was the first Hellenistic monarch to identify himself with Dionysos. He was imitated by Ptolemy XII Auletes and Mark Antony, his successors on the Alexandrian throne.[72]

The idea spread rapidly in the Hellenistic world, and Dionysos was to receive the favor of the Attalids of Pergamon and Mithridates Eupator of Pontos, as he had enjoyed the approbation of the Ptolemies. The Seleucids gave their preference to Zeus or Apollo, while Macedonia, Thrace, and Greece in general remained outside the pattern.[73] Even Actium did not end the movement, which finally infiltrated Italy as well.

V

And what about Rome? There very different influences seem to have been at work to popularize our theme: the belief that the first kings of

Weinreich, "Zwölfgötter, Zwölfzahl und Zwölfstaat," *Aus. Unterr. und Forschung,* (1935), pp. 319-331. On his "divine" wife, Myrtale-Olympias: W. Tritsch, *Olympias, die Mutter Alexanders des Grossen* (Frankfort, 1936).

70. See notes 17-19 supra; on Clitus: Plut., *Fort. Alex.,* 2, 5.

71. Note 36 supra.

72. Notes 21-34 supra.

73. Notes 35, 37-40 supra.

Alba and Rome had been incarnations of Jupiter;[74] the celebration of triumphs, in which the victorious generals were adorned with the trappings of Juppiter Optimus Maximus, if not identified with him;[75] claims of descent from Mars or Venus;[76] the tremendous propaganda of philosophers and poets (especially Ennius, who sang the divinity of Romulus and assimilated him to the Sabine god, Quirinus, and Plautus, who spoke of men as *Juppiter terrestris,* or *Juppiter Lenonius;*[77] examples of deification of ancient kings and warriors, famous generals and administrators.[78] Among these precedents are several interesting legendary identifications, such as that of Aeneas with Jupiter Indigetes, of Latinus with Jupiter Latiaris, Lavinia with Venus, the shepherd Faustulus with Faunus, Nicostrate with Carmenta, Romulus with Mars-Quirinus (an important case because of Augustus' later assimilation to Romulus).[79] Among the historical cases to be noted are Camillus, identified with Mercury; Marius, who, after his victory over the Cimbri, imitated Bacchus' manner of drinking; Sulla, who assumed the title Epaphroditos; Pompey, who parodied the triumph of Bacchus; his son, Sextus, whom popular belief assimilated to Neptune; the historian, Theophanes of Mitylene, likened to Zeus Eleutherios at Lesbos; and Fulvia, first wife of Antony, represented on coins as Nike or Dea Victoria.[80]

74. Frazer, *Golden Bough, op. cit.,* Vol. II, ch. XIII.

75. This is the opinion of J. G. Frazer, W. W. Fowler, K. Scott, L. R. Taylor, and O. Weinreich; contra, J. G. Reid, *op. cit.,* pp. 177-82. See also Bruhl, "Les Influences hellénistiques dans le triomphe romain," *Mél. d'arch. et d'hist.,* XLVI (1929), 77-95; E. Wunderlich, "Bedeutung der roten Farbe in Kultus," *R.G.V.V.,* XX, 1 (Giessen, 1925).

76. H. M. R. Leopold, "Venus als Tockomstgodin in de eerste eeuw van Christus," *Med. van het Nederl. Hist. Inst. te Rome,* VI (1936).

77. Cf. G. Sigwart, "König Romulus bei Ennius," *Klio,* XVII (1921), 16-32; E. Fränkel, *Plautinisches im Plautus* (Berlin, 1922), esp. pp. 38-50, 95, 115.

78. For those cases: F. Pfister, *Der Reliquienkult . . . ,* II, 593-606; H. Seyrig, "Inscript. de Gythion," *Rev. Arch.,* XXIX (1929), 95, n. 4.

79. Aeneas: Livy, I. 2.6 Latinus, Lavinia, Faustulus: E. Pais—J. Bayet, Hist. Gén. de Glotz, *Hist. Rom.,* I, 50 f.; Nicostrate: Strabo, 5, 3, 3; Romulus: K. Scott, "The Indentification of Augustus with Romulus-Quirinus," *Trans. Proc. Am. Phil. Ass.* LVI (1925), 82105; Gertrude Hirst, "The Significance of Augustior as Applied to Hercules and to Romulus: A Note on Livy, I, 7, 9," *Amer. Jour. Philol.,* XLVII (1926), 347-57; J. Gagé, "Romulus Augustus," *Mél. d'arch. et d'hist.,* XLVII (1930), 138-81; Sil. Ital., 17, 648-51, compares Romulus to Liber and Tirynthius (Hercules); for a mockery of this divine kinship, see Ruesch, *Guida illustrato del Museo Nazionale di Napoli* (Naples, 1908), p. 291, no. 1265.

80. Camillus: Juba Maurit., *F. H. G.*; Müller, III, p. 469, no. 7—Plut., *Numa,* 7, 6;

These cases, and the example of the foreign kings, contributed to the spread of our theme in the Roman Empire, where it was adopted by practically all the emperors, even Augustus. Nevertheless, the Roman theme was only a derivation of the Hellenistic, and met with only limited approval on the part of the Roman people, and it is noteworthy that the sane emperors seem to have given in to it only in so far as it strengthened their power or helped their political propaganda. Indeed, it was clever policy to encourage demonstrations of loyalty in the provinces from which it was well to profit without examining the causes.

VI

To outline the different values and variants of the theme remains a delicate undertaking. Each case is subjected to diverse mixtures of politics, religion, flattery, opportunism, etc., but, nevertheless, it is possible to discern the major currents. For political, religious, or merely private reasons, the ruler is presented, or more often presents himself, as the incarnation of a god. Here it is more than simply a matter of prestige, and it is only at a later period, under the megalomaniac emperors, that the theme deteriorates. This "masculine" theme really constitutes the high point of the ruler-cult, with Dionysos as the favorite model, especially in the Hellenistic period.

Side by side with this identification, there exists a theme of poetical and symbolical inspiration, frequently deprived of theological values. The product of fawning sycophancy, constraint, or fear, nevertheless, it sometimes denotes gratitude or genuine admiration for a benefactor.[81]

Marius: Val. Max., 3, 6, 6; Sulla: Plut., *Sulla*, 34; cf. M. Poplawski, "L'Apothéose de Sulla et d'Auguste," *Eos*, XXX (1927), 273-38; C. Lanzani, "La venere Sillana," *Historia*, I (1927); Pompey: Pliny, *N. H.*, 8, 2, 2; Sextus Pompey: Dio Cass., 48, 31, 5; Theophanes: *I. G.*, XII, 2, 163; Fulvia: B. V. Head, *Historia Numorum* (Oxford, 1911), p. 673. For Romulus, Scipio, Pompey, Caesar, Antony as Hercules: see Anderson, note 62 supra (many cases seem doubtful). For Sulla and Lucullus probably as Dioscuri: Rhys Carpenter, "The Identity of the Ruler," *Am. Jour. Arch.*, XLIX (1945), 353-57.

81. There is a slight difference between comparison and indentification with a god, see A. D. Nock, "Note . . . ," p. 32; there is also a difference between a mere expression of gratitude and a real cult: A. D. Nock, "Severi and Augustales," *Mél. Bidez* (Brussels, 1934), p. 627. According to the Greek view, anyone is free to thank his benefactor as he sees fit, even by deifying him: H. Hepding, "Der Kult der Euergetai," *Klio*, XX (1925), 490 f.; K. Scott, "Ruler-Cult and Related Problems in the Greek Romances," *Class. Philol.*, XXXIII (1938), 388 f.; A. D. Nock, "Notes . . . ," p. 31, n. 51 f.; M. P. Charlesworth, "Some Observations . . . ," s. 1, 8-16; Vergil, *Bucolics.*, 1, 7: "Namque erit ille (Octavian) mihi semper deus. . . ."

Being a symbolical theme, it applies especially to queens, and naturally prefers Aphrodite as a model. Its importance must not be underestimated, since it frequently served to support the "masculine" theme, especially in Egypt.[82] An unexpected development of this theme occurred in relation to courtesans. Demetrius the Besieger, not content to have his wife, Phila, called Aphrodite by the Thebans, permitted his mistresses, Leaina and Lamia, also to be identified with the goddess.[83] After the death of the empress, Arsinoe II, Ptolemy II authorized statues of his mistresses, with Clino holding a cornucopia, and Bilistiche as Aphrodite.[84] There was no reason to deny to male favorites what had been granted to courtesans, and thus Themison, minion of Antiochus II, was called Heracles, and Antinous was identified posthumously with various gods, but mainly Dionysos.[85]

Another curious variant is the identification of male rulers with goddesses, to which Alföldi and Eitrem have devoted a brief study.[86] Completing their list, we have the following examples: Alexander as Artemis, Demetrius the Besieger and Ptolemy I as Athena, Ptolemy IV perhaps as Aphrodite, Germanicus as Nike, Drusus as Aphrodite, Caligula as Hera, Artemis, and Aphrodite, Nero perhaps as Cybele, Pescennius Niger with the attributes of Isis, Elagabalus as Venus, the Great Mother of the Gods, and perhaps as Diana, and Gallienus as a goddess.[87] The

82. Ptolemy II benefited greatly from the deification of Arsinoe II; and the same for Ptolemy VIII Evergetes II and Cleopatra III, see W. O.-H. Bengston, *op. cit.* On the activity of the queens, see G. H. Macurdy, *Hellenistic Queens,* (Baltimore, 1932).

83. Phila: *Polemon ap. Ath.,* 6p. 253 b, 254 a; Leaina and Lamia: *Demochares Ath.,* 6p. 253 a.

84. Clino: Ath., 10p. 425 e, 13 p. 576 f.; Bilistichè: Plut. *Amator.,* 9. Also, F. Lenormant, "La Vénus de l'Esquilin et le Diadumène de Polyclète," *Gaz. archéol.,* III (1877). 128-52. The cases of Flora (Plut., *Pompey,* 2) and Larentina (Tertul., *Apol.,* 13, 9 and 25, 9) are probably later legend-making.

85. Themison: *Pythermos ap. Ath.,* 7 p. 289 f—290 a; Antinous: see note 57 supra. It is also noteworthy that Argynnos, Agamemnon's minion, had received a monument called, "of Aphrodite Argynnis" Ath. 13 p. 603 d).

86. A. Alföldi, "Zur Kenntniss . . . , 2. Das Problem des 'verweiblichten' Kaisers Gallienus," *Zeits. f. Numis.,* XXXVIII (1928), 187-94; S. Eitrem, "Zur Apotheose . . . ," 3: Der Androgyne Herscher, pp. 132-34. Cf. A. Bertholet, *Das Geschlecht der Göttheit* (Tübingen, 1934); G. S. Marr, *Sex in Religion: An Historical Survey* (London, 1936).

87. S. Eitrem, "Zur Apotheose . . . ," p. 134. Also, Ptolemy IV: F. Courby, *op. cit.,* pp. 509-13; Nero: F. Imhoof-Blümer, *Kleinasiatische Münzen* (Vienna, 1901-1902), II, 521, n. 2; P. Niger: *Hist. Aug. Niger,* 6; Elagabalus as Diana: B. Pick, "Inedita der Sammlung Mandl in Budapest," *Num. Zeits.,* XXIII (1891), 66, no. 21, 67.

motive of this theme seems to be the desire to annex feminine qualities and thus increase the stock of glorious "virtues" of the ruler. What appears to facilitate this is the "deification" of certain abstractions, particularly virtues ascribed to the sovereign.

The cult of these abstractions was practiced especially in the Roman period, but the Hellenistic world also knew them.[88] It had celebrated the Victory of a monarch by applying to him the title (Theos) Nikephoros, or commemorated his *soteria* by naming him Soter, or by praising him as Euergetes, source of harmony.[89] It went so far as to identify Ptolemy VI Philometor with Dikaiosyne, and Vitellius with Concordia.[90] Upon these conceptions is based the political philosophy of the ancient rulers,[91] though sometimes they are content with more prosaic ideas, for example, the Hellenistic Tryphe.[92]

Finally, beside the "masculine" theme and the "symbolical" theme, there existed a mitigated form, having its origins also in Egypt, i.e., the adoption of the title Epiphanes, containing the idea of divine apparition, on which subject the works of Pfister, Nock, and Pertinax should be consulted, as well as that of Weinreich on the subject of the related title, Θεοὶ Ἐπήκοοι.[93]

88. There is a vast literature to be quoted here: principally, J. Gagé, "La Théologie de la victoire impériale," *Rex. hist.*, CLXXI (1933), 1-43; L. Berlinger, *Beiträge zur inoffiziellen Titulatur der röm. Kaiser*, Diss. Breslau, 1935; M. P. Charlesworth, "The Virtues of a Roman Emperor: Propaganda and the Creation of Belief," *Proc. Brit. Acad.*, XXIII (1937), 105-33.

89. See principally Kruse, "Nikephoros," P.-W.², 33 (1936), cols. 310 f.; H. Linssen, ΘΕΟΣ ΣΩΤΗΡ, Diss. Bonn, 1929; E. Skard, "Zwei religiös-politische Begriffe: Euergetes-Concordia," *Avhandl. u.a.d. norske Videns. Akad. i Oslo* (1931), 1-106.

90. Plut., *Fort. Alex.*, 2, 6; Ptolemy VI: P. Grenfell, II, 15, col. 1, 8, and P. Adler, I col. 1, 5; Vitellius: *Hist. Aug. Vitell.*, 15, 8.

91. E. Goodenough, "The Political Philosophy of Hellenistic Kingship," *Yale Class. Stud.*, 1 (1928), 55-102; E. Kostermann, "Statio Principis," *Philol.*, LXXXVII (1932), 358-68, 430-44; P. Zancan, *Il monarcato ellenistico nei suoi elementi federativo* Padua, 1934); W. Schubart, "Das hellenistische Königsideal nach Inschriften und Papyri," *Archiv. f. Pap.*, XII (1936), 1-26, and "Das Königsbild des Hellenismus," *Antike*, XIII (1937), 272-88.

92. A. Passerini, "La Τρυφή nella storiografia ellenistica," *Stud. Ital. fil. class.*, N. S., II (1934), 35-56; J. L. Tondriau, "La Tryphè, philosophie royale ptolémaïque," *Etudes Ancien.*, next issue.

93. F. Pfister, "Epiphanie," cols. 277-323; A. D. Nock, "Notes . . . ," III, Ptolemy Epiphanes, pp. 38-41; J. Pertinax, *Das Motiv der Wiedergeburt in Mythos, Religion und Dichtung* (Radolfzell, 1935). With Nock, and contra Pfister (cols. 306-9), we admit Egyptian origins, and remark that Ptolemy IV Philopator was already called Epiphanes: *P. Frankf.*, 3, 1.10 (10th year of the reign). O. Weinreich, "Θεοὶ Ἐπήκοοι," *Mitt. deutsch. Arch. Inst.*, Gr. Abt., XXXVII (1912), 1-68.

All these forms are accompanied by a multitude of minor variants:[94] divine surnames; priesthood and piety; claims to divine lineage; the direct kinship or special protection of a deity; images and cult statues; theogamy; cases of *sunnaos;* assumption of divine attributes or clothing; travesty of sacred meals (where, in the most famous case, it is surprising to find the future emperor Augustus as Apollo); honorific months; ascensions and "celestial transportations"; the presidency of religious associations (for example, the Technitai mentioned above); divine titles, such as Kyrios, Theos Megas, or Megistos; special invocations; feasts and processions of deification (the most typical being that of Ptolemy II Philadelphos); birthdays and sacred days; apotheosis, "heroization," proskynesis, etc. All these manifestations tend sooner or later toward the same objective: to deify the reigning monarch, or—the supreme aim—to identify him in his lifetime with a god.[95] But it is curious to observe the hesitations, even the contradictions, found in the royal religion: sometimes the ruler is a hero, a son or other relative of a deity; sometimes identified with a god or goddess, or simply associated with them.[96] Immisch tried to explain the phenomenon by the Greek belief in divine immanence: since the Divine Soul impregnates all nature, it is immaterial whether a man is considered to be a god, a hero, or a being intermediate between humanity and divinity. However, we

94. It is not possible to give a full bibliography here, but the following are especially pertinent to our question: for the titles Iouius and Herculius applied to Roman emperors, see Suidas, s.v. *Iobeioi and Herkouleioi*; for other variants see the following studies: F. Dirlmeier, "Θεοφιλία–φιλοθεία," *Philol.,* XC (1935), 55-77, 176-93; K. Scott, "The Significance of Statues in Precious Metals in Emperor Worship," *Trans. Proc. Am. Phil. Assoc.,* LXII (1931), 101-23; A. Klinz, Ἱερὸς γάμος, Diss. Halle, 1933 (for the marriage of the Athenian queen to Dionysos, pp. 72-74); A. D. Nock, "Σύνναος Θεός"; G. H. Macurdy, "The Grammar of Drinking Healths," *Am. Jour. Philol.,* LIII (1932), 168-71; A. Alföldi, "Die Ausgestaltung des monarchischen Zeremoniells am römischer Kaiserhofe," *Mitt. deutsch. Arch. Inst.,* Röm. Abt. XLIX (1934), 3-118, and "Insignien und Tracht der röm. Kaiser," *Ibid.,* L (1935), 139-54; J. Horst, *Proskynein* (Gütersloh, 1932); K. Scott, "The Honorific Months In Greek and Roman Calendars," *Yale Class. Stud.,* II (1931), 201-78; L. Cerfaux, "Le Titre Kyrios et la dignité royale de Jésus," *Rev. sc. philos. et théol.,* XI (1922), 40-71; XII (1923), 125-53, and "Adonai et Kyrios," *Ibid.,* XX (1931), 417-52; Williger, "Kyrios," *P.-W,* XII (1924), cols. 176-83; B. Mueller, Μέγας θεός, *Diss. Philol. Hal.,* XXI, 3 (1913); S. Eitrem, "Zur Apotheose," and M. P. Charlesworth, "Some Observations . . . ," contain many valuable reflections on this subject.

95. For the development in Ptolemaic Egypt, see J. L. Tondriau, "Le Point culminant . . . ," pp. 107 f.

96. E.g., Hadrian is, at the same time, descendant of Dionysos and Neos Dionysos: A. D. Nock, "Notes . . . ," p. 34, n. 67.

prefer Delatte's solution and see here only "divergent forms of expression of a rather vague popular faith."[97] Moreover, the numerous private cults also had their influence, and everyone was free to deify his patron as he pleased.

What were the objectives aimed at? This is the place to contemplate a saying of Claire Préaux: "There are problems which it is wrong to try to reduce to a single element. That of the divinity of the Hellenistic kings is one of them. One should note local and social distinctions."[98] It would be as fallacious to attempt to discover all the motives for a deification as to claim that it was the result of a single cause. Each country, each king, was faced with totally different problems, and solved them in their own fashion, with more or less success. Certainly there were norms, similarities, like reactions and results, but we must not flatter ourselves, when we have the luck to discover a "how," that we are certain of deducing the "why." It is, then, not one cause, but a combination of causes which one must look for, in each particular example. Nevertheless, there are, let us repeat, common features, reasons which seem specifically Hellenistic for comparing or identifying a monarch with a deity. The following are the two most patent.

The successors of Alexander were Greco-Macedonians who, by the right of conquest, occupied thrones usurped from native sovereigns. It was shrewd of them to present themselves as the rightful heirs of these powers by divine right. To identify themselves with gods was a clever scheme to secure the veneration of their subjects, to unite their disparate populations, and consolidate their position as dynasts. But we must avoid the fallacy of believing that the royal cult was the only tool which assured the power of the ruler;[99] Bikerman has shown the error of this hypothesis in so far as the Seleucids are concerned.[100]

The second explanation is the gratitude owed to benefactors.[101] We

97. O. Immisch, "Zum Antiken Herrscherkult. Aus Roms Zeitwende," *Das Erbe der Alten,* XX (1931), 8; L. Delatte, *op. cit.,* p. 130.

98. Anal. of C. W. MacEwan, "The Oriental Origin of Hellenistic Kingship," *Chronique d'Egypte,* XXII (1936), 585.

99. W. S. Ferguson, *op. cit.,* p. 15; M. Rostovtzeff, *ibid.,* 162; U. v. Wilamowitz, *Der Glaube der Hellenen,* II (Berlin, 1932), 264.

100. E. Bikerman, *Op. cit.,* pp. 256 f.; see also A. Heuss, "Stadt und Herrscher des Hellenismus," *Klio,* Beiheft XXXIX (1937).

101. A. D. Nock, "Σύνναος Θεός," p. 51; M. P. Charlesworth, "Some Observations . . . ," p. 8; H. Windisch, "Friedensbringer-Götterssöhne," *Zeits. f. neutest. Wiss.,* XXIV (1925), 240-60.

find the loudest echo of this in the hymn which the Athenians sang to Demetrius the Besieger, which Weinreich calls "that complete arsenal of important historico-religious motifs." It declares: "The other gods are distant, or else they hear us not, or else they pay us no heed; thou, on the contrary, we see thee present, thou art neither of wood nor of stone, but real. We implore thee, O most dear one, give us first of all Peace, for thou art its master. . . ."[102] Is this not the spontaneous cry of a people who, after the vicissitudes of war, long for the joys of peace, and who, deceived in the hopes of aid from invisible gods, entrust their future to a more tangible benefactor? Are they not the same accents which were sounded on the accession of Augustus?

It is proper to say a word here about *Neos*.[103] For both the "masculine" and "symbolic" themes, the name of the existing deity is normally preceded by the word Neos. The use of this adjective is far from unimportant, as has sometimes been thought. Besides the attraction of everything *new*, from which magical virtues emanate,[104] an attraction which the new god shares, there is also the need, on the part of the beneficiary, to define the extent of his incarnation; he assumes the name and powers of the ancient deity, *but he places them on a new plane*. It was necessary to make innovations, because the people always desire novelty; but it is never good to be too revolutionary, and to break abruptly with tradition. Neos, therefore, reconciled ancient beliefs and modern exigencies. Rulers borrowed from the past the good it had to offer, and dressed it in new clothing. Neos sums up all this politico-mystical content.

The choice of models varied according to personal taste or local needs. Aphrodite-Venus, goddess of womanly beauty and power, was naturally the best choice for the princesses. As for Dionysos, if he prevails over the other gods, it is because he enjoyed the greatest international prestige at that time; also, he was "the most Attic of the gods,"[105] and the one who, by his astonishing power of syncretism, was able to assimilate all the others to himself. He was the god of royalty par excel-

102. *Duris ap. Ath.* 6p. 253 e; O. Weinreich, "Antikes Gottmenschentum," p. 247.

103. On the Neoi Theoi: O. Weinreich, "Antikes Gottmenschentum," pp. 644 f.; A. D. Nock, "Studies . . . ," p. 93, "Notes . . . ," pp. 35 f. On the comparative form: H. Oppermann, "Neotera," *P.-W.*², 16, 2 (1935), col. 2478.

104. S. Eitrem, *P. Osloenses*, 1, 100, 1.266.

105. W. S. Ferguson, *Hellenistic Athens* (London, 1911), p. 222.

lence—the Victor over his enemies, the Conqueror, the Triumphant.[106] Finally, he was the characteristic god of re-incarnation, and the favorite of the religious associations which played an important part in the ruler-cult.[107] It can be concluded that "no other god met with so great favor in the different regions of the Hellenized world,"[108] and that if any Greek god were able to conquer the whole world, Dionysos was the only possible one.[109] As for Zeus-Jupiter and Hera-Juno, it is not surprising that they were also popular for our theme, as the divine couple ruling in the heavens as the royal couple rules on earth.[110] The connection was too obvious not to lead to comparison and then identification. Moreover, at Rome, there was possibly confusion between the name of the goddess and *juno,* a common noun designating the *genius* of a woman.[111] In Egypt, the success of Aphrodite was heightened by her assimilation to Isis, while, at Rome, the claim of the Julian house to be her descendents conferred upon her increasing prominence. Around these major deities gravitated, with greater or less success, the "minor" divinities. Finally, it is noteworthy that Mark Antony spectacularly abandoned his model, Heracles, when he took charge of affairs in Egypt; from that time on it was Dionysos who received the favor of the triumvir, who ended up by presenting himself as Neos Dionysos.[112]

VII

The last step in our study should be an analysis of the opinions held by the ancients themselves on this theme of deification. We should examine, first, the point of view of authors, both proponents and opponents; secondly, the point of view of the rulers themselves; and thirdly, the point of view of the common people. But, even when this lengthy analysis is complete, one cannot hope for an exact estimate, because the data is too fragmentary. Moreover, the ideas of the same person may have varied according to circumstances, and a ruler per-

106. W. Otto, *Dionysos, Mythos und Kultus* (Frankfort, 1933), pp. 183 f.

107. F. Poland, *Geschichte des griechischen Vereinwesen* (Leipzig, 1909), p. 196.

108. F. Cumont, *Religions orientales,* p. 195.

109. W. W. Tarn, *Op. cit.,* p. 316.

110. Cf. G. W. Elderkin, "The Marriage of Zeus and Hera and Its Symbol," *Am. Jour. Arch.,* XLI (1937), 424-35.

111. E.g., see *Tib.,* 3, 19, 15; Juno even meant *coniux:* Plautus, *Cas.,* 230: "Heia, mea Iuno, non decet esse te tam tristem tuo Ioui."

112. On this evolution: K. Scott, *The Imperial Cult under the Flavians,* p. 6, n. 4; and Tondriau, "Thiases dionysiaques . . . ," pp. 160 f.

sonally opposed to the cult may have given in to it, either because he saw its advantages, or feared to displease his subjects. We should not forget that the important thing is not so much what one *is* as what one seems to be. An article by Scott on humor at the expense of the ruler-cult might leave the impression that the sovereigns and their courts remained rather sceptical in this matter of deification.[113] Perhaps so, but human vanity is so unfathomable, and flattery so eager to excel itself, that we may be certain the question was regarded quite seriously, witness the abundance of examples, the care and expense employed , the vast propaganda, and the persistence of the theme.

We have mentioned the exterior ceremonial, and the question of propaganda is also worth a brief consideration.[114] Several rulers had the privilege of being praised and deified by eminent panegyrists,[115] for example, Philip II by Isocrates, Ptolemy II by Theocritus and Callimachus, and Augustus by Vergil, Horace, and Ovid.[116] Some had only shameless flatterers like Martial and Statius.[117] Others had to endure the mockeries of writers, imitators of Aristophanes, and opponents of the cult. In general, the independent authors condemned the deification of human beings, and especially identification with the gods, as is notably the case with Cicero, Seneca, Dion Cassius, Plutarch, and Lucian,[118] to say nothing of the determined opposition of Christians and Jews.

113. K. Scott, "Humor at the Expense of the Ruler-Cult," *Class. Philol.*, XXVII (1932), 317-28; P. Friedländer, "Lachende Götter," *Antike*, X (1934), 209-26; H. Kleinknecht, "Zur Parodie der Gottmenschentums bei Aristophanes," *Archiv f. Religionswiss.*, XXXIV (1937), 294-313, and *Die Gebetsparodie in der Antike* (Stuttgart, and Berlin, 1937).

114. Cf. W. Otto and H. Bengston, *Op. cit.* (for Ptolemy VIII Euergetes II); M. P. Charlesworth, "The Virtues of . . . ," pp. 105-33, and "Some Fragments . . . ," pp. 172-77; K. Scott, "Octavian's Propaganda . . . ," and "The Political Propaganda of 44-30 B.C.," *Mem. Am. Acad. in Rome*, II (1933); E. A. Haight, *op. cit.*; H. J. Rose, *op. cit.*; On propaganda in general: L. W. Doob, *Propaganda: Its Psychology and Technique* (New York, 1935).

115. L. K. Born, "The Perfect Prince according to the Latin Panegyrists," *Am. Jour. Philol.*, LV (1934), 20-35; K. Scott, "Emperor Worship . . . ," I, The power of poetry to deify, pp. 44-46, and "Ruler-Cult and . . . ," pp. 380-89 (for Chariton, Heliodorus, Xenepho of Ephesus, and Ach. Tatius, concerning ruler-cult at the Persian court).

116. F. Taeger, *op. cit.*, G. Schlatter, *Theokrit und Kallimachos*, Diss. Zurich, 1941; for Augustus, see note 50 supra.

117. See note 56 supra: Scott, Weinreich, and Sauter.

118. Aristophanes: H. Kleinknecht, see note 113 supra; Cicero: J. J. Sullivan, "Consecration" in Cicero, *Class. Weekly*, XXXVII (1944); Seneca: M. Altman, "Ruler-Cult in Seneca" *Class. Philol.*, XXXIII (1938), 198-204; Dion Cassius: F. Taeger, "Zum

One might say (to parody Tertullian) that to deify a monarch is "while changing the name of the prince at the bottom of our heart, to dedicate a model and an image of our hopes," but, with Seneca, we must deplore the abuse and observe that the majesty of the gods suffers from the vulgarizing of the cult, because "such an honor should not be squandered. Formerly it was a serious matter to be deified; today they have made of it a bean-mime."[119] It is obvious that the more the custom was discussed and defamed, the more necessary it was to have recourse to an intensified propaganda. For this purpose coins played an important role in the country districts and isolated spots.[120]

"If in our folly we seek to reach Heaven itself," suggests Horace, "can we reproach princes for having yielded to temptation?"[121] "The ruler-cult appeared to the ancients always as one of the effects (whether damnable or praiseworthy) of the superhuman position that a monarch assumes among men. For it was an error of the Gentiles, says St. Jerome, to consider every man above them as a god."[122]

We hope that this article will serve to stimulate research in one of the most exciting fields of study of the ancient way of life. Before criticizing a fact, it is well to meditate upon a thought of Pirandello: "Facts are like bags. If they are empty, they do not stand upright. In order for a fact to stand upright and have a meaning, it is first necessary to understand the motives and feelings which provoked it."

Kampf den antiken Herrscherkult," *Archiv. f. Religionswiss.*, XXXII (1935), 282-92; Plutarch: K. Scott, "Plutarch and the Ruler-Cult," *Trans. Proc. Am. Phil. Assoc.*, LX (1929), 117-35; for Lucian, see his *Portraits* and *Defence of the Portraits*. Also consult: K. Scott, "Tacitus and the *Speculum Principis*," *A.I.P.*, LIII (1932), 62-72; Tenney Frank, "Curiatius Maternus and His Tragedies," *Am. Jour. Philol.*, LVIII (1937), 225-29; V. Valdenberg, "La Théorie monarchique de Dion Chrysostome," *Rev. Et. Gr.*, XL (1927), 142-62, esp. 147 ff. and 151.

119. Tertullian, *Apol.*, 35, 11; Seneca, *Apocol.*, 9, 3; Petron., *Satir*, 17, 5.

120. M. P. Charlesworth, "The Virtues . . . ," pp. 110-15.

121. *Carm.*, 1, 3, 38; see the interesting commentary of L. Delatte, "Caelum ipsum petimus stultitia . . . ," *Antiq. Class.*, IV (1935), 309-36.

122. E. Bikerman, *op. cit.*, p. 257.

MARTIN BUBER'S RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY: A REVIEW ARTICLE*

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IN THE FULLNESS OF HIS YEARS, Martin Buber stands as living proof that the creative vitality of the Jewish religious genius still flourishes. At seventy, he can look back on a life of great productive activity and of service to the Zionist cause. His thought has been an inspiration not only to Jews, but also to Christian theologians, both Protestant and Catholic, and to philosophers and men of letters. Despite his wide European renown, it is only recently that there has been any attempt to gain him an audience in the United States by the presentation of his works in translation. Indeed, thus far his original works in religious and social philosophy are being published in England and imported to this country. The only studies of Buber of any moment which have been made in America include a careful academic presentation by Jacob B. Agus[1] and a brief, and moderately sympathetic account by John J. Tepfer.[2]

Buber, who is the descendant of a famous Galician rabbinical

* This seventieth birthday tribute to Martin Buber is written in the light of a reading of four recent English translations from his works. It stands, therefore, in lieu of a review of the following books: *Mamre: Essays in Religion.* Translated by GRETA HORT. Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, Australia, 1946. xiii, 190 pp. 12/6. *Tales of the Hasidim: The Early Masters.* Schocken Books, New York, 1947. xviii, 335 pp. $3.75. *Ten Rungs. Hasidic Sayings.* Schocken Books, New York, 1947. 127 pp. $1.50. *Between Man and Man.* Translated by RONALD GREGOR SMITH. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1948. viii, 210 pp. $3.50.

1. Jacob B. Agus, *Modern Philosophies of Judaism* (New York, 1940), Ch. IV, pp. 213-79.

2. John J. Tepfer, "Martin Buber and Neo-Mysticism," *Yearbook* of the Central Conference of American Rabbis, XLIV (1934), 203-19. To this and the reference in note 1 above might be added Paul E. Pfuetze, "Martin Buber and Jewish Mysticism," *Religion in Life,* XVI (1947), 553-67, which expounds some aspects of Buber's thought, and gives some information about his background and his influence. Professor Pfuetze succeeds admirably in his intention of writing an "appreciation" of Buber from the Christian viewpoint. I hope he also gained the ease of soul he sought in writing, in some measure, as "a personal penance for what Christendom has done to the Jews" (see the author's charming note on p. 567). Hans Kohn, "The Religious Philosophy of Martin Buber," *Menorah Journal* XXVI (1938), 173-85, despite the author's intimate knowledge of his subject, is too simplified to have much value. An earlier article in the same journal, by Ludwig Lewisohn, tells far more about Lewisohn than it does about Buber.

family,[3] was fortunate in childhood in becoming at home in two worlds: the world of European learning and scholarship in Vienna, and the intensely pious Jewish world of his grandfather's circle in Eastern Europe. By the meeting and fusion of the best of these two worlds in his own mind and thought, we have all been made more richly aware of the living potentialities of personal religion today.

This fusion did not develop at once; for a time Buber almost seems to have had two parallel careers: one as a scholar, the other as a Jew. As a scholar, he edited and translated early literary and religious classics of the Chinese, Welsh, and Finnish peoples, and published a volume of *Ecstatic Confessions,*[4] a chrestomathy of autobiographical accounts of the mystical experience drawn from ancient and modern mystics. As a Jew, he was in temporary revolt against the very spirit of personal religion which so interested him in other cultures, and which had at first impressed him in his grandfather's group. From the first years of the century, he was an active cultural Zionist, following the lead of Achad Ha'am, seeing in Jewish nationalism not merely the establishment of a Jewish state, but also the re-creation of a Jewish culture. Gradually, however, the influence of his studies in mysticism and of his contact with a group of young men led by Gustav Landauer who were attempting to discover the inner springs of the ideal community in the individual's feeling of organic unity with mankind, led him to revolt against the moralism of Achad Ha'am's view. He came to believe that the distinctive note of Jewish character—the Jewish soul—was to be found neither in legalistic puritanism nor in ascetic purity, but in immanent spirituality, in the realization that the spirit of God is present in all life; that, therefore, all life is holy, and that nothing is alien to Judaism in which the spirit of life can be found.[5]

Not until he had reached this point did he realize that the mystical pietism of the Hasidim, with which he had become familiar in his childhood visits to his grandfather and against which he had been in

3. His grandfather, Solomon Buber of Lemberg, was one of the great figures of the Galician Haskalah (Enlightenment) who devoted himself to the production of critical editions of the *Midrash.*

4. *Ekstatische Konfessionen* (Jena, 1909).

5. His discussions of this realization came in various articles which were collected in a series of books published between 1910 and 1920, especially *Die Jüdische Bewegung,* vol. I (Berlin, 1916), vol. II (Berlin, 1920), and *Vom Geist des Judentums* (Leipzig, 1916).

revolt for more than a decade of Jewish activity, exemplified both the sanctification of all life and the essence of spiritual community. His recognition of these qualities of Hasidic belief was charmingly expressed in one of his finest essays, a fragment of spiritual autobiography called "My Route to Hasidism,"[6] which, as far as I know, has never appeared in English translation. Here he pointed to the Hasidic movement as the truest expression in recent times of the spiritual power of Judaism: "Indeed, nowhere has the spiritual power of Judaism so manifested itself in recent centuries as it has in Hasidism."[7] He valued particularly the fact that Hasidic piety represented a ready acceptance of immanent divinity, concerning itself little with dogma and ritual, but rather attempting to establish a human community on the foundation of divine truth.[8] The teachings of the Hasidim can be compressed into one sentence: God can be seen in everything and can be reached by means of every innocent act.[9] Hasidism was not a monastic order, but a great popular movement; never had Europe seen another movement of comparable size and multiformity so concentrated on spiritual perception.

Nie hat in Europa eine grosse Volksgemeinde—nicht ein Orden Abgeschiedener, nicht ein Bruderschaft Auserwählter, sondern eine Volksgemeinde in all ihrer Geistigen und sozialen Vielfältigkeit, in all ihrer Gemischtheit—so das ganze Leben als eine Einheit auf das innerlich Erkannte gestelt. Hier ist keine Trennung zwischen Glauben und Werken, zwischen Wahrheit und Bewährung, in heutiger Sprache zwischen Moral und Politik; hier ist alles Ein Reich, Ein Geist, Eine Wirklichkeit.[10]

The interest in Hasidism which Buber came to as the fusion of his concerns for Judaism and for mysticism has become one of the central strains in his thought and has developed into a persistent phase of his literary activity. Greta Hort has translated two public lectures on "The Beginnings of Chassidism" delivered by Buber at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem as recently as 1940.[11] To begin these lectures, Buber insisted that "the decisive factor for the nature and greatness of Chas-

6. *Mein Weg zum Chassidismus* (Frankfurt a.M., 1918). This essay appeared first late in 1917 in a German-Jewish youth movement publication, and was later reprinted with minor changes in *Die Chassidischen Bücher* (Hellerau, 1928).
7. *Die Chassidischen Bücher,* p. 658.
8. *Ibid.,* p. 657.
9. *Ibid.,* p. 658.
10. *Ibid.,* p. 659.
11. *Mamre,* pp. 149-80.

sidism is not found in a teaching, but in a mode of life; and, indeed, in a mode of life which shapes a community, and regulates a community in accordance with its own nature."[12] This characteristic of Hasidism makes it necessary to explore its meaning in its legend rather than in its theoretical literature. "The theoretical literature is the gloss, the legend is the text. . . . It is obvious that legend is not chronicle; however, to him who knows how to read the legend, it conveys more truth than the chronicle."[13] Much of Buber's own study has been a learning how to read—and to retell so that others may read—this legendary material. Early in his career, he collected and retold the tales of Rabbi Nachman of Bratzlav[14] and of the Baal Shem himself, the founder of Hasidism.[15]

Later, however, Buber decided that his method of treatment of the transmitted legends was too free[16] and, after reconsideration, he fixed upon the technique which guided him in all his later collections.[17] He had earlier still rejected the method of mere translation of the sources and his free retellings were based upon the attempt to live through in his inner consciousness every legend he translated.[18] Now he worked out a method which seemed to him "to do justice simultaneously to legend and to truth." This is his account written in 1946:

> One like myself, whose purpose it is to present the Zaddikim [Hasidic leaders] and their lives from extant written (and some oral) material, must above all, . . . supply the missing links in the narrative. . . . I found it most expedient to begin by giving up the available form (or rather formlessness) of the notes with their meagerness or excessive detail; their obscurities and disgression, to reconstruct the events in question with the utmost accuracy, . . . and to relate them as coherently as I could in a form suited to the subject matter. Then, however, I went back to the notes and incorporated

12. *Ibid.*, p. 149.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 125.
14. *Die Geschichten des Rabbi Nachman* (Frankfurt a.M., 1906).
15. *Die Legende des Baal Schem* (Frankfurt a.M., 1908).
16. Cf. *Tales of the Hasidim: The Early Masters*, p. xi.
17. *Der grosse Maggid und seine Nachfolge* (Frankfurt a.M., 1922); *Das Verborgene Licht* (Frankfurt a.M., 1924); *Die chassidischen Bücher* (Hellerau, 1928), which includes an augmented version of the 1922 and 1924 collections, as well as somewhat altered version of the unsatisfactory, earlier works, and parts of which were translated into English by Lucy Cohen, under the title *Jewish Mysticism, and the Legends of Baalshem* (London and Toronto, 1931); *Tales of the Hasidim: The Early Masters* (New York, 1947).
18. He tells of this decision in *Mein Weg zum Chassidismus.*

in my final version whatever felicitous turn or phrase they contained. On the other hand, I considered it neither permissible nor desirable to expand the tales or to render them more colorful and diverse. . . . Only in those few cases where the notes at hand were quite fragmentary did I compose a connected whole by fusing what I had with other fragments, and filling the gaps with related material.[19]

Only by such a method can the reteller of legend introduce his readers to what Buber calls "a world of legendary reality," legendary because its materials are not authentic as a chronicle is authentic, reality because it is "the experience of fervent souls, a reality born in all innocence, unalloyed by invention and whimsy."[20]

Three factors in Hasidic piety which appeal to Buber have already been mentioned: their community life, their sense of spiritual immanence, their freedom from monastic separation from society. There are three other factors on which he lays great stress which emerge most clearly in the teachings of the Hasidim, but which are founded in Hasidic living as much as those mentioned earlier. First of these is the ideal of a life of exalted joy, a "life of fervor." To develop such a life in its adherents he sees as "the underlying purpose of all religion." Since the elation which is sought is such as "cannot be stifled by any experience," it must, therefore, "spring from a relationship to the eternal, above and beyond all individual experience."[21] Elation of this sort Buber finds central to Hasidism. "Everything the true hasid does or does not do mirrors his belief that, in spite of the intolerable suffering men must endure, the heartbeat of life is holy joy, and that always and everywhere, one can force a way through to that joy—provided one devotes one's self entirely to his deed."[22]

The last phrase brings us to the related ideal of *kawwanah*, of holy intention. In the sense that the word is used by Buber, intention is complete concentration. There was an earlier, magical use of the word in Cabalistic teaching; Hasidism substituted *kawwanah* of the heart for magical formularies. Buber quoted the Baalshem as saying "He who uses in his prayer all the kawanoth [in the magical sense] which he knows, . . . produces only that which he knows. But he who speaks the word in great collectedness, for him all kawanah enters of itself into

19. *Tales of the Hasidim*, p. viii.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 1.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

each word."[23] And again, speaking for himself on "The Interpretation of Chassidism," Buber associates true *kawwanah* with Hasidic "pan-sacramentalism" and differentiates it thus from Cabalistic theurgy:

> Against the kawanoth which can be known—in this and this way one should meditate, in this and this way one should recollect oneself—rises up the one life-embracing kawanah of the man who gives himself up to God and his redeeming work. . . . Man does not truly engage in kawanah when he accompanies an act with an already known mystical method, he exercises kawanah when he completes his act with the whole of his being facing towards God.[24]

Kawwanah, however, can be translated by "fervor" as well as by "intention"; it is clear, therefore, that holy joy and holy intention are so close in nature that it is possible to say that holy joy is the highest stage of intention.

The last of the points which Buber stresses in his accounts of Hasidism is its intensified reinterpretation of the traditional Jewish messianic concept. Traditionally messianism among the Jews is the dream of a coming perfection of truth, justice, and mercy on earth; symbolic of the perfection of that age are the subsidiary beliefs that it will be introduced by the return of the children of Israel to the Holy Land under the leadership of one anointed by God, and that in that age there will take place the resurrection of the dead to eternal life. To some degree it was always believed that everyone could help to bring about the perfection of the messianic age by perfecting his own life. This, however, was not a prominent feature of the tradition, but rather one which came into an artificial prominence in messianic movements, when perfection seemed soon to be realized. When failure came to these movements, and despair to the followers of the pseudo-Messiah, the alternative miraculous method of achieving perfection by divine intervention was stressed. Buber emphasizes the fact that, for Hasidism, the messianic redemption of the world is to be prepared by men not in extraordinary acts, not by asceticism and puritanism, but by the sanctification of the "deeds of the everyday."

> The intention of the divine revelation is to form men who can work for the redemption of the world. By this is not meant one single messianic act, but the deeds of the everyday, which prepare for the messianic fulfilment. . . . He who does a mizwah [fulfils a commandment] with complete kawanah, that

23. *Mamre,* p. 88.
24. *Ibid.,* p. 147.

is completes an act in such a way that his whole existence is gathered in it and directed towards God, he works on the redemption of the world, on its conquest for God.[25]

If this form of expression suggests that God needs man's help, it does not mean that God could not have redeemed the world without man's help, but that God "wills to have need of man." Specifically, God's will is that man should be of assistance in completing the work of creation, and since God wills this aid, "the use of man for this work becomes an effective reality."[26]

One cannot speak of man's part in the work or of God's part in the work, or, for that matter, of collaboration between man and God. "God and man do not divide the government of the world between them: man's action is enclosed in God's action, but it is still real action." Each moment of every person's life is part of a continuous series of moments of creation and it is also part of a continuous series of moments of redemption; "it falls within creation in that it is made; it is tied and bound to redemption in virtue of its power for making."[27] Just as the work of creation is renewed by God every day, so man carries on the work of redemption every day. In terms such as these, every action done with simple heart in complete turning towards God is messianic action. God will ultimately harvest the fruits of the seeds of redemption which fall from the lives of men in an unredeemed world.

Buber's concern for Hasidism led him to revalue the position and contributions of the Zaddikim to the tradition, and in this revaluation to make some memorable comments on the nature of leadership. Typical of the older view of the Zaddikim is that expressed by Solomon Schechter,

> Each Zaddik sought to have a whole little sect to himself, from which to draw an undivided revenue. And each deluded little sect as it arose boasted of the exclusive possession of the true Zaddik. It must not be supposed that these structures apply to the whole class of Zaddikim. . . . But, despite the adherence of these worthy men the fate of Chassidism, as a regenerative force, was sealed from the day when Zaddikism replaced the original doctrines of the sect.[28]

25. *Ibid.*, p. 173.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 113.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 114.
28. Solomon Schechter, *Studies in Judaism* (Philadelphia, 1896), pp. 41, 43. Schechter was far more sympathetic to Hasidism than were earlier critics, and the essay from

Contrast this with Buber's account:

> The Zaddik helps everyone, but he does not relieve anyone of what he must do for himself. . . . Through the Zaddik, all the senses of the hasid are perfected, not through conscious directing, but through bodily nearness. The fact that the hasid looks at the zaddik perfects his sense of sight, his listening to him, his sense of hearing. Not the teachings of the zaddik but his existence constitutes his effectiveness. . . . Here we come to the very foundation of hasidism, on which the life between those who quicken, and those who are quickened, is built up. The quintessence of this life is the relationship between the zaddik and his disciples. . . . The teacher helps his disciples find themselves, and in hours of desolation the disciples help their teacher find himself again. The teacher kindles the souls of his disciples and they surround him and light his life with the flame he has kindled.[29]

It is difficult to realize that these soul-leaders are the venal and self-seeking men described by Schechter.

The interaction of leader and disciple, the mutual quickening power of the relationship is the key to Buber's appreciation of the Zaddik. The Zaddik is "the man who leads the community in God's stead,"[30] but he is also the man who has to help his Hasidim. In order to do this, "it is necessary for him to comprehend their whole life, from the concern for their food to the concern for the cleansing of their souls. He has not to do something definite for them; he has to do everything for them."[31] In thus becoming the servants as well as the leaders of the people, the Zaddikim enter into an organic connection with their communities. The ideal is that "the learned must become aware of their own shortcomings and take part in the life of the people, for only thus can they also lift up the masses."[32]

The generalization of this view of the serving and teaching leader is beautifully expressed in a brief essay called "Trust," which Greta Hort has translated from Buber's 1933 collection, *Kampf um Israel*. Herein Buber distinguishes two types of leader: the leader in whom we "put our faith," and the leader whom we trust. When we put our faith in a leader, we assert that we accept his verdicts of right and wrong, true and false, without reference to a standard beyond the person of the

which this quotation is taken marks the beginning of a new appreciation of the positive values in Hasidism.

29. Buber, *Tales of the Hasidim*, pp. 6, 8.
30. Buber, *Mamre*, p. 164.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 167.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 168.

leader. True is true because he says it is true. When we trust a leader, we are certain that "this man whom one trusts stands in a quite definite, positive relationship to truth, to the real truth . . . as its servant." Thus in trusting such a leader we believe in a truth which is not relative, "which does not exist by our grace." This is the crying need, "to substitute trusting human beings for putting our faith in them." The kind of leader that we need is one we follow not for his own sake, but for the sake of the truth which he serves. "From the kind of service which the leaders give, we see that it is the right one. . . . They set us ever in the presence of the searching beams of truth. They lead in that they teach. Theirs is the secret history of the world."[33]

Because of his inward understanding of the Hasidic movement, it does not surprise us to learn that at one stage in his career Buber believed that what he called "underground Judaism," the spiritual societies which were attempting to achieve the perfection of human society, was the only true Judaism. Buber has outgrown this limitation of view; he has come to see that in Judaism there is a fusion of ethical and religious elements about the two centers of a transcendent God who is yet in immediate relations with men, and a redeeming power that "is working everywhere and at all times, and that yet nowhere and at no time is there a state of redemption."[34] This Buber now finds as the uniqueness of Judaism; the Jewish spirit is attuned to the essential message of religion that human life is to be dominated by the consciousness of the presence of God. This dominance is to be achieved not by a turning away from the world, but by the sanctification of the world. The aim of religion is to infuse the light of God into the actual world.

But though the Jewish spirit is in tune with the essential message of religion, the Jew himself is torn between the ideal and the real, between the spirit and the flesh. The urge to attain an inner unity in the place of this inner disunity finds its chief expression in the life of religion; it is not a passive inner unity which is sought, but an endeavor to actualize the ideal in the real world, to create a unity between thought and action. The chosen people doctrine means to Buber that the Jewish people are committed to begin immediately the redemption of the universe by the actualization of the ideal. The Jews must not

33. *Ibid.*, pp. 62-63.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

wait until other peoples are ready to join them in this work; they must begin at once, because "the Jew, as part of the world, experiences perhaps more intensely than any other part, the world's lack of redemption. . . . The burden of the unredeemed world rests on him."[35]

While this development of Buber's relation to and interpretation of Hasidism was maturing, he was carrying on his studies and bringing to maturity a philosophy of religion which must needs constitute his major claim to world recognition. In the development of this position, Buber has generalized the relationship which we have described between Hasid and Zaddik, and amplified it into a theory of the "mutual relation between man and man" which serves in addition as the basis of a social philosophy and a philosophical anthropology. His thought owes a great deal to that of Kierkegaard, though he is by no means a slavish follower, but rather one of the great Dane's most sober and acute critics.

Buber's earliest attempt to state his philosophy of religion is to be found in the untranslated *Daniel.*[36] Here we have five dialogues in which the author tries to show how mystical experience can aid in resolving problems in the lives of men. In the first dialogue he is concerned to show that there is multiple directionality of consciousness in space; in ordinary experience we apprehend objects without reference to any of these directions, but in the mystical experience there is a concentration of apprehension along that directional line which is peculiar to our own soul, and which, therefore, produces a luminous quality in our perceptions. He instances the case of a man who looks at the pine tree with directional perception and completely identifies himself with the tree. "He feels its bark as if it were his own skin and its cones as if they were his own children." Still searching for the way to express this sense of unity, in the second dialogue Buber substitutes two attitudes toward life for the two types of perception. The attitude of ordinary experience is that of "orientation," i.e., getting things in their proper spatio-temporal and causal perspectives; the attitude corresponding to directional perception he calls "actualizing," i.e., going out with one's entire being to meet all things. In the third dialogue, the subject/object duality is discussed under the head of *Sinn,* which seems here to be used in the sense of intuition of the mean-

35. *Ibid.,* p. 25.
36. *Daniel. Gespräche von der Verwirklichung* (Leipzig, 1913).

ing of life. Here security, the failure to recognize that there is a deep chasm between the self and the other, is associated with the attitude of orientation, while an ever present sense of danger is the concomitant of the attitude of actualization. The spiritual life begins in the experience of duality; in the experience man finds that his task is to overcome the duality by living in unity, by apprehending the universe and all that is therein directionally. The fourth dialogue introduces the duality of the world into the spirit. The being of the spirit is bipolar; existence and non-existence are the two poles between which unity never is, but always becomes. Obscure as this dialogue is, it seems to me that, in the context of the whole, what is said here is that the primary duality of the spirit is its being between the assertion and the denial of an individuated and differentiated selfhood. In the attitude of orientation, selfhood is asserted in the very act of asserting the otherness of the other; in the attitude of actualizing, selfhood is denied in the living towards the other. Such an interpretation of this dialogue clarifies the final dialogue, in which Buber asserts that man must first become conscious of duality, and then must overcome that duality by action. He says "Unity must be lived"; clearly the living of unity is the risk-taking life of freedom which is variously called in the early dialogues directional perception and actualization.

Some light is cast upon this early attempt to express the nature of the religious life by examining a little book called *Die Rede, die Lehre, und das Lied,* written in about the same period as *Daniel.*[37] In the second of the papers which make up this book, Buber asserts that since man's knowledge (orientation) is gained by separating the part from the whole, by abstraction, it is not true knowledge (actualization, the living of unity); since man's action generally expresses only a part of himself, it is not true action, which must be the action of the whole being, and, therefore, non-action, or better, not action against, but living towards.

After these preliminary attempts, Buber succeeded in expressing the heart of his religious philosophy in the book called *I and Thou,*[38]

37. *Die Rede, die Lehre und das Lied. Drei Beispiele* (Leipzig, 1920) contains Buber's introductions to *Ekstatische Konfessionen* (Jena, 1909), *Reden und Gleichnisse des Tschuang-Tse* (Leipzig, 1910), and *Kalewala. Das Nationalepos der Finnen* (Munich, 1914).

38. *Ich und Du* (Leipzig, 1923). English translation, *I and Thou,* translated by Ronald Gregor Smith (Edinburgh, 1937).

which is a prose poem rather than a treatise and is therefore difficult to present in epitome. Its effect depends largely upon its direct appeal to the reader, and especially to the reader who is more concerned with the religious experience than with theological debate.

Buber's main theme is that there is a fundamental difference between a man's attitude toward other men and his attitude toward things. The former is a *relation between* persons; the latter is a *connection with* objects. In the personal relation *(I–Thou),* one subject confronts another subject; in the connection with things *(I–It)* the subject contemplates and experiences an object. The *I–Thou* relation and the *I–It* connection represent the two basic situations of human life, the world of *Thou* and the world of *It.*

The other person is an independent reality, and although this other person is a datum to the *I* in the world of *Thou,* it can never be fully bounded by the *I.* The characteristic situation of the world of *Thou* is one of meeting; the *I* meets the *Thou,* but cannot appropriate the *Thou.* In the reality of the meeting of *I* and *Thou,* the *I* does not become merely an experiencing subject, nor can the *Thou* be reduced to an experienced object. As long as the *I* remains in relation with the *Thou,* the *Thou* can only be known in the relation itself, cannot become part of the experience of the *I.*

In the world of *It* the only center of consciousness is the *I* which experiences, arranges, and appropriates. In the *I–It* connection, we regard things either as tools capable of being employed to further our interests, or as obstacles in our path. Common sense and science share this attitude, in which space, time, and causality are meaningful. Whenever we concern ourselves with the physical world, with its characteristic framework of space and time, with its laws of causation, this is to be in the world of *It.* If we try to transform our relation with other men into an understood connection, we make the other, the *Thou,* an object of our experience; we convert the *Thou* into an *It* and thus fail in our loyalty to the truth of the meeting with the *Thou,* of the dialogic relationship.

The one *Thou* which can never become an *It* is "the eternal *Thou,*" or God. The perfection of dialogic relationship constitutes the reality of God in his approach to man, of divine immanence. God, says Buber, may be "addressed, not expressed." In this eternal *Thou* the extended lines of relations meet.

Every particular *Thou* is a glimpse through to the eternal *Thou;* by means of every particular *Thou* the primary word addresses the eternal *Thou.* Through this mediation of the *Thou* of all being fulfillment, and non-fulfillment, of relations comes to them: the inborn *Thou* is realized in each and consummated in none. It is consummated only in the direct relation with the *Thou* that by its nature cannot become *It.*[39]

This mild form of mysticism does not lead to a mystic absorption in God. It leads rather to a receptive attitude towards the universe. Such receptivity is suggested by the various personal religious experiences described by Buber.[40] It is achieved by a conscious abandonment of the self-centered attitude in a readiness to devote our energies to a creative task which we cannot know until we have lived in the *I–Thou* relationship. Every situation in which we find ourselves may be the starting point of creative activity; if so, the nature of the task will be made clear to us in the situation itself. These acts make us real; in our creativity we help God to create the world. But man cannot actively seek out God by a renunciation of the world, any more than he can find God by an exclusive devotion to the world.

To step into pure relation is not to disregard everything but to see everything in the *Thou.* . . . Men do not find God if they stay in the world. They do not find Him if they leave the world. He who goes out with his whole being to meet his *Thou* and carries to it all being that is in the world, finds Him who cannot be sought.[41]

The discovery of the Eternal Thou is "a finding without seeking." Thus the self-consciously "religious" life is as inadequate as the self-consciously "secular" life. Just as the determined materialist tries to reduce all to the world of *It,* so the determined mystic tries to make God an object of the self, and thus is false to the world of *Thou* by denying the essential twoness of the dialogue relation; this is true of both forms of mysticism—the negation of the self by its absorption in God, and the negation of God by asserting the all-embracing character of the self.

There is a distinctively socio-ethical character in Buber's idea of "confronting" the eternal Thou. "Meeting with God does not come to man in order that he may concern himself with God, but in order that

39. *I and Thou,* p. 75.

40. E.g., the experiences described in *Daniel,* especially in the first and third dialogues.

41. *I and Thou,* p. 79.

he may confirm that there is meaning in the world."[42] The living word of revelation—and "all revelation is summons and sending"—appears in history in those times in which "the solidarity of connexion between *I* and the world is renewed."[43] This renewal tends to create community, replacing mechanical forms of public life and mechanical institutions. This cannot be achieved simply by the direct approach of people to people in warm humanity of feeling; each person must first take his stand "in living mutual relation with a living Centre," and then, derivatively he will be in "living mutual relation" with his fellow men.[44]

In "Dialogue," Buber supplements this discussion by a brilliant statement of the distinction between community and mere collectivity or numerical aggregation. This distinction marks the preservation in Buber's thought of the ideas of *Gesellschaft* and *Gemeinschaft,* as developed by Ferdinand Tönnies, and discussed by Buber, Landauer, and their club.[45] After talking (in 1929) of conceding "to a band conspiring to conquer the state power that the comradeship which fills it is of value, just because it strengthens the band's reliable assault power," that is, increases its effective power for achieving its end, he points out that the values of community are not gained thus. "The feeling of community does not reign where the desired change of institutions is wrested in common, but without community, from a resisting world." Only where there is a "community struggling for its own reality as a community," is collectivity overwhelmed. Collectivities of the right and of the left are marching into a common abyss in which both dialogue and monologue are forever silenced:

> But who in all these massed, mingled marching collectivities still perceives what that is for which he supposes he is striving—what community is? They have all surrendered to its counterpart. Collectivity is not a binding but a bundling together: individuals packed together, armed and equipped in common, with only as much life from man to man as will inflame the marching step. But community, growing community . . . is the being no longer side by side but *with* one another of a multitude of persons. And this multitude, though it also moves towards one goal, yet experiences everywhere a turning to, a dynamic facing of, the other, a flowing from *I* to *Thou.* Community is where community happens. Collectivity is based on an organized atrophy of

42. *Ibid.,* p. 115.
43. *Ibid.,* p. 119.
44. *Ibid.,* p. 45.
45. For a full discussion of the influence of Tönnies on Buber, see Hans Kohn, *Martin Buber, sein Werk und seine Zeit.* (Hellerau, 1930), pp. 188-95, *et passim.*

personal existence, community on its increase and confirmation in life towards one another. The modern zeal for collectivity is a flight from community's testing and consecration of the person, a flight from the vital dialogic.[46]

This beautiful and stimulating passage makes it clear that Buber's social philosophy is of one piece with his religious thought, that the dialogue of religion has its starting point and its culmination in the dialogical society, the community. Indeed, must this not be so, since it is the very nature of "dialogic" to go beyond dialectic by not merely thinking towards another thinker, but also living towards his concrete life. "The life of dialogue is no privilege of intellectual activity like dialectic. . . . It begins no higher than where humanity begins."[47]

Buber's brilliant critique of Kierkegaard is found in "The Question to the Single One."[48] The critique is sharpened and brought into clearer focus by being paralleled with a criticism of Max Stirner's concept of the "unique one," published originally at about the same time as Kierkegaard's work.[49] Different, nay, opposite as the Single One and the Unique One are, there is one respect in which they are comparable: both admit of no possibility of genuine, essential relation with the Other. The Single One renounces all others in a radical solitariness; the Unique One denies primary existence to all others. (Political inference: "Many a rigid collective *We,* which rejects a superior authority, is easily understood as a translation from the speech of the Unique One into that of the *Group–I* which acknowledges nothing but itself.")[50] Stirner's dismissal of moralistic questions of responsibility and

46. *Between Man and Man,* pp. 31-32.

47. *Ibid.,* p. 35.

48. *Ibid.,* pp. 40-82. The title, rather awkward in English, renders fairly, if not clearly the German *Die Frage an den Einzelnen* (1936), an elaboration of an address delivered in Switzerland in 1933. Buber himself says of it that it "contains some political inferences. . . . The book appeared in Germany in 1936—astonishingly, since it attacks the life-basis of totalitarianism. The fact that it could be published with impunity is certainly to be explained from its not having been understood by the appropriate authorities" (*Between Man and Man,* p. vii). The translator explains that the German *der Einzelne* "is a fairly precise rendering of Kierkegaard's *hiin Enkelte,*" which cannot be adequately rendered as the "individual," since everyone is an individual, which is a biological or natural category, while a "Single One" is a rare thing, "the spirit's category" (*Between Man and Man,* p. 207).

49. Cf. Max Stirner, *The Ego and his Own,* translated by S. C. Byington (London and New York, 1913).

50. *Between Man and Man,* p. 41.

truth does not touch the reality of responsibility and truth, but only their "routine forms." Thus Buber conceives that he has "prepared for their purification and renewal. . . . Stirner has unmasked as unreal the responsibility which is only ethical by exposing the non-existence of the alleged receivers as such."[51] By doing so, he has led toward Kierkegaard even as Protagoras led toward Socrates. For Kierkegaard means "true" responsibility which "presupposes one who addresses me primarily, that is, from a realm independent of myself . . . about something that he has entrused to me and that I am bound to take care of loyally."[52] So, too, with truth.

The Single One, however, is a conception in which Kierkegaard contradicts Jesus. For Jesus joined in one the commandments to love God and to love one's neighbor. "By connecting the two, Jesus brings to light the Old Testament truth that God and man are not rivals. Exclusive love to God . . . is, *because he is God,* inclusive love, ready to accept and include all love."[53] For Kierkegaard, however, becoming a Single One means entering into an exclusive relation with God. "Everyone should be chary about having to do with 'the others,' and should essentially speak only with God and with himself." Thus, explains Buber, Kierkegaard transforms the *exclusive* relation into the *excluding* relation, "the relation which in virtue of its unique, essential life expels all other relations into the realm of the unessential."[54]

"In order to come to love," says Kierkegaard about his renunciation of Regina Olsen, "I had to remove the object." That is sublimely to misunderstand God. Creation is not a hurdle on the road to God, it is the road itself. We are created along with one another and directed to a life with one another. . . . God wants us to come to him by means of the Reginas he has created and not by renunciation of them.[55] God is not an object beside objects and hence cannot be reached by renunciation of objects. God, indeed, is not the cosmos, but far less is he Being *minus* cosmos. He is not to be found by subtraction and not to be loved by reduction.[56]

From this critical view, Buber goes on to point out the weakness of Kierkegaard's view that the category of the Single One is "as sharply

51. *Ibid.,* pp. 44, 46.
52. *Ibid.,* p. 45.
53. *Ibid.,* pp. 51-52.
54. *Ibid.,* p. 50.
55. *Ibid.,* p. 52.
56. *Ibid.,* p. 58.

opposed as possible to politics." Marriage is "the exemplary bond" which leads us "to insight into the right and the legitimacy of otherness and to that vital acknowledgement of many-faced otherness . . . from which dealings with the body politic receive their religious ethos."[57] It is only the Single One who takes up the life of the crowd into his own life who "changes the crowd into Single Ones." Indeed, it can be no other, for one who remains far away can not do so. "It cannot be one who is reserved, only one who is given; given, not given over."[58] The "question" of the title, the question to the Single One, arises out of the fact that in our age "the person has become questionable through being collectivized. . . . The truth, on the other hand, has become questionable through being politicized."[59] The question to the Single One is whether he will devote himself to the restoration of community out of collectivity and absolute truth out of politicized relativity. For "there is need of persons who are not collectivized, and of truth which is not politicized. . . . True community and true commonwealth will be realized only to the extent to which the Single Ones become real out of whose responsible life the body politic is renewed."[60]

Martin Buber is one of the greatest of living thinkers about religion. Here, in these pages, is an attempt to sketch the major themes of his religious thought, and to show forth as its central feature that without losing sight at any moment of man's need for God, it emerges in a social philosophy of redemption because of God's need for man. Here is mysticism, indeed, but it is not remote from the concerns of man. The meeting of the *I* and the eternal *Thou* takes place neither in the Heaven of Heavens, nor in the Holy of Holies, nor in the Heart of Hearts; man and God meet in the community.

57. *Ibid.*, p. 61.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 65.
59. *Ibid.*, pp. 80, 81.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 82.

BOOK REVIEWS

Greek Piety. By MARTIN PERSSON NILSSON. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press; New York: The Oxford University Press, 1948. viii, 200 pp. $4.25.

All lovers of the study of Greek religion will hail with delight this English translation by the eminent professor of Greek at St. Andrews University, Herbert Jennings Rose, of this small book of vast importance, by the professor emeritus of classical archeology of the University of Lund. It is, truly, an ill wind that blows nobody any good, and in this case, it was the very ill wind of war which brought us so precious a gift, for *Greek Piety* (published in Sweden, in 1946, under the title, *Grekisk religiositet*) was written as a summary of the author's magnum opus, *Geschichichte der grieschischen Religion,* at a time when that work seemed doomed to be listed as a war casualty. As Professor Nilsson describes it in a letter to the reviewer:

> May I tell you something of this ill-fated book. The first volume, to Alexander the Great, a big book of more than 800 closely packed pages, was set up before the war broke out, but appeared only in 1941. I know that a few copies reached USA. I have seen reviews in *Classical Philology,* 1945, and in the *Classical Journal,* 1943. Owing to circumstances of the time, it is now impossible to get a copy. The publisher (Beck of Munich) wrote to me that he had brought his book store to a safe place . . . , but it is of little use as long as he is not permitted to sell and export the books. If anyone can do something, it is the Americans, because Munich is in the American zone.

And so, thus it happens that this new book, *Greek Piety,* is our only means of contact with Professor Nilsson's great *Geschichte* . . . , the fruit of half a century of classical studies, a work which Frederick C. Grant describes (in the *Anglican Theological Review,* January, 1948) as "one of the most majestic examples of pure scholarship that I have ever seen, and one of the most rewarding books I have ever read."

The review presented here was written in the first place from the Swedish original text, before there was any certainty of an English translation, and was, therefore, cast in the form of a lengthy, rather detailed summary, with considerable quoted material translated into English, but since the book is now available in English, it is unnecessary to publish such a summary. Also, since Professor Grant has written such an excellent review of Vol. I of the *Gesichte* . . . , of which this book is itself a summary, it seems unnecessary to go over

that ground again, therefore, it would seem that the ends of scholarship can best be served by concentrating on the latter portions of the book, that is, the portions based on the still unpublished Vol. II of the *Geschichte*. . . . I shall, then, briefly outline the contents of the earlier portions, and refer the reader to Professor Grant's fine review in the *Anglican Theological Review*.

Introduction: The National Religion of Greece.

Ch. I. Religion in the Archaic Period: (1) Ecstatic and Mystic Movements; (2) Legalism; (3) Justice; (4) The Law of Apollo; (5) Know Thyself; (6) *Hybris* and *Nemesis;* (7) Deity.

Ch. II. The Dissolution: (1) Patriotic Religion; (2) Individualistic Religion; (3) Criticism; (4) Conflict; (5) The Earlier Hellenistic Period.

With Chapter III, called "Rebuilding," begins the portion based on Vol. II, and therefore not covered in Professor Grant's review. Some of this material has already been published in English translation in an article by Professor Nilsson in this *Review* (January, 1947) under the title, "The Psychological Background of Late Greek Paganism," itself a summary of a summary! It is, indeed, a loss to scholarship that a work of such magnitude should reach us thus piecemeal, and we can only try to possess our souls in patience and hope for the best!

According to Professor Nilsson's view, the work of demolition of the old religion of the city-state was accomplished in the early Hellenistic period, that is, in the century immediately following the death of Alexander, with the growth of skeptical philosophies and the materialistic view of life among the intelligentsia, while the people, deprived of their state cults, relapsed into the more primitive forms of nature religion and superstition. Thus a crisis developed which lasted until the victory of Christianity, half a millenium later. The reason for the long duration of this crisis "is that it was no longer a matter of pulling down but of building up something new from the foundations, something which should be more appropriate to the needs of the age and of humanity" (p. 92).

The two factors which played the greatest part in this rebuilding of religion were, first, the influence of the Orient, and, second, the new cosmology constructed by the natural philosophers. As the known civilized world became politically "one world" under the dominion of Alexander, and later of the Romans, the interchange between East and

West was greatly intensified, and Greek and Oriental deities met in every city of the empire. The marked tendency toward syncretism displayed itself in the merging of all sorts of incongruous elements in an abortive attempt toward monotheism. With the development of science, the old geocentric cosmology, with the gods close at hand and ready to intervene in human affairs, gave way before the new heliocentric system (put forward in the third century B. C. by Aristarchos of Samos), with the sun as the center of the choir of heaven. When this new science of astronomy met the ancient Babylonian pseudoscience of astrology and fused with it, the stage was set for radical changes in the religious world-view. The heavenly bodies were conceived of as mysterious "powers," governing the destinies of man. "The system is constructed on strictly mathematical lines, one might say trigonometrical, for the strength of the influence of the heavenly bodies is reckoned like a parallelogram of force, according to their reciprocal relations one to another and their position in the Zodiac" (p. 110). Thus the universe became a vast mechanism, in whose laws even the gods were unable to meddle, a concept which naturally led to atheism. "Astrological determinism is a product of the inexorably logical Greek thought" (p. 114). But, whereas this determinism led some to atheism, it forced others into mysticism, for, "Religion is man's protest against the meaninglessness of events, which is contained in mechanical causality."

But this discovery by science of an order of events in the universe led others to the explanation of a supreme ruling Intelligence, whether transcendent as in Platonism, or immanent as in Stoicism. In a treatise of the first century A. D. (erroneously attributed to Aristotle) called *Concerning the Universe,* this tendency toward monotheism based on the new cosmology is well represented. But true monotheistic religion never quite came off; the solar religion was merely a state cult and never popular, and even Zeus never actually was regarded as the one and only god. Pagan monotheism remained purely philosophical, and Professor Nilsson points out that St. Paul's sermon to the Areopagus was so much in this spirit that it might just as well have been delivered by a pious pagan philosopher (perhaps this explains why Paul made no converts on that memorable occasion!).

The most characteristic development of this period was the rise of religious transcendentalism under the varied forms of Neoplatonism,

Hermetism, Gnosticism, etc., which had their origin in mysticism rather than in pure philosophy—the longing for union with god and freedom from the fetters of material existence. The dualism underlying these movements was not derived from Zoroastrianism (which is based on the conflict of good and evil in *this* world), but from Plato's doctrine of the two worlds, the transient world of phenomena and the eternal world of the Forms, which led naturally to contempt for material life and attempts to escape from it by ascetic practices and mystical experience.

With the development of various forms of occultism and theosophy, true science withered away until, shorn of its strength, it became at last a slave to religion. This pseudo-science of late antiquity had a purely practical aim, like magic. "There was no longer any difference between religion and science, for both rested upon divine revelation; religion had swallowed science up" (p. 141).

In his account of the mystery religions, Professor Nilsson is inclined to minimize their importance, and especially their influence on Christianity. Because of their dissimilarity, and the obscure and ambiguous nature of the evidence, he does not think it possible to formulate a "mystery-theology," although they are supposed to have certain ideas in common. These "can be summed up in a few words: death and resurrection, regeneration and sonship of God, enlightenment and redemption, deification and immortality" (p. 151). He finds that the idea of resurrection from the dead is not part of the mystery religions, but is unique with Christianity; in the mystery cults "rebirth" is simply a metaphor for the changed status after initiation, and contains no idea at all of becoming a child of God. For Christians, salvation means deliverance from sin and death, the wages of sin, but in the mysteries, salvation means deliverance from *heimarmène,* unavoidable destiny, often conceived of as astrological determinism. They believed only in the immortality of the soul, either in some form of paradise or in union with the Supreme Being, and not in bodily resurrection. In stressing Christianity's independence of the influence of the mystery religions, Professor Nilsson writes:

> Are we not to recognize the gift of originality possessed by Christianity and particularly by St. Paul, one of the greatest religious geniuses that ever lived? He conceived wide ranges of fruitful thought, gave them depth, and created ideas which had the power to grip the religious consciousness not only of

antiquity but of all times to come. For its victorious religious power Christianity need not thank the circumstances that it moved along these lines travelled by the mystery-religions (p. 156).

The section on Folk-Belief is especially interesting, dealing as it does with the dark shadow-side of religion,—sorcery, charms, amulets, love-philters, signs, omens, dream interpretation, divination, etc. Superstitions concerning the life after death became more and more fantastic, with realistic description of the torments of the damned. "There is no denying that Hell is a Greek invention, but Christianity introduced the fateful change that instead of offences against good morals, unbelief was made the reason for damnation" (p. 164). As belief in the great gods declined, popular superstition centered upon the *daimones* as the source of power for good or for evil, and as beings who intervened in human affairs.

Belief in magic and daimones arose out of the depths of the people as a reaction against Greek anthropomorphism, both in its outward form, which made the gods much too humanly beautiful, too aesthetically satisfactory, to be real Powers, and its inner, which robbed the gods of their marvellous potency by representing their interventions in a way comprehensible to men (pp. 172 f.).

With regard to the social aspect of religion, Professor Nilsson stresses the fact that, with the break up of the religion of family, clan, and city-state, there came a new form of religious community, the sect. One of the reasons for the failure of Gnosticism was its excessive divisiveness: each prophet or philosopher had his own little band of disciples, with no central organization to relate them to each other. The same was true of the mysteries, each local cult being quite independent of all the others. This inability of the separate units to co-operate in any way prevented them from becoming universal religions. Whereas Christianity, on the contrary, showed a remarkable power of cohesiveness from the start; in spite of conflicts and heresies, in spite of persecution, the Christian community remained intact, with a network of intercommunication. Its organization was built upon the governmental divisions of the Roman Empire, centering around the cities, which became bishoprics. It was thus fitted to become a state religion under the Christian emperors.

Professor Nilsson sees the whole development of Hellenistic religion in terms of conversion—"a conversion, not of the individual only, but of all humanity. When a man sees his world of concept and thought

smashed to pieces and his hopes ruined, repressed powers rise up from the recesses of his soul and guide him on a new path" (p. 187). This conversion he describes as follows:

> It was a conversion from rationalism to mysticism, from the clear, logical lines of Greek thought to faith in the wonderful, supernatural, and supersensuous, from love of the beauty of the world and the body to flight from the world and condemnation of all that was corporeal, from sensual desire to asceticism. The Greek word *asketés*, which once meant "athlete," came to mean "ascetic." It was a conversion from social or collective piety to individual religion, for the individual chose his religion from among the movements of the age, even though he might seek the fellowship of men of like faith, and so a new collective piety arose; but it was not associated with society but with religious community (p. 188).

It would, of course, be an egregious act of *hybris* for me to attempt to *criticize* such a book as this, but perhaps one may venture a few remarks. Professor Nilsson, like all good classicists, is inclined to minimize the influence of the Orient on Greek thought before the Hellenistic period. For instance, he calls Dionysos a "wild Thracian," but does not mention the tradition which tells of his arrival in Greece by ship, from the East, or his similarity to certain vine gods of the Near East. But in his discussion of Orphism, which he considers an indigenous movement, he says:

> With this complete inversion of soul and body in their mutual relations and value is connected an Orphic trait which particularly attracted contemporary notice, their ascetic mode of life. They were vegetarians and considered it unlawful to kill a beast. . . . Probably the reason for this prohibition is to be found in the doctrine of transmigration of souls. . . . Another and obscure passage [in Pindar] is to be understood to mean that souls which commit sin in the other world are sent back to this world to be punished, exactly as sins committed here are punished in the underworld (pp. 24 f.).

Asceticism, vegetarianism, *ahiṁsā*, transmigration, *karma!* To even a superficial student of the religion of India, these ideas must conjure up a picture of the period of the Upanishads, and the two religious movements stemming from them—Buddhism and Jainism. How could these ideas, so contrary to the spirit of Greek culture and religion, have arisen, from within, without the stimulus of an alien influence? It is too bad that Ananda K. Coomaraswamy is not alive to take up the cudgels on this point, since this reviewer feels wholly unequal to the task!

As for the translation—it is, of course, splendid in its elegance, its

accuracy, and its clarity, and we should be very grateful to so eminent a scholar for undertaking a tedious and difficult task of translation such as this. But sometimes one misses the simple, homely charm of the Swedish, for example, when *ett smafolk av gudar* is translated "a divine proletariat," instead of "a small fry of gods," which is closer to the Swedish idiom. But the reviewer knows from experience how hard Professor Nilsson's pithy, compact style is to render into English, and is, therefore, in a position to appreciate the fine job Professor Rose has made of it.

There is no need to pile Ossia on Pelion in praise of this book. Professor Nilsson's fame is too well established for that to be necessary. It is an honor and a pleasure to introduce it to American scholars, and to speak the word which best describes it—"indispensable."

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The Spirit of Chinese Culture. By FRANCIS C. M. WEI. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947. xii, 186 pp. $2.75.

This is a thoughtful, well written book, worthy of its author, a philosopher by training and bent, and president of one of the Christian colleges in China. Its six chapters were delivered as a series of lectures in several theological seminaries in the United States in 1946. Its subtitle, "an interpretation of the philosophy and religion of China," covers only part of the book's content. Besides giving his readers a sketch and critical appraisal of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism, the author deals with the appropriateness of Christianity's penetration of China, the ways it can best make itself at home, and how it can create a truly Chinese church. Dr. Wei has read widely in English, German, and Chinese literature on religion, and, during the enforced retreat of his college to the border of Tibet, in the last few years has evidently pondered deeply some of the questions which he raises. This reviewer has become chary of recommending a short list of books everyone who goes to China should read. None the less, he feels at the moment that every religious man, certainly every Christian, planning such a trip should study this one.

Deep in the book Dr. Wei says something which might well have been put in Chapter I: "The Chinese are, generally speaking, very religious people. Their family and community life fully vindicate this. People who speak of the Chinese people as being not religious have a strange conception of what religion is." This is important; else one might well ask—especially one who had just read Northrop: *The Meeting of East and West*—why all the pother? If the Chinese have been but lightly concerned about the mysteries of creation and life and death, have turned but a curious ear to missionaries from India, central Asia, and Iran, have worried merely about material existence and toyed charmingly with a few of the delights that go with it, then the Christian Church is surely wasting its time and substance in following on the heels of the Buddhists. A few hundred years from now the attempt at establishment of bases south and north of the Great Wall, together with all their educational and eleemosynary adjuncts, might make only another footnote to history like the ones we have now on Manicheism or Zoroastrianism under the T'ang. Dr. Wei shows convincingly that the Chinese have had a religious history, and may even have something to contribute to a world Christianity.

What kind of a church does he envisage for his own country? He offers these interesting suggestions. The social genius of the Chinese finds itself in the small compact community of intimate personal relationships. Hence Chinese Christians should make their "church cells" small, say 100 to 150 adult members, or 30 to 50 families. Religious meetings might be held in one or another member's house, or in an abandoned temple. If community wealth were sufficient a church building might be considered; architecturally it should style itself after a local ancestral temple. Here all social activities would center, and a family atmosphere would be fostered. The cell would have no paid ministers. Volunteers—preferably ones trained to the work—would share the work in their spare time. Several cells in a given area—interdenominational of course—would support a center of social service. The business of the Christian seats of learning, articulated with the whole Christian movement in China, would be to contribute vitally to the Christian thinking of every cell, and especially to the cells nearest to them. Finally, Dr. Wei lends the weight of his support to the idea of centers of Christian pilgrimage. As in many parts of the ancient world,

so in China, pilgrimages have played a great part. Sacred mountains and their like are places of beauty and sometimes of awe. Let Chinese Christians too have a few until "in course of time . . . the country is dotted with them." At each such spot would be erected an appropriate house of worship; adjacent would be a cemetery where "leading Christians are buried" (this scares the reviewer a little; why not cremate everyone and bury or scatter everyone's ashes roundabout?); nearby would be an inn, a library of devotional literature, and even a museum. On the great Christian festivals these places of pilgrimage would take life, and become centers both of recreation and edification. One might expand—let those stirred by these suggestions read the whole text. This reviewer finds the entire proposal appealing, especially as Dr. Wei urges inter-denominationalism to the limit, and naturally open Communion.

The author's knowledge of his country's literature and religious history is full and generally up-to-date, but at times he has nodded without importantly affecting his argument. For example, it was not the emperor Hsüan-tsung, but T'ai-tsung, who reigned when the famous pilgrim Hsüan-tsang returned from India (in 645). It was not T'ai-tsung, but Hsüan-tsung, who standardized the text of the Confucian canon (in 741). And this canon was not inscribed in stone and set up in front of the Imperial Academy until the years 836-841. Further, it was not Hsüan-tsung but Hsien-tsung who in 819 had a bone of the Buddha escorted to the capital. (Cf. Homer H. Dubs in *The Review of Religion*, Nov. 1946, pp. 8-14.) On pages 101 and 118 Dr. Wei contradicts himself. First he recognizes that the story of the coming of Buddhism to China in A.D. 67 following the emperor Ming's dream may be a myth. Next he tells us that in A.D. 335 the Chinese government first gave official permission for Chinese to take the Buddhist monastic vows. "268 years after the introduction of Buddhism into China could be definitely dated." As a matter of fact, scholars have long discussed a still earlier date: A.D. 65, when a small Buddhist community is known to have been functioning in northern Kiangsu under the protection of the Prince of Ch'u, own brother to the emperor Ming.

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Yung-ho-kung, an Iconography of the Lamaist Cathedral in Peking, with Notes on Lamaist Mythology and Cult, Vol. I. By F. D. Lessing. (Reports from the Scientific Expedition to the Northwestern Provinces of China under the leadership of Sven Hedin. Publication 18, VIII, Ethnography 1.) Stockholm: Sino-Swedish Expedition, 1942. XX, 179 pp. 32 pl.

It is not without considerable trepidation that the writer of this review, far removed from reference books, undertakes her task, in accordance with a promise made before leaving the United States. Her ignorance of the Sanskrit and Tibetan languages unfits her for criticism of many elements in the book. However, the author's profound erudition in these fields is well known, and other reviews by more capable hands dealing with these elements will doubtless be published, if they have not already appeared. Here, a few general comments will be presented.

First of all, this volume unquestionably contains information of great value, not only to those interested in Buddhist iconography in general and Lamaist iconography in particular, with which it principally deals, but also to students of religion, metaphysics, history, folklore and architecture, especially Tibetan and Chinese. Based on long and intensive research among documents in many languages, as well as on personal experience in China and Mongolia, including intimate contact with Lamaist cult objects and with learned lamas, it constitutes a veritable mine of knowledge.

The student of iconography will find a rich vein of information about the attributes, gestures *(mudrā),* retinue, etc., of various Lamaist divinities. As of special interest and importance, the description, explanations and illustrations of Samvara and his *maṇḍala* (pp. 117-38) may be cited. Included also is a long and detailed account of the Sung monk Pu-tai (the central figure in Hall I of the Yung-ho Kung) and of his later transformations and travels (pp. 21-37). Pu-tai holds an important place in the history of Chinese Buddhism, at least from the Ming dynasty on, but, as the author points out, he plays in Lamaism "the ludicrous role of a buffoon."

The student of religion likewise will find much to interest and excite him, e.g., in addition to the passages just cited, the explanations of four rites given in the Appendix (pp. 139-61). The important *homa* or fire ritual is included. Sections like that treating the significance of

Guhya-samaja (pp. 74-75), will have value also for the student of metaphysics.

Passing over the many typographical errors, which, as explained by the author, are largely due to problems of distance separating author and printer, we have two rather important criticisms of the book to make. First, the plan of the four volumes of which this work is the first seems to us not wholly satisfactory. The first three volumes are to be studies of the various halls of the Yung-ho Kung, while the fourth "will give a general introduction into Lamaist cult, iconography, etc., with a detailed analytical index" (p. XV). We think that this general introduction would find a more fitting place in the first volume. The many references to the "Introduction" (e.g., pp. 64-65, 71, 74, 82, 139, 142-43, 150, 153, 155-56 and elsewhere) tend to annoy and distract the reader. The same may be said of the references to material to appear in volumes II and III.

The Yung-ho Kung, being, as the author makes clear, (p. XIII) "in partibus infidelium," seems to us not the best possible basis for a detailed discussion of Lamaism. On the other hand, the present volume with its elaborate descriptions and involved explanations makes an unwieldy guide book. The isolation in the last volume of the guide-book material, which seems to us, in the part so far available, to interrupt the iconographic studies, would, we think, have made the work easier to use. Volumes II and III would then be open for studies of particular divinities, and the reader would have been prepared for them by the "Introduction" in Volume I.

Dr. Lessing informs us that the original plan to take up the halls of the Yung-ho Kung in numerical order has been altered. He will discuss in Volume II "The Terrible Deities,[1] Yi-dams, Lamas," covering halls 5, 11, 13, 15 and 16; and in Volume III, "The Buddhas, Bodhisattvas and Goddesses," covering halls 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10 and 12. Volume IV will contain, as first planned, a general survey and an index. This amended plan is doubtless an improvement, in that divinities in the same class or rank will be discussed side by side; but, in our opinion, it is by no means the best possible plan.

The second important criticism we have to make concerns the author's conception of the meaning of the word "iconography." We are

1. We should prefer to call the Terrible Ones "divinities," reserving the word "Deity" for the Godhead.

not sure that he gives a definition of this crucial word; we are judging from the use of the word in the book and from the fact that the book is called in the sub-title "an iconography." To us, the science of iconography is concerned not only with the identification of divinities, descriptions of attributes, etc., but also and more especially, with the significance of images and symbols, i.e., with the abstract principles which all images and symbols embody. As Dr. Lessing states more than once in the book, he is "chiefly concerned with the visible procedure (this with regard to a ritual, but it applies also to his treatment of images), not with abstract ideas" (p. 150).

Here we may state that we take exception to the description of certain symbols as "debased" (p. 1), "objectionable" (pp. 189-90), "obscene" (p. 70), and the like. In a scientific work, the reader has a right to expect an objective presentation. It would have been wiser, in our opinion, to let the illustrations speak for themselves in this regard, and to accept, as at least the authoritative meaning, the explanations given in the Lamaist scriptures and by learned lamas, instead of finding, "according to our conception, an obscene connotation." Reference in this connection may be made to *Peaks and Lamas,* by Marco Pallis, to the books on Hindu Tantrism by Sir John Woodroffe (Arthur Avalon), and to the works of the late Ananda K. Coomaraswamy. We regret our present inability to furnish detailed references.

A third and minor criticism concerns the insertion of interesting but irrelevant material. We may cite the long and intriguing note (5a to Hall I, pp. 163-65) about the bell. The valuable and fascinating stuff in this note could readily have been expanded into an article or even a book of great interest, not only to students of music and religion but also to the intelligent layman, and published elsewhere on its own.[2] Since, as the author himself inform us, "In Lamaist ritual bells play a rather insignificant part," we think it should have been condensed into a short paragraph here.

A mis-statement on page 21 may be noted. The author says, with regard to the *āsana* of Pu-tai, "This posture, called 'royal ease,' is met with in statues *(sic)* of monks and minor saints only." On the contrary, the *Mahārājalīlāsana,* or "Pose of Royal Ease," is characteristic of the Bodhisattva, second in rank only to the Buddha, who wears the crown

2. Dr. Lessing informs us that we may look forward to the publication of a more detailed study of Buddhist bells.

and royal ornaments and who has been well called "The Buddha as King." The six-armed form of Cintāmaṇi-cakra Avalokiteśvara, for example, and other forms of this important Bodhisattva sit at "royal ease."

The book is furnished with thirty-two plates, including many interesting and illuminating photographs, in addition to drawings and diagrams in the text—valuable iconographic aids—, as well as a plan of the Yung-ho Kung. The good bibliography of books and articles in European languages will prove valuable to readers.

In conclusion, we may say that this volume, beautifully printed and well illustrated, contains a wealth of authoritative information in various fields of learning and is well worth the serious attention of both scholar and layman interested in Lamaism and Lamaist art. Nor will students of Buddhism in general or those interested in Chinese history, architecture, and folklore seek in it in vain. The reader, however, to a large extent will have to work the mine for himself, at least until the promised analytical index to all four volumes appears (to be included in Vol. IV). The whole series will undoubtedly constitute a compendium of Lamaist learning to which all in this field will find it necessary and profitable to refer.

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Pathways through the Bible. By MORTIMER J. COHEN. Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1946. xxv, 549 pp. $3.00.

Journey through the Bible. By WALTER D. FERGUSON. New York and London: Harper & Brothers, 1947. xi, 364 pp. $3.50.

Despite the coincidence of titles, these two books have somewhat different readers in mind and different methods of procedure.

Pathways through the Bible seeks primarily to introduce the young Jewish reader to his Holy Scriptures, by means of an enjoyable, simplified version: an aim which does not exclude the adult or non-Jewish reader, but defines what he is to expect. In order to provide such a simplified version, the author has ably selected and arranged the biblical material so as to present a coherent, continuous narrative from Creation to the Restoration of the Temple, indicating the important major personalities and religious developments within this framework.

The biblical books remain under the three major divisions of the Hebrew Bible—the Law, the Prophets, the Writings—except for Ruth, which is placed between Judges and Samuel. But the "Latter Prophets" have been presented chronologically, and the selections from them also rearranged in probable or possible chronological sequence. In the process of selection most of the duplicate versions and unsavory (or too savory) material in the early books is eliminated, which would be loss for the biblical student, but is pure gain for the young reader. Chronicles and some of the minor prophets are omitted, which again is desirable in a preliminary reading of the Bible.

The beginning reader also obtains some idea of the geographical setting and historical background of his subject, for a few good semi-pictorial maps accompany the text and give local habitations to many biblical events which otherwise at first reading seem to take place in a dim no-man's land. Explanatory material also introduces each book and the various selections from a single book. These short introductions suggest the historical background and contemporary religious relevance of the passages, their relation to present Jewish festivals, and, in some cases, include rabbinical interpretations or recent critical theories.

It is good for non-Jewish, especially Christian readers, who are accustomed to regard the Old and New Testament as a unit, to see the Hebrew Scriptures at some time through Jewish eyes, as a completed revelation with autonomous meaning and value. Such readers may well be interested rather than repelled by the point of view of the book as a whole. Such a specific point of view and objective does, however, result in certain weaknesses. It leads the author to omit from his shortened version of Esther any mention of the vengeance which the Jews wreaked on the Persians, and to present the story as a deplorable example of anti-Semitism. It also seems responsible for the regrettable dependence upon depreciatory adjectives to describe the non-Hebrew religions in and near Palestine—for references to the "disgusting and horrible ceremonies" (p. 172) and "the lower religion of the heathen peoples" (p. 275).

Even an excellent choice of selections like Mortimer Cohen's will draw some criticisms. Job suffers seriously by being so stringently reduced. Those who regard the Bible as primarily literature will protest because Jephthah and his daughter have no place in Judges.

If something desirable is left out, however, much is included, and the author emphatically states he is not providing a substitute for the Bible. He has, in fact, more than fulfilled his modest promise of furnishing a "road-map," for he actually takes the reader through a representative portion of the Old Testament. The format of the volume is attractive: the type large and clear, the material of each biblical book divided into short, separately titled sections. The account is so edited that it moves along clearly and continuously, and one can follow along the main road of Israel's story without bewilderment and without becoming mired in genealogies, the fine points of the Law, or specifications for Noah's Ark, the Ark of the Covenant and the Temple. Of course, one must turn to the Bible for further study and to explore the byways—to examine Job at greater length, and to find Jephthah and his daughter. But if the layman wishes to make a preliminary, fairly wide acquaintance with the Old Testament and wishes to enjoy the experience, he has here an able guide.

Walter Ferguson, professor of English at Temple University, has written *Journey through the Bible* "in the hope that new readers may be attracted to the Book of Books and that veterans may catch a new zest in the old enterprise." In contrast to *Pathways through the Bible,* his survey assumes a mature, though non-professional interest, and the point of view is implicitly, sometimes explicitly Christian.

The scheme of the book is to follow the general chronology of the biblical content, briefly retelling or describing this content and interpreting it under the author's own divisions and chapter titles, "as critics examine books today." When the reader sees through Mr. Ferguson's eyes, the biblical characters become contemporaries. Eve looks like "a bisque doll" (p. 7). Moses' family are portrayed as "homespun Zipporah and her frowsy children" (p. 23). Nehemiah "seems more like an American than anyone else in the Bible—you could almost imagine him the charter member of a Rotary club" (p. 55). Esther is "the beauty queen" (p. 61). And where the biblical narrative is terse, one is urged to read between the lines. "How the tongues of Moses and Joshua must have run as they hastened down the mountain, Moses carefully holding the two tablets of stone, one in either hand, and Joshua assisting him past bushes or rocks so that the precious freight would not be scratched or damaged" (p. 25).

There are specific strong and weak points as the author proceeds in his survey. There are chapters, like those on Job and the Song of Songs, which clarify material that, at a first reading of the Bible, is difficult and confusing. There is a good summary of the events between Malachi and Matthew for anyone wholly ignorant of intertestamental history and literature. There are also unsatisfactory chapters. One may give a fair impression of Proverbs in eight pages, but Psalms merits and requires somewhat more space proportionally, yet receive the same. In the chapter on the life of Jesus according to the synoptic Gospels, the author emphasizes the close understanding between Jesus and John the Baptist because of their kinship, without mentioning the weight of evidence and critical opinion against such an assumption. There is an unavoidably inadequate presentation of Paul's life and thought, since the Thessalonian letters claim more notice than Romans, which is recognized as Paul's "most important religious utterance" but given almost no attention, apparently because "in literary effectiveness it is below the level of I Corinthians" (p. 299). And especially throughout the New Testament chapters, one feels that the author bases his interpretations on too limited and often not the most authoritative biblical scholarship.

There are also merits and defects in style: clever underlining of the implicit humor in many biblical incidents, arresting description, facility in retelling a story; and, on the other hand, a good deal of overwriting (words for words' sake), like the opening reference to Paul's letters: "Somewhere—perhaps in Ephesus—there could have been a golden cabinet of remembrance containing thirteen yellow parchments tied with a purple ribbon of love" (p. 288).

But such evaluation, and other specific criticisms one could make, still leave unanswered several basic questions which this type of book raises. In the first place, for most of its readers will it actually be an introduction to the Bible rather than a substitute? Secondly, assuming that the answer be "yes," is such an introduction desirable? Would a student or teacher of Shakespeare wish anyone, however untutored, to read a description and examination of Shakespeare's plays before reading the plays themselves? (To mention only one reason why he would not, such a procedure leaves the reader helpless to distinguish between description of the actual content and critical opinion.) Finally, is the amateur the best guide for the layman? If the Shakespearian scholar

advises the man in the street to accompany or follow his reading of the plays with some explanatory or critical book, will he recommend the work of a biblical specialist who has a keen amateur appreciation of Shakespeare? If the answer is "no" in the case of Shakespeare, there are equally good reasons not to welcome unchallenged the growing number of laymen's guides to and through the Bible.

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Die Probleme der Kolosser- und Epheserbriefe. By ERNST PERCY. (Acta Reg. Societatis Humaniorum Litterarum Lundensis, XXXIX). Lund: C.W.K. Gleerup, 1946. xviii, 518 pp.

Both the epistles with which this dissertation deals profess to have been written by "Paul, an apostle of Christ Jesus" (Col. 1:1; Eph. 1:1); in Colossians, "Timothy our brother" is named as co-author. There is no doubt that both were included in the earliest collections of the Pauline epistles, and that both were accepted in the ancient church without demur as authentic letters of the great apostle. Since the end of the eighteenth century, however, many competent critics have felt themselves compelled to deny the Pauline authorship of one or both of them; critical scholarship today is still divided in its verdict, but tends on the whole to accept Colossians as genuine and to reject Ephesians. It is admitted by all that the two letters present in different degree features of language, style, and thought which mark them out from the acknowledged epistles of the Pauline corpus: the question debated is whether these differences are of a character to indicate diversity of authorship, or whether they are susceptible of some other explanation.

In this dissertation, Percy offers to the learned world a most formidable defense of the authenticity of both epistles. He has made a fresh study of all the problems which have been raised and has treated them with a thoroughness which has not been approached by any investigator since H. J. Holtzmann.[1]

After a brief sketch of the history of the criticism, he examines the two epistles separately in respect of (1) Language and Style; and (2) Leading Ideas *(Gedankengehalt).* To this is added an exhaustive dis-

1. *Kritik der Epheser- und Kolosserbriefe* (Leipzig, 1872).

cussion of the Colossian "heresy" and a study of the relationship between Ephesians and Colossians, with a close examination of all the parallel passages and a general comparison of the treatment of similar ideas in the two epistles. The work is completed by chapters devoted to three particular problems—the purpose for which Ephesians was composed and its address, and the time and place of writing of the companion letters (Rome). It will be evident, therefore, that while Percy's work centers upon the question of authenticity, the investigation leads him to offer valuable contributions in every field of Introduction, and a great deal of careful and thorough exegesis of particular passages.

The treatment of the thought of the epistles in relation to Paulinism is the least satisfactory part of the work. Percy alleges that a number of characteristic Pauline theologoumena are faithfully reflected in these two letters, while they are either neglected or misunderstood in all other post-Pauline Christian literature. In his study of the word *sarx,* for instance, he claims agreement in usage between these epistles and the undisputed works of Paul, and proceeds: "Diese Übereinstimmung zwischen der Vorstellungsweise des Epheserbriefes und derjenigen der paulinischen Homologoumena is nun umso beachtenswerter, als die ganze nachpaulinischer Literatur . . . nichts Entsprechendes aufzuweisen hat" (p. 262); a similar claim is made with respect to Colossians (pp. 79-80). The argument, even if soundly based, is not decisive; it is not to be taken for granted that Paul had no disciples who were capable of apprehending his ideas accurately and of incorporating them into their own thinking. The most convinced opponents of the hypothesis of authenticity would all admit that the writer (s) of Colossians and Ephesians stand far closer to Paul than even the author of Hebrews, let alone Ignatius and other second-century men. Moreover it is not to be forgotten that we have very little literature from the second Christian generation, and none at all from the first, to use for purposes of comparison; we are not in a position to estimate accurately how many Christians of the time shared Paul's estimate of "the flesh." But, in fact, the argument is not soundly based, at least for Ephesians; it rests upon an erroneous exegesis of Eph. 2:11, where the word has none of the "ethical" sense given to it by Paul. "Gentiles in the flesh" here means simply "Gentiles in the literal, physical sense."

The suggestion is made that Ephesians, in certain respects, "die sonstigen Paulinen in einer Weise ergänzt, . . . den Schlüssel zu dem vollen Verständnis der uns in diesen . . . begegnenden Aussagen gibt." It is quite in keeping with this point of view that he should say, at the conclusion of his discussion of the *Gedankengehalt* of Ephesians, that 'der Verfasser des Epheserbriefs . . . , wenn er ein anderer als der Apostel selbst ist, mit seiner Paulusverständnis in der ganzen nachpaulinischen christlichen Literatur vor Luther ganz allein stehen dürfte" (p. 356). This common Protestant supposition that nobody between the first century and the sixteenth really understood Paul rests upon the naïve assumption that the Lutheran understanding of Paul is eternally and absolutely superior to that of all the Fathers and Doctors of the Church in all their generations. It must, however, be admitted that Luther no more assimilated the whole substance of Paulinism into his own teaching than did any of his predecessors; he selected and emphasized certain aspects of Pauline doctrine which had not been given such central and normative significance in any earlier period. This could only be done by neglecting or, at least, subordinating elements in Paul which had appealed more strongly to the theologians of the early church and of the Middle Ages, to whom the doctrine of justification by faith was certainly not the *praecipua pars evangelii,* as the Augsburg Confession has it. The letters of Paul have been a quarry for theologians of many different schools, but the use made of Pauline doctrines has always been eclectic; Paulinism as a whole—if we may use the expression in any intelligible sense—has been the foundation of no later system.[2] It is only on the basis of personal predilection that one may regard Ephesians in the first century or Luther in the sixteenth, as giving the key to a true understanding of the apostle's thought. Indeed, if it be true that Ephesians sets certain Pauline lines of thought in a clear light for the first time, this would perhaps be less satisfactorily explained on the hypothesis of authenticity than on that of Professor E. J. Goodspeed: "The writer of Ephesians was thus the earliest student of the letters of Paul—indeed, we may truly say, the first interpreter of them."[3]

2. Cf. the remark of Adolf von Harnack: "Paulinism has proved to be a ferment in the history of dogma, a basis it has never been," *History of Dogma* (tr. Neil Buchanan), I (London, 1894), 136.

3. *The Meaning of Ephesians* (Chicago, 1933), p. 10.

The real weight of Percy's work lies in its treatment of the peculiarities of style. It is doubtful if so complete and thorough examination of the stylistic features of a New Testament writing has ever before been made. Extensive and searching comparisons are made with the style of the undisputed epistles and of other Greek writings of the Hellenistic and Roman periods, Christian and non-Christian, which by their subject-matter afford any reasonable basis for taking them into consideration. The argument is twofold. On the one hand, it is alleged that the marked differences of style which are to be observed in Colossians, and still more noticeably in Ephesians, are much less conspicuous when they are laid alongside the occasional passages in the undisputed epistles which have a *liturgical* character. The differences are found to be not evenly distributed throughout the epistles, but concentrated in the first chapter of Colossians and the first three chapters of Ephesians—precisely in the areas which are themselves liturgical in tone. On the other hand, it is argued with much force, and with copious illustration, that there are a number of highly distinctive features of style which Ephesians and Colossians exhibit in common with the undisputed epistles, but which are scarcely to be found at all in any writer other than Paul. Now it must be admitted that, in previous investigations, there has been a natural tendency to fix attention upon the elements of style which distinguish Ephesians and Colossians from the other epistles of the corpus.

Yet it is of at least equal importance to observe the points in which general Pauline usage co-incides with that of these epistles. Such coincidences are, of course, significant only in the degree that they are not to be found in other writers also; they must be something more than commonplaces of the rhetoric of the age, and Percy believes that he has discerned a number of such features, "to which counterparts from other Greek literature are scarcely to be discovered" (p. 250). Percy himself admits that the argument cannot be finally decided in this field, but he is justified in claiming that his evidence, so far as it goes, lends strong support to the hypothesis of authenticity. In any case, whether it carries entire conviction or not, the very full exhibition of the stylistic phenomena is a contribution of the first magnitude to Pauline studies, and no serious student of the language of the New Testament can afford to neglect it.

Professor Goodspeed's hypothesis concerning the meaning of Ephe-

sians seems to be dismissed rather too cursorily. In particular Percy does not seem to have dealt at all with the claim that:

> Almost every line of Ephesians shows the literary influence of the known letters of Paul. What is more astonishing and significant, however—these letters almost completely satisfy his materials; that is, he seems to have used them and practically nothing else, except some touches from Luke-Acts and the Septuagint. . . . Paul himself could hardly have so rigidly confined himself to what he had previously written, still less to just that part of what he had written which has come down to us.[4]

The difficulties of the long interpolation in Eph. 3:2-13 are admitted, but the ease with which they are resolved on the Goodspeed hypothesis is not remarked. Certainly someone is here commending Paul—extolling his "insight . . . into the secret of the Christ" (v. 4, Goodspeed) in language which suggests the admiring epigone, rather than the apostle himself. Moreover, Percy finds an unreal difficulty in regarding the epistle as an encyclical addressed to all Christians, in certain expressions which seem to distinguish between the readers for whom the epistle is destined and other believers. He seems to think that this compels us to hold that it is "ein für einen begrenzten Leserkreis bestimmtes Schreiben" (p. 445). The only limitation, however, is the lack of a personal acquaintance with Paul; and this belongs to the entire pseudepigraphical setting.

It is a pity that there is no Index of the references to modern literature, so that, if one wishes to discover how the writer has dealt with the arguments of Dibelius or of Goodspeed, he is obliged to leaf through the five hundred odd pages of text with their multitudinous footnotes.

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Ma Joie terrestre ou donc es-tu? (Études Carmelitaines 26) Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1947. 380 pp. 120 frs.

The *Études Carmélitaines,* of which this volume is listed as the twenty-sixth, were issued semi-annually until interrupted by the devastating conditions of the second world war. They have now been resumed, and the most recent publication is a worthy successor of a notable series by Carmelite authors. This collection includes essays by

4. *Op. cit.,* p. 9.

various writers in addition to some well-known Carmelites. The index of title-headings indicate the scope of the undertaking: The Sources of Joy in Holy Scripture, The Joy of Jesus Christ, The Joy of Christians; upon which follow six essays on The Discovery of Joy, and as to whence it comes; another six on the Sites and Times of Supreme Joy, monastic, Hindu, the interior life of Christians, including an essay on Kierkegaard and his concept of the "instant"; with a final six under the title of The Supreme Joy and its Witnesses, citing St. John of the Cross and asking whether St. Dionysius the Areopagite may be ranked as Christian. The concluding essay, by P. Bruno de Jésus-Marie, gives the history of the Carmelite Order from Mount Carmel down to the French mystics of recent centuries.

The initial essay traces the note of joy in Holy Scripture, the joy in creation, for God, "the first author of beauty" (Wis. 13:3) saw all that He had made and it was good. In spite of sin, God chose man to be united to Him rejoicing "as the bridegroom rejoiceth over the bride" (Isa. 62:5). Man responds in the words of the Psalmist with "joy and gladness." In the New Testament it is recorded that Christ promised that "my joy shall remain in you, and that your joy may be full." (St. John 15:11) The second essay insists on the evident serenity of joy in the earthly life of our Lord, and notes that the term "man of sorrows" or its equivalent does not occur in the New Testament. This joy is traced to four sources: (1) His perfect innocence, (2) His unshakable confidence in God His Father, (3) the joy He found in service and self-sacrifice, (4) His joy in the spiritual awakening of His brethren, His joy over the revelation to "babes." The joy of Christians, it is said, should be today like that of the first Christians, who lived in a world much like ours in its break-up of political organizations and the consequent turmoil, yet the note of their lives was exultant joy, even in face of martyrdom. The Middle Ages gave St. Francis of Assisi, with the dominant note of joy, which was his legacy even to our day. And we may remember here that, for canonization, Rome requires evidence of joy together with heroic sanctity. There is a striking essay by a priest afflicted with Potts' disease and in constant suffering, entitled "Laughter and the Cross." He testifies: "I found my joy in the Cross and no man can take it from me." In eloquent words he describes the source of his joy, his union with Christ, his inner vision of the Blessed Trinity,

and his share in eternal beatitude even here and now. The group of essays concerning the "Discovery of Joy" deals principally with conjugal joys, and indicates their trinitarian character in the family life. A paper on humility arraigns the modern man for his over-activity, leading to nervous breakdown. Humility re-establishes the equilibrium broken by egotistic pretensions. "It puts us in our place."

The main theme of the "Places and Times of Supreme Joy" is that of the relation of solitude to supreme joy. It is emphasized, in the essay on the Grande Chartreuse and Carmel, that the monks do not retire to the desert for the sake primarily of penitential exercises, but because they are in love with God, and desire above all union with Him. The pure contemplative seeks God alone, and solitude is a necessary condition of that search. An essay on Christian solitude treats of solitaries living in the world, shows how some, though solitary, may miss the mark, but that the goal is reached when in serenity the soul finds within her Love Incarnate.

The witnesses evoked to express the supreme joy point to its consummation in the vision of God. The title of the volume asks the question: What is the source of terrestrial joy? and the answer is found here. Man, soul and spirit within a mortal body, can never find lasting joy in passing pleasure—he must seek it the world beyond. An essay devoted to an exposition of the teaching of St. John of the Cross quotes various passages from his works to express the supreme joy of the soul in its union with God, joy by the way of faith, faith in obscurity, for God is beyond human knowledge, to be known intuitively, however, through love, and love of its nature brings forth joy. In a further essay a great number of extracts from mystical writings are given on the general subject of the experience of God in darkness and obscurity, ranging from the Latin and Greek doctors of early Christian days to saintly souls of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The relevance of certain of the essays to the main topic is not very evident, yet the volume offers an organized whole in its setting forth of the source of true joy.

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The Philosophy of Being. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, Vol. XXI. Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America, 1947. 207 pp. $2.00.

Existentialism is the golden word of today, in many circles. To be existential in approach is to be modern, to be abreast of the times. This fact has brought about a rather interesting situation where thinkers and schools with decidedly divergent outlooks have come to be called, or want to be called, by the same name. And, indeed, St. Thomas Aquinas is also among the prophets. He is here made into the one who can most properly be called an existentialist.

> For these reasons the philosophy of St. Thomas has every right to be regarded as "existential" par excellence. But by the same token it would be the only philosophy which has any right to be so regarded. Consequently to speak of the "existentialism" of St. Thomas, if that were to imply that it is one of the many forms of existentialism . . . would be to confuse the issue. . . .

Without question this volume throws much light on modern existentialism in the broader beam of traditional Western presuppositions, especially those of the Aristotelian Catholic branch of Christian thought. Though homage is paid, almost incredulously to both Aristotle and Aquinas, there are genuine stirrings to get away from their apron strings, even enough to think with some independence on our grave modern issues of thought. The claim is actually made that Aristotle went as far as unaided human reason can go! And St. Thomas is over and over again treated as an oracle *sui generis.* Yet in many instances, there is a feeling that modern philosophy must work out its own inherent presuppositions without being crushed by the hard hand of mere tradition, and President Pegis in his live presidential address, says that Aquinas "was a teacher and disciple of revealed wisdom . . . rather than a philosopher," and that it is therefore necessary to give "Thomism an elaboration and development which it did not have of St. Thomas himself." And Professor Kiltzer, in an able paper, vigorously maintains that it is necessary "to keep philosophical thinking alive by confronting it with problems that have arisen since the time of St. Thomas." He also affirms that, even as Albertus Magnus dared to say that if Aristotle was human, he could make errors like any other human being; so Catholic scholars, followers of St. Thomas, "can make these statements our own charter of intellectual freedom."

Perhaps the most important point about this volume is that here ex-

istentialism is seen as a welcome means to escape the burden of a rigid past. Modern thought will not rest with Aristotle, and we seem to be in for a transition in the very presuppositions which govern the relation between time and eternity, to be arriving at perspectives far more adequate than those of the Greek philosophy, pre-critical as it was, necessarily, both as far as the larger and different view of the universe goes, but also as far as the Christian implications go as well. These are just being worked out in our age in a new and different setting, and Catholicism, always adjusting itself to different views as needs must be, is already groping for the newer and better setting.

The Annual Association Address, on "Existence and Philosophy," was written by Etienne Gilson and read to the meeting. It is well summarized as showing "the irrationality of existence without philosophy and the futility of philosophy without existence," while also explaining "how conceptual knowledge can respect the rights of existence." From Gilson himself the following sentences will give the clue to his paper:

> Existence is not a malady of essence, it is on the contrary its life; and since this life can diffuse itself only in other intelligible determinations, it is in its turn the source of new essences. . . . At the term of every ontology of existence, we meet a phenomenology which is clarified by its principles, but which also completes it; for phenomenology begins at the precise point at which thought makes the effort to grasp existence in its proper function as the cause of being, that is to say, in its vital and ever-renewing activity.

The Presidential Address, by Anton C. Pegis, on "The Middle Ages and Philosophy," comes like a fresh and welcome breeze. The "feel" of it is expressed by the thought that

> we are becoming . . . increasingly worthier heirs, because there are some indications in our day that we are willing to learn from the struggles and defeats of our teachers as well as from their triumphs. . . . We must guard against the power that we have to ruin philosophy and to stifle our intellectual lives, by forsaking existence. . . . Knowingly by means of concepts we are always open to the danger of finding in reality only that which can be contained in concepts.

Aquinas himself used philosophy too theologically. Philosophy has now as its task to find its own proper orientation for our day. Thomas himself was a vigorous existential thinker; scholasticism violated his spirit by slavish imitation; or at least it never worked out for itself "the deeply existential inspirations of original Thomism."

In a paper, "Existentialism and the Judgment," Father Henle "examines" the central act in the human knowledge process, the judgment, and points out the important relation which it has to existence "as revealed to us immediately in our sensory and intellectual experience of the material world according to the analysis of human knowledge by Thomas Aquinas." Father Renard goes on to show "Essence and existence as principles of being which constitute all finite realities and set them off from the unlimited being of God." Father Kiltzer treats "The Modes of Existence" in the light of "the unique yet all-embracing concept of being. The concept of being or reality is for us the ultimate frame of reference which relates all differences to each other, and beyond which the mind cannot move except to the simple denial of being." This is an insightful historical study, developing the road from "the analogy of attribution" to "the analogy of proper proportionality," which was possible only after Greek and Arabian Neoplatonists had prepared the way by their discussion of finite and infinite, unity and multiplicity. Only the Christian idea of a Creator "whose free creative will is the source of all reality, including the various modes of existence by which one being is distinct from another can adequately account for all modes of existence." The point is well taken that "analogy is less the answer to a metaphysical question properly speaking than it is an answer to a question in the order of our *knowledge* of being."

The Round Table Discussions contain some of the most interesting material, and some of the best written as well. They are on Logic and Methodology; Metaphysics; Psychology; Ethics and Philosophy of Society; Philosophy of Law and Government; and History of Philosophy. To me, the beautifully written paper on "The Challenge of Scholastic Legal Philosophy in a Revolutionary Age," by Ben W. Palmer, was especially stirring, for here was a man who, as a legal practitioner, brings in vital life, yet is grappling with the depths of the problems in a beauty of presentation which at times rises to first class literature.

I have left to the last, to me, the most vital paper of all, which actually belongs directly before this section. It is Father Phelan's paper on "The Existentialism of St. Thomas." He takes the view that the existentialism of St. Thomas is not a system but a wisdom. He then goes on in a most illuminating manner to discuss the contemporary crisis of philosophical thinking illustrated by the growth of existentialism "as

the problem of the intelligibility of existence." He never evades the problem of "the deep sense of the irreducible, individual, incommunicable act of existing which makes that which *is* to be a subject in its own right and as such incapable of being objectified in a concept." He knows and feels the depths of the searchings of modern existentialisms but sees also their one-sidedness. His own conclusion is that "it is as impossible to de-essentialize existence as it is to de-existentialize essence." With strength, he points out that being *(esse)* with St. Thomas is the act of all acts, basically, not a static something but a dynamic striving.

> The *esse* which each being possesses as its own inviolable property, so to speak, has been communicated to it by Him who is *Esse* itself. It is this transcendent communicability of being which constitutes the very warp and woof of the existentialism of St. Thomas and conditions the solution of all the problems of knowing, loving, acting and producing in his philosophy.

I shall make only three comments on this volume, which has a real place in the hands of every student of modern and past thought. (1) The Thomist tradition, by virtue of its Christian insights, has much vitality, some helped to expression by Aristotelian thought, but much thwarted from finding its own inherent strength. It is well, therefore, that Thomism examine its heritage and disentangle the foreign elements from the Christian perspective, which is more than ever needed in these days of confusion. (2) I cannot help wondering about the idea that Thomism is basically existential and that the growth of essentialism has been contrary to its genius. Did not St. Thomas himself maintain that "the first author and mover of the universe is an intellect"? Did he not put contemplation above emotion and will? Did he not maintain that "shared contemplation (is) better than solitary contemplation, because it is built of abundance of *contemplation*" rather than on fellowship? I know how he put faith on a level below the division of being into intellect and will, and in this sense stressed existential whole-response, and I know his strong emphasis on the dynamic in many instances; but is there not a strong support in his teachings for truth being prior to love? Such statements come to mind, and such a position was also taken by Father Phelan, as over against mine, at the Third Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion, in, I thought, St. Thomas' name. (3) I also wonder if some of us, including myself, had not better drop the term "existential." From Kierkegaard on, as far as the realm of religious truth goes, at least, it has had the connota-

tion that religious knowledge in terms of universals is impossible. Religious knowledge has come to be a term either taboo, or a term indicating the paradoxical, absurd, or infinitely riskful decision of the individual, where no theoretic theological foundation, no ethical applicability, no historic proof or progress, have any validity, being objectively external to the reality of the individual as a deciding being. If we believe that this severing of existence and essence has been carried to an impossible extreme by the "existentialists," irresponsibly making constructive knowledge impossible, should we then go on, nevertheless filling the term with new meaning, *accepting all the while, of course, the real truths of discontinuity which it rightly bears,* or should we abandon the term as a red flag and use new terms more acceptable for a new day, or else, again, should we fill our older terminology with whatever lessons have been genuinely learned from this modern existentialist debauch? Existentialism as a primary term indicates genuine and ultimate truth. Existentialism as an exhaustive category is self-contradictory and intellectually destructive, leading to lack of adequate guidance to a confused civilization.

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Pilgrim of the Absolute. By LÉON BLOY. Extracts from his works selected by RAISSA MARITAIN, and translated by JOHN COLEMAN and H. L. BINNSE. Introduction by JACQUES MARITAIN. New York: Pantheon Books, 1947. 358 pp. $3.50.

The theme of this book is Suffering– and "the frightful mockery of Progress." Progress aims to abolish or, at least, to diminish suffering. But neither has it succeeded in doing so, nor can it succeed, nor should it; this makes it a "frightful mockery," as Léon Bloy sees it.

Léon Bloy did not need the experience of our most glorious age; he died before the time of Hitler. But, nevertheless, he knew the

> Poor Man whose surprising destiny is to represent God Himself, the poor man who is externally vanquished, buffeted, flouted, raped, cursed, cut into pieces, yet who never dies—the poor man who is shoved under the table, like some piece of refuse, from Asia to Africa, and from Europe onto the whole world—without so much as an hour granted him to quench his thirst with his own tears or to scrape the crusts of his blood! (p. 314).

He knew also that Christianity had not relieved the weak man from his burden, but had made it heavier by an addition of spirituality.

These are the facts. But what about the possibilities? "Every earthly thing is ordered for Suffering. It is the beginning, just as it is the end, the only purpose and the very logic of history, the always agonizing birth pangs of the slightest change in the world's ecumenical story" (p. 314). "Suffering is necessary" (p. 275).

But is suffering good? Is it desirable, that is, something that ought to be? This is the crucial point; and the answer given by Bloy is poor and unsatisfactory. First of all, it is self-contradictory. The reason for this is an ambiguity rooted in the very heart of suffering itself. On the one hand, suffering is a curse, the consequence, the punishment for man's Fall, as reported in the Bible. Bloy considers suffering as a retribution for sin, and happiness as compensation for unjust suffering. He blames his friends bitterly for letting himself, his wife, and his children suffer. He complains of his suffering, and the way in which he speaks of the suffering of the poor man does not indicate that suffering in itself is a positive value. The obvious implication of all this is that suffering is an evil.

But, on the other hand, the most striking thing in Bloy's works is the ecstatic emphasis on the positive value of suffering. "You are always on the right side when you are with those who suffer persecution and injustice. . . . We know that there is no suffering without God being close at hand" (p. 348). "Only suffering here below is supernatural. The rest is human." "Man has places in his heart which do not yet exist, and unto them enters suffering in order that they may have existence." "A heart without affliction is like a world without revelation." "Suffering is the helper of creation" (p. 349).

"Would it not be enough to gather in a bundle, in a sheaf, all the wretchedness, all the afflictions of the poor, and all their sufferings? You would have the history of God" (p. 350). "The Lord of Lords is always thirsty for suffering" (p. 343). "Everything is vain except tears" (p. 326). ". . . that Cross of misery and glory" (p. 329). "The people of God—is everyone who is poor, everyone who suffers, everyone who is deeply humiliated. It is a vast flock in the wilderness, an infinite multitude of sad hearts in quest of Paradise. Some among them barely earn their bread, never have an hour in which to cultivate their souls and end by denying they have any" (p. 224). ". . . we are the

members of the Man of Sorrows, of the Man who is supreme Joy, Love, Truth, Beauty, Light and Life solely because He is the Lover eternally stricken with the supreme Suffering, the Pilgrim of the last torment! . . . God is the gushing fountain of inexhaustible Suffering" (p. 275). "You do not enter Paradise tomorrow, or the day after, or in ten years, you enter it *today*, when you are poor and crucified" (p. 300).

These quotations could be augmented to show the positive appreciation of suffering by Léon Bloy. They manifest a very genuine experience. But the way in which Bloy tries to reconcile this positive aspect of suffering with its negative aspect is not on an equal level. He attempts to do it with the vulgar idea of compensation serving as actualization of the positive value of Justice. He comes closer to the truth when he tries to describe more concretely the beatitude of communion with Christ's suffering, but he spoils this attempt by abstract interpretation in the fashion of a sterile theology. He is closest to the solution when he visualizes the supranatural or spiritual character of the positive value of suffering.

Broadly speaking, the negative aspect of suffering concerns the damage and deformation of the animal being of man; the positive aspect concerns the jubilant coming into existence of the supranatural or spiritual existence of man—by just the same suffering of his natural being.

"A sound mind in a sound body," this proverb regarded as a commonplace, contradicts the facts. But still more ridiculous than this proverb is the attempt to establish the pagan ideal of a harmony between the external and inner man, between nature and spirit, between body and soul, between aesthetics and ethics—on the ground of Christianity! Either-Or: this has become the motto for all genuine thinkers of recent times. Nietzsche chose body, "life," beauty, and nature; Kierkegaard chose spirit and God. Léon Bloy joins the latter, and so he finds himself in radical opposition to everything called *modern* and *progressive*; more than that, he finds himself, like Kierkegaard, in opposition to what figures at the present time as Christianity. The official Christendom, in Protestantism criticized by Kierkegaard, as well as in Catholicism, has forgotten that there is not and cannot be any compromise or harmony between earthly satisfaction, welfare, or pleasure on the one hand, and the spiritual existence of man on the other.

It is here that the most critical problem of our time appears upon the horizon, and urgently requires a solution. The man of today has become himself an instrument of the powerful instruments he has created, and, at the same time, has lost sight of any direction or reasonable goal for which to use them; he has lost the initiative and the strength of will to determine his way of using them. There is some truth in Bloy's words when he calls the "modern age the most iniquitous and stupid age" (p. 317). Statistics, calculation, recording of facts, modern man confuses with thinking, gregariousness with brotherhood, impersonality with unselfishness, and laissez-faire with freedom. Winning the treasures of the world, he loses his own soul, and bored by his own emptiness, unable to endure it, he escapes into what he calls fun or amusement, namely noise, senseless activity, and childishness. Modern man lives without knowing for what purpose. Only one purpose is obvious to him—pleasure. But it is *suffering* that makes man a person. All the pleasures of modern man are means to prevent him from becoming what he ought to be—a person.

One becomes a person only in solitude, apart from the crowd, and solitude is everywhere where God can be met. It is this solitude with God and with oneself as "the only one of my kind" which modern man hates most.[1] And this not only because he cannot stand his own emptiness, but because he needs "the others" in order to be firm about what he can believe to be true and good.

Thus, modern man has persuaded himself that not to be himself is a virtue, and to be himself is a crime, so he tries with all his power to be "objective," detached—like a stone. His pride is to be always, everywhere, and towards everything and everyone, the cool observer. He never feels guilty or committed to anything, for everything happens according to inexorable laws of nature. "There is nothing I can do about it" is the modern version of the biblical "Am I my brother's keeper?" And since the dominating law of life, according to modern science, is the survival of the fittest in the merciless struggle for existence, modern man may even convince himself that it is good to help nature, in the interest of progressive evolution, by pushing the weak ones down, instead of helping them back to their own feet

1. This may be the reason why the greatest writers, such as Emerson and Whitman, who both enthusiastically enjoyed solitude, are not adequately appreciated today.

again.[2] That is called "free enterprise," and he who acts against it is not called a good Christian, but, on the contrary, is considered to be a blasphemous utopian.

This is the world of the modern man, which must drive genuine Christians into radical opposition to what Léon Bloy calls "the frightful mockery of Progress." Industrial progress and the abominable species of the "modern man" seem to be necessarily coordinated with each other. But going beyond this factual situation which seems to prove the incompatibility of Christianity and Progress, there seems to prevail an incompatibility in principle. Industrial progress is essentially concerned with satisfying the external man; Christianity seems to be exclusively a matter of the inner man. Industrial progress tries to diminish and even to abolish human suffering; Christianity, on the contrary, sees in suffering the unavoidable way to human perfection and to God. And apart from that, progress is essentially a temporal affair; Christianity is a matter of a-temporality, of Eternity, and Otherworldliness.

The consequence of all this seems to be very simple and unequivocal, namely absolute disinterestedness in the external condition of human life: Let people hunger and drudge, suffer injustice and humiliation, pains and illness, and let them die! It is the will of God, since it is a well deserved punishment, and, besides, it has an educative influence on man.

It seems to me that Léon Bloy is not very far from this position, in spite of all his vehement denunciation of the heartlessness and stupidity of the rich and powerful lords of this earth,[3] and in spite of his complaint of the injustice and damage done to himself by the indolence of others. He is not a social reformer. He seems not to be interested in abolishing the external conditions of human suffering, but, rather, in making men feel their obligation to help the victims of bad external conditions. I do not doubt that Bloy shares the view of the medieval philosophers who considered poverty as necessary, since charity is good, and without poverty there would not be an opportunity to exercise charity!

It must be some inner necessity which drives the despiser of prog-

2. "The wretch must fall! Nothing would save him, for God Himself wants him to fall" (p. 39).

3. See pp. 214-15.

ress into the camp of an astonishing narrowmindedness, manifested, in the case of Bloy, in an astonishing nationalism and intolerance:

> Mankind is explainable and plausible only by means of France. . . . Whatever may be her infidelities or crimes, she (France) springs back to life under the blade of punishment. . . . Stop and think! God has only France! Were France to perish, the Faith, perhaps, would survive somewhere, were it in some polar nook, along with shivering Charity, but there would be no more Hope! (p. 324).

"The Protestant world surrounding me is beyond dispute ugly, mediocre, as devoid of the Absolute as possible" (p. 322). Protestant Germany is called the "renegade murderess" (p. 323). The collapse of "what the demons of the North have wished to call German culture is . . . the definitive and supreme flowering of Lutheranism" (p. 328). Luther replaced the Christian Cross by the Iron Cross, which the emperor of the heretical Germany offers today to murderers and incendiaries as reward for their crimes.

These quotations indicate bluntly the narrowmindedness of nationalism and intolerance, which are so far from Christian universalism and brotherhood. He who does not see and acknowledge genuine Christianity and inwardness in Bach and Rembrandt, in Luther, in German mysticism, romanticism, and philosophy—how can he advocate Christianity at all? Many will have noticed, when walking through the rooms of the Louvre, that they found nowhere else such an atmosphere of spirituality as in the small chamber with the Holbeins and Dürers. These, at least, are as "Christian" as any works of French art.

It is evident that escape from temporal affairs into eternity and otherworldliness does not prevent a person from participating, voluntarily or involuntarily, in very human and earthly affairs. Apart from that, according to Léon Bloy's own philosophy, there is no real separation possible of temporal events and actions from the Absolute and Eternal. "The least of our actions resounds down to infinite depths" (p. 337). And God "writes His own Revelation in the appearance of this world's events" (p. 330), or, of "historical events, looked upon as the divine hieroglyphics of a revelation through symbols" (p. 312). So it does matter what happens and what we are doing here on earth, for it has the eternal meaning of a Divine Revelation. But if it does, then human action has to be taken according to the

eternal standards of Christianity, since man is free and ought to obey them.

Now, speaking of progress, whether we like it or not, we happen to live in this our age with its industrial achievements, and we must make our decision what to do with it; not to make a decision is also a decision, because that means that we do not use our freedom. But first we must know what the meaning of progress is. Is there really any at all? The truth is that, in the long run, man will be unable to carry on the burden of modern civilization whose principle the idea of progress is, without having faith in its ultimate ends and values.

What set modern civilization in motion, was the belief that man's ultimate, genuinely Christian ends could be achieved by better external conditions, freeing man from want, drudgery, suppression, and the struggle for his existence. It was the belief that material abundance would deprive men of the causes which made them hate, envy, and fight each other, and care for the external man at the expense of the inner man. These expectations have been proved wrong, for we know now that man's power over nature can be used to destroy, degrade, and suppress men just as well. But this fact in itself does not disprove the idea of progress; it shows only that we have not yet found the right way to use our power.

Finally, it is a fundamentally wrong interpretation of Christianity to justify any omission to improve the material welfare of man by pointing to the positive value of suffering. The suffering which Christianity praises cannot be forced upon men by bad external conditions. These conditions can cause criminality and utter decay of the inner man just as well as they can help to make him a saint. The suffering which Christianity preaches must come from within. It is a matter of free decision. The paradigm of all Christian suffering, the suffering of Christ Himself, would lose all its greatness and absolute meaning, had it been forced upon the Sufferer from without, instead of being chosen voluntarily by Himself. And, in spite of the sanctity of Christian suffering, the New Testament, even still more emphatically than the Old, stresses the positive value of providing one's neighbor with *material* goods—food, clothing, shelter—softening his pain, healing him from sickness. Charity, the basic Christian virtue, becomes an empty word without that. The positive value of material goods is not denied by a single word in the New Testament. On the contrary, God

is praised as the creator and provider of them. Deploring the perishability and uncertainty of material goods and the exposure of bodily life to illness, pain and death, does not deny the appreciation of material goods, and of life, health, and pleasure themselves; on the contrary, it presupposes their appreciation. This positive affirmation of earthly happiness in spite of its essential unspirituality distinguishes Christianity fundamentally from Brahmanism and Buddhism. What is denied, however, is the indestructibility and priority of material goods over the eternal value of spiritual existence.

But what many modern churchgoers have still to learn, is that, due to the industrial environment, charity has changed essentially from a private affair to a matter of social reform. In our day, charity is a public affair and a matter of organization. At the present time, millions of our fellowmen can be condemned to suffer and to die by a single decision of the government . These millions cannot be helped through alms; modern relief organizations are the ways through which the weaker ones are helped by the stronger to survive, instead of being left to themselves to perish—according to the "Darwinian Code" which is the radical antipode to Christianity.

But if it has been resolved to choose the anti-Christian way, then the consequences must be thought of: it means to deprive our industrial environment of any positive meaning. It means to enslave the majority in the interest of a minority which must necessarily grow more and more bestial, unspiritual, pagan, wasting their material revenues in wars for power and in shamefully nonsensical "amusements." It means to help Spengler's prediction of the "Decline of the West" become true.

The other, the Christian way, is to put men on a higher level by making them free from fear and want—and making them free for spiritual tasks, just as man became free for civilization only after he had overcome a state in which he had to be on the alert every moment to fight for his life. He did not lose thereby his initiative for free enterprise, but his enterprising spirit turned towards higher goals than sitting in a tree with a club ready to kill or to be killed.

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BOOK NOTES

The Gilgamesh Epic and Old Testament Parallels. By Alexander Heidel. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1946. 269 pp. $3.50.

This is a companion volume to the author's *The Babylonian Genesis* (1942), and it follows the same pattern of presentation, namely, a translation of the text with few philological and exegetical notes and a long discussion on the O.T. parallels. Chapter I, "The Gilgamesh Epic" (pp. 1-101), contains an introduction and the translation of the epic. Chapter II, "Related Material" (pp. 102-36), offers translations of Sumerian and Akkadian deluge versions, The Atrahasis Epic, The Deluge Account of Berossus, Ishtar's Descent to the Netherworld, Nergal and Ereshkigal, and A Prince's Vision of the Netherworld, based on von Soden's publication. In chapter III, "Death and the Afterlife" (pp. 137-223), Heidel discusses the beliefs held in Babylonia and in Israel concerning the nature of death, the realm and condition of the dead, and finally, the resurrection of the dead. In chapter IV, "The Story of the Flood" (pp. 224-69), the author compares the Sumero-Akkadian versions of the deluge with that of Genesis. The book is thus divided in two parts, a translation of texts, and a comparative study of the belief and disbelief in immortality among the Babylonians and the ancient Hebrews.

As regards the first part, there is nothing but high praise for Heidel's industry. The translation of the epic is reliable and accurate. He deserves credit for having made available this great work of art, the most celebrated literary composition of the ancient Babylonians, to large numbers of intelligent readers.

Unfortunately, the same can not be said about chapter III. Heidel is, of course, right when he states that there was no belief in immortality in the Sumero-Akkadian religion. The positive evidence of outspoken disbelief in any kind of resurrection is very eloquent in the texts. But is not the same true also of the Old Testament religion? Heidel maintains that there are "passages (in the O.T.) which clearly and unmistakably hold out to the righteous the hope of a future life of bliss and happiness in heaven." Furthermore, he contends that there is evidence that the Hebrews of the Old Testament actually believed in a doctrine "of a resurrection of the flesh" (pp. 222-23). The evidence for these two assertions is Isaiah 26:19 and Daniel 12:1-3. These two passages are late. But assuming, for the sake of argument, that they are early, do they, in view of the overwhelming evidence to the contrary, change the picture? At best, we can say that this was the opinion of the author of Isaiah 26 and of Daniel, but it certainly was not the opinion of the ancient Hebrews as a whole. Immortality is not *a* problem but *the* problem confronting man. As a result, wherever a belief in immortality existed it constituted the very basis and essence of the given religion. One need not look for dubious passages and search for late pronouncements in the Talmud, in the New Testament, and in the Qur'an to prove a belief in immortality. It is there for everyone to see. This is not the case in the Old Testament.

In conclusion this reviewer wishes to express regret that the book was produced in offset instead of in print. A little more courage and imagination on the part of our great university presses are in order.

I. M.

India: A Synthesis of Cultures. By KEWAL MOTWANI. Bombay: Thacker and Company, Ltd., 1947. xx, 319 pp. Rs. 7/14.

The author's view of the seriousness of the Indian situation is stated at the end of his study:

> In India, we are witnessing a social dislocation on a large scale. The stage is set for an epidemic of crises which will take the form of famines, communal squabbles, crime on a large scale, civil war. To stem the tide of this social disorganization, which will probably be a long drawn-out process, should be one of the primary duties of those who still entertain some love for what India stands for (p. 309).

Dr. Motwani, who is, according to the jacket, an experienced lecturer and writer, offers as his solution of India's needs special attention to sociology in education from High Schools up; development of schools of social sciences in the Universities; the creation by provincial and central governments of institutions of research and training in public welfare and organization; and the establishment of departments of public welfare, both provincial and central. Along with this, the author states as the purpose of his book: "To define the uniqueness of the Indian culture and its spiritual values; to focus attention on the significance of the social disorganization so widely prevalent at present, and to indicate the technique for meeting the challenge of today" (p. 21).

He then devotes two chapters to a sketch of Indian history and culture. Here the western reader cannot help feeling that the author lets himself go much as a speaker at Union Square, or some similar place, would do, addressing his audience with lack of restraint and balance. His review of Indian history and culture is interspersed with tirades against the West, especially the United States, its economic organization, specialization, and democracy. "Democracy and dictatorship are the twin children of science and machine" (p. 191).

The author is a student of Manu, and has written on that lawgiver under the title, *Manu: A Study of Social Thought,* and yet he says, after describing the four *varṇas,* ending with the Sūdra, "According to Manu, there are no other groups" (p. 123).

At the end of Chapter V, Dr. Motwani seems to realize suddenly that India has to live with the West, and that the latter has a great deal which the former needs. "Science and the machine have come to India to stay" (p. 272). He turns to planning-synthesis and accepts specialization, which he had decried before.

A book of this kind is the despair of an outsider interested in India, containing, as it does, so much of overstatement and the slurring over of facts.

GEORGE W. BRIGGS

The History of the Jews of Italy, by CECIL ROTH. Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 5706–1946. xiv, 575 pp. $3.00.

This is the first comprehensive treatment of a subject which had been studied somewhat unevenly in its various phases and aspects. The author, a distinguished student of both Jewish and Italian history, covers the history of the Jews in Italy from classical antiquity down to 1945. Political, economic, and cultural developments are given equal attention, and the characteristic differences of times and places are duly noted. The well written book includes an amazing wealth of interesting details that are unknown except to the specialist and provide significant sidelights, by similarity and by contrast, to the tragic events of our own time, which are soberly reported in the last chapter. The author shows not only a full command of the sources but also critical judgment, and an understanding of the general developments and their causes. A full index facilitates the use of the work for reference purposes, but the absence of any documentation or bibliography is to be regretted.

PAUL OSKAR KRISTELLER

The Language of Faith. Edited by NAHUM N. GLATZER. New York: Schocken Books, Inc., 1947. 128 pp. $1.50.

It was a happy idea that moved the Schocken house to launch its Schocken Library of books expressive of the best in Jewish thought and experience in convenient format, beautifully printed, and reasonably priced. Heading the series is this selection of Jewish prayers, with English translations on facing pages. The selection is a judicious one, ranging over the vast field of Jewish literature, and including prayers is Hebrew, Aramaic, and Yiddish. One is particularly grateful to the editor for having tapped little known sources of devotion, the Kabbalistic-mystical and the popular pietistic. The division of the book into seven sections, according to the functions of the particular days in the scheme of creation, aids in the comprehension of some of the selections.

This reviewer fully agrees with the statement that "even the familiar prayers acquire a new meaning when they are taken out of their biblical or liturgic context," but a new meaning is not necessarily a richer meaning. Quite the contrary, for in the realm of religious experience context is essential to content, and any tampering with the former impoverishes the latter.

On the jacket of the book is a declaration that the "translation strives faithfully to reproduce the living emotion and directness of speech of the original." In this respect, the translators seem to have been influenced by the

views of Franz Rosenzweig, who, confronted with a similar problem, concluded that it was the task of the translator "nicht das Fremde einzudeutschen, sondern das Deutsche umzufremden." Apparently here, too, the translator's task was conceived not as Englishing the Hebrew, but as Hebraizing the English—a procedure which may be seriously questioned. For example, what is gained by a peculiarity of construction such as, "My God, the soul you have placed in me pure is"?

The translations were made by Jacob Sloan and Olga Marx. The former, with the exception of the aforementioned mannerism, combines faithfulness to the original with pliancy of phrase and elegance of rhythm. Here and there one stumbles over an unnatural idiom, such as "to watch the words of the Torah," but, on the whole, his translations are readable and resilient. But Olga Marx takes undue liberties with the original. Her translations are qualified as "free," but the question remains how far freedom can go without becoming license. Some of her translations are more in the nature of a paraphrase of the ideas of the original than a rendering of it into English. A line which, in a literal translation, would read, "My Rock, and give my portion in thy law," becomes, "Compel me to obey, my Rock, what you ordain" (p. 62), which is certainly violence done to the author. There are also occasional interpolations, for example, where the poet celebrates the future return to Jerusalem, the translator enlivens the scene with "dancers will move to a lilting refrain" (p. 104), a line not in the original. Sometimes these liberties completely pervert the spirit of the original. The prayer recited by Jewish women at the close of the Sabbath, breathing utter humility and self-effacement, "Enter my house, O Lord," is accorded the following cavalier rendition, "Dear my Lord, oh, come and be here inside this room with me."

It is a pity that these and similar extravagances detract greatly from an otherwise splendid little book.

SHLOMO NOBLE

Studi su l'Antica Apologetica. By MICHELE PELLEGRINO. Rome: Edizioni di "Storia e Letteratura," 1947. xii, 210 pp.

It is pleasant to welcome this collection of scholarly studies in the Christian Apologists by an Italian scholar, published in an attractive format last year. The studies themselves make no startling new contributions but increase our knowledge of the subject helpfully at several points; Pellegrino shows a good acquaintance with the authors and the immediately relevant literature, although perhaps not as much as might have been useful of related fields. The most general study, "The propagandistic and protreptic element in the Greek Apologists of the second century," proves, at perhaps excessive length, that the Apologists appealed for conversion as well as pleading for toleration, and notes parallels in the form of their writings to the literature of philosophic exhortation. Some particular items are noted as examples: e.g., Justin's wish that someone would mount on high and proclaim the truth (II, 12, 7-8) has a

remarkable number of parallels, running back to Socrates standing before the Athenians on the one hand, and the messengers who brought good tidings to Zion on the other. There follow more detailed analyses of the structure of the *Embassy for the Christians* of Athenagoras (Pellegrino defends the clarity of the Apologist's argument, but admits that his general plan is more orderly than the detailed arrangement), and the apologetic themes in the works of Cyprian, for whom Pellegrino properly vindicates a place in this series. The last study deals with Minucius Felix as a source of Lactantius. Pellegrino adds considerably to the parallels listed in the CSEL edition of Lactantius; one interesting group shows us Lactantius, evidently reading a section of Cicero's *De natura deorum* with his predecessor's work in hand, profiting by his use of the passage (on the philosophical testimony to monotheism), but making his own direct use as well (Minucius, *Octavius* 19; Lactantius, *Divine Institutes* v, 16-23). Elsewhere, when necessary, he adapts Minucius' statements to the changed conditions of his time. As in other fields of literature, such study of forms is a useful piece of scholarship, and definitely assists our understanding of the aims and methods of the authors.

E. R. Hardy Jr.

Memoir on the Nature of the Church of Christ, on its Fundamental Law, and on Christian Life. By Apostolos Makrakis. Translated from the Second Edition by D. Cummings. New York: Christian Brotherhoods Zealots of Orthodoxy and John the Baptist, 1947. vi, 168 pp. $1.50.

Divine and Sacred Catechism as Taught by the Holy Spirit and Its Official Instruments from the Day of the Pentecost until the Last Ecumenical Synod, Expounded in Comparison and Contrast with the Contradictions and Misinterpretation of the Devil. By Apostolos Makrakis. Chicago: Hellenic Christian Educational Society, 1946. iv, 224 pp. $2.00.

There is no reason why these two books should not be reviewed together, for they supplement each other as the work of an ardent Greek Orthodox priest who devoted his long life to an exposition of the Orthodox Faith at that moment when the Church of Greece was just emerging from centuries of Turkish domination to the possibility of a new and free spiritual life. They also supplement the two volume work by the same author, *A New Philosophy and the Philosophical Sciences,* which appeared in English in 1940.

These books reflect the ideas and methods of thinking of a scholarly and devout priest of the Greek Orthodox Church in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Makrakis was unsparing in his denunciation of those ideas both within and without his own Church, with which he did not agree, or which he felt were contrary to the truth. At the same time he was endeavoring to present the positive side of Orthodox Christianity as he saw it. There are few books on the Orthodox Faith in English which will be of

more value to the person who endeavors to learn what the Orthodox Church stands for in the realm of modern Christianity.

The translators and editors deserve the thanks of Christian scholars everywhere for this undertaking. They have done an important task in a careful and dignified manner, and while there are a few misprints and awkward expressions, these do not obscure the sense of the work or hamper its use by all those who are desirous of learning the actual teaching of Orthodoxy in its Greek form.

C. A. M.

Proofs of the Authenticity of the Septuagint. Chicago: Hellenic Christian Educational Society, 1947. 32 pp.

A polemical defence of the traditional account of the Septuagint, intended to supplement the volumes of Makrakis reviewed above, and published by the same group.

Comparative Religion. By A. C. Bouquet. New York: Penguin Books, 1946. 240 pp. 25 cents.

Students and teachers of the history of religions should be grateful for this handy new edition of Dr. Bouquet's valuable work, which covers so large a field with such admirable brevity and clarity. The author has ranged through vast areas of knowledge with an inquiring and unprejudiced mind, and presents us with the fruit of his labors in a style delicately spiced with quiet humor reminiscent of Jane Harrison (it seems to be the English scholar who is best able to combine charm with erudition).

Chapter VII, "The Phenomenon of India," is especially valuable as a guide through the labyrinthine ways of the jungle of Indian religion. But the author seems a trifle unfair to Buddhism in his statement that "neither Buddhism nor its parent Hinduism has any actual place for what in the West is called social service. The effect of seeing a pauper's funeral worked quite differently in the respective cases of Gotama and Anthony Ashley Cooper. The former saw in it a reason for leaving the world. The latter saw in it a challenge to transform the social order" (p. 133). Gotama left the world only temporarily to find the cause of suffering, and when he had found it, he returned to the world to spend half a century in arduous missionary work, the aim of which was not "to transform the social order," but to transform the spiritual life of mankind. Also, it is noteworthy that Ashoka, in his Rock Edicts, gave the teaching of the Buddha as the basis for all his humanitarian reforms, and, it is a matter of history that, in many lands, Buddhism has done a great deal to elevate and ameliorate social conditions.

M. B.

The Christian Future or The Modern Mind Outrun. By Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy. New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1946. xii, 248 pp. $2.50.

This little book is more of an extended sermon on the spiritual maladies of America and how to cure them than a developed and systematic exposition of the author's views. As a distillation, in a familiar and aphoristic mood, of his historical-dialectical conception of Christianity, built up over years of study, teaching, and social work, it is not without charm and bears the marks of the loving-care and humanity of its author. It may, however, seem strange, cryptic, and obscure to the unsophisticated reader who is not familiar either with the detailed history of the Church and Christianity or the dialectical school of philosophy, both Hegelian and Marxian.

"The Modern Mind" he finds characterized by prudence, pragmatism, and Deweyism. By this he means the "alienation," particularly in the Marxian sense, which has overtaken the individual in this era when "Man in the factory is treated virtually like an inanimate object" (p. 16). In the too perfect adjustment of man to the conditions of modern life occurs a destruction of man's creative powers which, he fears, will make any future at all impossible. "Future means novelty, surprise; it means outgrowing past habits and attainments. When a job, a movement, an institution promises nothing but treadmill repetition of a given routine in thought and action, we say correctly, 'There is no future in it.' " (p. 61).

The "Future," as he sees it, is similar to the ones Rousseau, Hegel, Marx, even Nietzsche hoped for. The question then is, why will this be "The Christian Future"? He arrives at this confidence primarily by a translation of traditional Christian dogmas and conceptions into what are essentially dialectical conceptions of the relations of man and nature, man and society, and man and history. This is not such a *tour de force* as it might seem, for, as he points out (p. 129, n.3), Hegel's thought was based on a study of Christian history. On the other hand, by the same token, he translates basically Hegelian-Marxian notions into Christian ones.

This dialectically conceived "Christian Future," is offered, nevertheless, as a peaceful alternative to the revolutionary theories of Marx's contemporary followers. But, apart from reading or writing such books as this one, or the experience of voluntary community service such as Camp William James, in Vermont, or the Quakers' work camps, the author offers few suggestions as to how this new attitude and a renewed future are to be brought about. It is doubtful whether these proposals can be an effective alternative to a *futurum saeculum* which is ever more and more secular, and only *Christianum,* as the author admits, incognito. Nevertheless, to all humanists, Christian and non-religious alike, Rosenstock-Huessy does offer a richer and profounder vision and a conception of human life that far transcends the contemporary condition of man.

Charles Trinkaus

Unity and Difference in American Life. Edited by R. M. MacIver. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947. 168 pp. $2.00.

This volume represents the third series of addresses on Group Relations inaugurated by the Institute for Religious and Social Studies three years ago. The lectures were given while we were still at war, but the value of the book has not been lessened by the delay in publication. The time lag only serves to underscore the wisdom of the group in its efforts to analyze and anticipate the emergence of group tensions in the post-war period. It also helps to emphasize the long range character of the problem.

Primarily the book pleads for the discovery and affirmation of the common factors in our national culture within which healthy differences may develop and find meaning. Differences which tend to separate and antagonize and destroy must be exposed and uprooted, if we are to fulfill the American way of life.

The series of lectures were given in three sections—"The Common Ground," "The Dividing Issues," and "What We Can Do About Them." It is interesting to note that in the first two sections spiritual and religious issues received special although somewhat limited consideration. In the last section, however, separate chapters are devoted to what the schools, the press, business, and the courts can do, but nothing is said about what churches and religious organizations can or should do.

It is true that, in the final chapter, the editor devotes several paragraphs to warning religious groups to avoid "the spirit of exclusiveness." The activities, however, of such groups in supporting released time programs in the public schools, and the like, are ignored. It is a surprising omission, and one that it is hoped the Institute will rectify in future programs.

The publication, however, serves as a useful introduction to the problem of unity and difference in our national life, and its plea for the "cooperation of differences . . . not the removal of differences," is an objective that is both noble and necessary.

Ormsbee W. Robinson

CORRECTION

In a review of *Am I My Brother's Keeper?* By A. K. Coomaraswamy, published in our May issue, the price was given incorrectly as $4.50. It should have been $2.25.

AMONG THE PERIODICALS

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